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ABSTRACT
While there has been extensive research on acquisitions primarily from a finance 
perspective, little research has specifically addressed the acquisition decision process 
This thesis is intended to address this problem by examining three areas A) How 
companies search for acquisitions and how they collect information, B) What criteria 
companies use to examine acquisitions and how these are applied, and C) How does 
experience and the management resources available influence the process and success
Data on the acquisition process were collected using 51 interviews with 48 companies 
within the United Kingdom Additional data was collected from corporate reports and 
financial databases Success was measured using 3 scales based on Datta and Grant 
(1990)
All companies limited the industries that they searched in looking for potential 
acquisitions. There was, however, variation in how broad these limits were Some 
companies limited the geographic areas that they searched This was correlated with 
higher success levels than those companies that operated global searches or did not 
explicitly limit the area they searched. The source of the idea to consider a specific 
acquisition was found to be correlated with success, with external ideas performing 
worse than internal ones. No relationship was found between levels of information 
collection and success
As predicted by the finance literature most companies used discounted cash flow 
analysis as a decision criterion. Few companies, however, used only discounted cash 
flow analysis. Most also used, payback, accounting rate of return and earnings per 
share dilution The use of non finance criteria was also widespread However, these 
were not as important as finance criteria.
Discounted cash flow analysis was found not to affect success levels A number of 
explanations for this were explored
Experience of acquisitions by the company and individuals concerned was found not to 
affect success Experience of the industry and company by the individual managing 
the project was, however, found to be positively correlated with success
No simple relationships between success and management resources available, or the 
number of consultants used were found However, a negative relationship between the 
use of merchant banks as advisers and one success measure used was found
xxv
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Cha nte r  1 INTKOIHK I ION
Acquisitions are a major feature o f modern corporate life. They dominate the financial 
headlines They attract the attention of regulators, politicians, academics, and trade 
unions. They are constrained by legislation at national and international levels They 
can rapidly transform an organisation and the lives of its employees Their impact on 
society and employees are studied The motives and benefits to shareholders are 
examined, yet relatively little is known about how these decisions are made and 
whether this influences success or failure The aim of this thesis is to develop a better 
understanding of how companies make acquisitions and what make acquisitions 
successful.
During the late eighties' acquisition activity in the United Kingdom increased 
substantially. Over 135 billion pounds was spent on acquisitions between 1985 and the 
end of 1989. During the early nineties recession, activity has, however, remained 
significant with approximately 110 billion spent on acquisitions in the 5 years between 
1990 and 1994.
The driving factor behind these acquisitions does not seem to be conglomerate 
mergers which characterised the sixties boom, but companies focusing on core 
activities 1 The main empirical evidence on acquisition decisions is, however, provided 
by Kitching (19672, 1974), Birley (1974, 1976) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) 
Many of Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) cases, however, are from before 1985
This thesis will attempt to address this problem by examining acquisitions conducted 
after 1988 Before examining the acquisition decision process in greater depth this 
chapter will addrcsithrec issues raised above. First, it will outline what this thesis will 
cover Second, it will explain why the researcher thinks the acquisition decision needs
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researching In the third part of this chapter the researcher will establish that a 
framework, to serve as a structure for the rest of this thesis, is required This will then 
be developed The chapter will conclude by using this framework to present a brief 
summary of some key findings. The researcher will begin by stating the problem to be
addressed.
1.1 The Problem
The question this thesis will address is: How do companies make decisions to acquire 
other companies? It will examine the internal management decision making processes 
from the idea to the conclusion of the bid.
To reduce this topic to manageable proportions, the researcher chose to limit the 
fieldwork to the United Kingdom. This was done because the researcher had no 
funding to cover overseas trips, and thought interviewing outside the United Kingdom 
would be too time consuming. Given this limitation, the researcher chose not to 
examine specific issues surrounding cross border take-overs, because no multinational 
comparison would be possible. The sample frame was therefore limited to, 
acquisitions where the analysis work and decision making, mainly took place within 
the United Kingdom
Second, the researcher thought it would be difficult to collect information on the 
negotiation phase He therefore chose to exclude specific hypotheses on it. Thus this 
research will study the acquisition process from idea to final agreement of a deal, but 
not the negotiation tactics. The writer will now explain why this process needed 
studying
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1.2 Why?
There were 3 reasons for examining the management process before an acquisition 
decision first, the scale of acquisition activity; second, researcli suggests that many 
acquisitions fail, third, there is little research on the decision processes within an 
acquiring company.
1.2,1 Scale of Acquisition Activity
During the mid-eighties the scale of acquisition activity increased markedly. As figure 
11 shows, during the last 10 years there have been over 16 ,000  acquisitions in the 
United Kingdom Activity peaked at about 2000 deals per year in the late eighties 
(Acquisitions Monthly 1989, 1987). More significantly perhaps, it shows that the 
number of acquisition in the United Kingdom remained above the 1000 deals level 
during the early nineties, a period of recession Activity has since increased it though 
has not regained its late eighties peak. In comparison activity in the early seventies 
boom peaked at around 1200 deals in both 1972 and 1973, falling to below 300 deals 
per annum in 1975 and 1976. (Figure 1.2)(Gray and McDermott 1989:8) It should be 
noted though that, the data in figures 1.2 and 1.1 do not match for the period which 
they overlap The researcher is unclear why, both sets of data, however, are valid 
indications of trends and the high level of activity in the United Kingdom
The volume of resources involved also is large, as figure 1.3 shows; with a peak in 
1989  of 4 5  billion pounds and activity remaining above 15 billion3 pounds per year 
spent between 1991 and 1993, and peaking at 70 billion in 1995 This compares to
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I »>88 to 1995
Figure 1.1 Total Numl>cr of Acquisitions in The United Kingdom
Source Acquisitions Monthly Annual Review 1997,1995,1994, 1990, 1988, and 1987 
Note - These data were not collected before 1985.
Figure 1.2 Number of Acquisitions in The United Kingdom 1971 to 1987
Source Gray and McDermott 1989:8
Note - These data do not match the data collected by Acquisitions Monthly. Precisely 
why is unclear .
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F igure 1.3 Total V;ilue of Acquisitions ill The
United kingdom 1985 to 1994
Source Acquisitions Monthly Annual Review 1997,1995,1994, 1990, 1989,and 1987 
Note - These data were not collected before 1985
That is the late eighties, a period of boom for merger activity, has gave way to a 
lower level of activity in the nineties, followed by a boom in the mid-nineties 
Acquisition activity has, however, remained consistently above the 1000 transactions a 
year level Comparison with the previous boom in the seventies is difficult because of 
inflation and the differences in collection of statistics. Expenditure in that boom 
peaked at 2.53 billion pounds in 1973 (Gray and McDermott 1989:9)
Acquisitions are thus important because of their number and the volume of resources 
involved They seem to have become a permanent part of British corporate life, as, 
unlike previous merger booms, the number of transactions does not seem to have 
dropped to the same degree ' Examining acquisitions therefore seemed worthwhile, 
because of the scale of the resources committed to them by managers, and their 
continued use as a method of corporate growth
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This researcher's second reason for examining acquisitions was their poor 
performance
1.3 Performance Record of Acouisitions
I he returns from acquisitions to the purchasing company have been at best modest 
Porter (1987) found that 60 per cent of the 2021 acquisitions made between 1950 and 
1980 by 33 large American companies into new areas had been divested by 1985 The 
problem with this measure of success is that it fails to distinguish between a profitable 
sell out for a large gain from a sell-out for a loss.
Kitching (1973) found 50 per cent of the 400 acquisitions in his sample were, 
according to the executives, failures or not worth doing Hunt et al (1987) found that 
managers assessed 36 out of 80 acquisitions he examined as not being successful. 
Excluding the above work (Porter 1987, Kitching 1972, 1973, 1974 and Hunt et al. 
1987) research has predominantly been within a finance methodology focusing on 
whether acquisitions increase or decrease shareholder wealth This literature has found 
that returns to acquiring shareholders are at best small but that the selling shareholders 
tend to gain The evidence is, however, not clear cut and is worth briefly examining
1.4 Shareholder Gains in Acquisitions
Over the last 15 years there has been extensive research on shareholder returns in 
acquisitions, using event study methodologies An event study methodology compares 
equity returns to a normal benchmark, over periods around the acquisition 
announcement Differences from the benchmark are attributed to the event The 
market is assumed to be efficient and therefore all information available is incorporated 
into the price 5
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Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review of research, concluded that, in total, corporate 
take-overs generate gains This result is supported by Mandelker (1974), Asquith 
(1983), Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988), Franks and Harris (1989) and Franks, Harris 
and Titman (1991).
Who gains is less clear-cut. Jensen and Ruback (1983) found that in studies they 
examined, target firm shareholders' gained a weighted average abnormal return of 29 
per cent over the 60 days around the announcement date, this compares to 3 81 per 
cent for bidding firm shareholder's. In contrast, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) 
concluded that acquiring firm shareholders were not better off after an acquisition 
These studies, however, are based on American data This research though, uses a 
British sample frame. It thus seems more relevant to examine studies based on British 
data
Franks and Harris (1989) used a sample of 1814 companies acquired between 1955 
and 1985 in the United Kingdom. To reduce benchmark problems they used 3 different 
benchmarks. 6 Two benchmarks generated significant positive returns to both sets of 
shareholders.7 The third benchmark generated negative returns to the bidding firm's 
shareholders, the difference was attributed to the acquiring companies outperforming 
the market by almost 1 per cent a month before the bid. The normal return was thus 
based on a period of abnormal returns Franks and Harris (1989:249) thus conclude 
that, 'the post-merger performance of bidders depends on the benchmarks against 
which bidders are evaluated '
In the light of this evidence Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) used four different 
benchmarks to examine the problem of sensitivity to the choice of, and inefficiency of, 
benchmarks 8 Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) suggest earlier studies may be suspect 
because the portfolios they used to generate normal returns, generate abnormal returns
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related to size and dividend policy. Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) conclude ' they 
(the benchm arks in previou s studies) are likely to generate negative performance for 
larger than average acquiring firms even if performance is favourable '9 (Franks, 
Harris and Titman, 1991:86) They thus attribute bidders negative post-merger share 
price performance in previous research as probably due to benchmark errors, primarily 
size effects. This approach appears to correct many of the faults of earlier market 
based measures It, however, does not solve one problem posed by Franks and Harris 
(1989:247) that 'bidders may time take-overs to coincide with favourable performance 
by their own stock ' Post acquisition performance will thus appear to be poor because 
the normal returns it is being compared to are based on a period of abnormal returns
More recent work by Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) question Franks, Harris 
and Titman's (1991) conclusions. They show that Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) 
results only hold for the seventies, a period, which represented half of Franks, Harris 
and Titman's (1991) data set (January 1975 to December 1984). Agrawal, Jatfe and 
Mandelker (1992) found a significant wealth loss for the bidders' shareholders during 
the fifties, sixties and eighties, even-though the method they used was not 
significantly different to Franks, Harris and Titman's (1991) and both were based on 
American data. Loderer and Martin (1992) in contrast, show that during the 5 years 
after an acquisition acquiring firms do not under-perform when compared to a 
benchmark corrected for size effects, changes in risk free rates and systematic risk.
The finance evidence therefore seems to suggest that gains to the acquiring company 
shareholders are at best small. That is some studies show acquiring company 
shareholders' gain, (Allen and Sirmans, 1987, Elgers and Clarke, 1980, Halpern, 1973, 
Mandclker, 1974), some they lose (Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker, 1992), some that 
the returns are not significantly different from zero (Asquith 1983, Franks, and Titman 
1991, Loderer and Martin, 1992, Franks, Broyles and Hecht, 1977), and some that it
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It should be noted that the event study methodology, that these results are based on, 
has several problems, the key ones being :
a) There can be no other major events specific to a company during the monitoring 
period 10 This is removes the most active acquirers from the sample This is a major 
problem if the post event monitoring period is 5 years, as in some recent studies
b) The event must be of sufficient size to affect the share price to a measurable degree
c) The assumption that returns from potential acquisitions have not already been 
discounted into the share price by the market. If this is not the case the total expected 
return of the acquisition to shareholders will not be captured.
The finance literature has established that acquisitions benefit the shareholder o f the 
target firm. Returns to bidding shareholders are less clear cut with evidence for 
abnormal positive, negative and zero returns. Coupling this with disagreements over 
methodology, it seems reasonable to say acquisitions have not performed particularly 
well for the bidding companies Other methodologies have, however, concluded that 
acquisitions performed badly (Kitching, 1972, 1973, 1974, Porter 1987, Hunt 1990)
The capital market perspective on acquisitions has also examined several other issues 
This represents a major part o f the academic work that has been done on acquisitions. 
It, however, focuses on variables which can be measured using publicly available data. 
This literature will be addressed separately in chapter 2, which will position this 
research relative to this work
The researcher has outlined two of his three reasons for examining the acquisition 
decision process, the number and value of deals, and poor results The third reason for
changes over time (Bradley et al 1988, Dennis and McConnell, 1986) but that
shareholders in the acquired firm gain
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examining the acquisition decision process, the lack of academic literature on the topic 
will be demonstrated in sections 1.5 and 1.6. These will outline why a framework was 
required for this research and develop one They will conclude with the structure this 
thesis will follow.
1.5 Need for a Framework
l'he researcher proposes that a framework based on the acquisition process literature 
is required to structure the wider decision material. A framework will then be 
developed using the literature directly on the acquisition process. This will allow the 
acquisition, decision process, strategic management and financial evaluation literature 
to be divided into themes and explored in the context of the acquisition environment in 
later chapters. This review will also demonstrate the limited nature of the academic 
material directly on the acquisition process.
The researcher will now establish that the decision process, strategic management and 
financial evaluation literature overlap without covering exactly the same issues. They 
employ markedly different methodological perspectives from the psychological 
experiment, to the long term ethnographic study of a series of one company's 
decisions The various subject areas have tended to ignore other tradition's work In 
consequence the various traditions do not cover the whole process, focus on different 
elements, and utilise different terminology.
The researcher contends that the decision literature consists of many parallel strands 
with limited connections and that, there is a need for a framework to structure this 
work, to allow meaningfully comparisons and generate hypotheses on the acquisition 
process The diversity of literature can be illustrated by two quotations from Edward's 
(1967B65):
A) 'Wasserman and Silander (1958) have prepared an annotated bibliography of the 
decision making literature which is extraordinary for omitting most of the literature on 
risky decisions in both psychology and economics '
B) 'Chernoff and Moses (1959) have published an elementary text on statistical 
decision theory, thus making accessible the ideas which Blackwell and Girschick 
(1954) so elegantly and unintelligibly present to mathematicians only.'
That is, it is possible for several books to exist which look at decision making, but be 
so rooted in different perspectives as to be unintelligible to each other.
This diversity of material is further illustrated by Allison's (1971) use of three different 
models; the rational, the organisational process and the bureaucratic politics model to 
explain the decision processes in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Each model offering 
different insights while ignoring other elements. In the period since Allison's (1971) 
work further strands of literature relevant to the acquisition process have developed 
including:
The Bradford group's (Hickson ct al 1986) work on strategic decisions 
Pettigrew and other management authors who have suggested that decisions should be 
examined in the context of a long stream of actions of a firm. (Pettigrew, 1988, 1989, 
1990b)
Tversky and Kahneman (Bell, Raiffa and Tversky, 1988, Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, Tversky, 1967, and Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, 1991) have experimentally 
examined rational choice models and how these fail to mirror human behaviour.
These models are conflicting yet only partly overlap Bach literature provides 
fragmentary glimpses of the issues without giving a broad illumination of the process 
The decision making literature can be viewed as a continuum moving from pure 
mathematics to pure description, from probability theory to history There are no 
problems with decision theory if you shut out anything that is not from your 
perspective, 'One response is merely to damn the behaviour 'If your procedures or 
decision or feelings are intransitive or otherwise discordant with subjective expected 
utility, they are incoherent 'irrational' or whatever you want to call it, and trying to 
justify them as coherent or find other rationalities is a waste of time" (Beach and 
Lipshitz 1993 :22 including quotation of Pratt 1986:486).
The state of the literature in the late seventies is summarised by Ness (1978:73) as, 
'With one exception (Mintzberg, 1973) all the paradigms of strategic decision making 
share one characteristic: All adopt one unique viewpoint, that is, either an economic 
one (e g Raiffa, 1968), a cybernetic one (e g. Cyert and March, 1963), a sociological 
one (e g Pettigrew, 1973 or Lindblom and Braybrooke, 1970), psychological one 
(Keen, 1973) a political one (e g Allison, 1971), an administrative one (e g. Bowers, 
1970:6) or even an argumentative one (e g. Reike and Sellars).' That is, there is a 
variety of conflicting literature on decision making, which concentrates on different 
variables, methods, perspectives and languages (mathematics or description) Thus the 
researcher concluded that to generate hypotheses he needed a framework to organise, 
and allow some comparison of the literature. To achieve this, the researcher proposes 
to examine the limited acquisition decision literature, to develop a model of the
The finance literature has evolved with the adoption of discounted cash flow
techniques and the capital asset pricing model as mainstream tools (Mao, 1976: 3-17,
Pike 1983)
acquisition process This will then be used in chapters 3, 4 and 5 to allow the 
literatures that can be applied to the acquisition situation to be used coherently
1.6 The Acdiiisilion Process Framework
To develop a framework the researcher will now present a brief review of the 
literature on the acquisition process. This review is not intended to be complete but 
to be sufficient to develop a framework to divide the process into meaningful sections 
It will also serve to illustrate my third reason for examining the acquisition process, the 
limited nature of the literature directly on the topic
As stated in the introduction, this research will not cover the negotiation phase of an 
acquisition because of the potential difficulty of obtaining data on the negotiation 
process, and the need to limit this research The research will also not focus on the 
issues that have dominated the economics and finance literature, the motivations 
behind acquisitions and the effects of externally measurable variables How the latter 
will be treated in this research will be detailed in chapter 2. They therefore will not 
feature in this section.
As stated earlier, the literature on the decision process in acquisitions is limited, with 
empirical evidence being provided by Kitching (1967, 1974), Birley (1974, 1976), 
Hunt(1990) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991). Duhaime and Schwcnk (1985) 
provide a series of conjectures about cognitive simplification in acquisition decision 
making but do not offer a model of the acquisition process. Hunt (1990) examines 7 
hypotheses: 3 concern the related hypothesis, 1 relative size, 1 the motivation to 
acquire, 1 integration and 1 the sources of the idea Only the latter is directly relevant 
to the decision making process This material will be integrated into chapter 3 where 
specific hypotheses on acquisition searches are developed. This work, however, does 
not represent a basis to develop a model of the process.
The only major piece of research conducted recently in this area has been I laspeslagh, 
and Jemison's, Managing Acquisitions (1991). This research was based on case study 
research in 20 firms over 8 years The aims of this research, are summed up by, 'Our 
primary message is that key differences between acquisition success and failure lie in 
understanding and better managing the processes by which acquisition decisions are 
made and by which they are integrated ' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991 3)
Haspeslagh and Jemison view the key problems with acquisitions as, the need, or 
perceived need, for urgency and secrecy. This results in many acquisitions being 
examined less rigorously than other capital projects, and that integration issues are not 
considered until after purchase From this they propose four common challenges in 
managing acquisitions -
Ensuring that acquisitions support the firm's overall corporate renewal strategy.
- Developing a pre-acquisition decision-making process that will allow consideration 
of the 'right' acquisitions and that will develop for any particular acquisition a 
meaningful justification, given limited information and the need for speed and secrecy 
-Managing the post-acquisition integration process to create the value hoped for when 
the acquisition was conceived
-Fostering both acquisition-specific and broader organisational learning from the 
exposure to the acquisition.' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:12)
They see these problems as a product of what they view as the conventional 
acquisition model (Figure 14) To counteract these problems and challenges they 
propose a process view of acquisitions as in figure 1.5.
The key differences between Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) process model and
conventional model of the acquisitions process are:
A) 'In contrast, the process perspective emphasises the role that acquisition decision 
making plays in helping a management team understand how value will be created, not 
just how to assign a financial value to a firm' (Ilaspcslagh and Jemison 1991:13).
B) It is less segmented
A problem with Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) process view, as a tool to subdivide 
the literature is that, it places most of the processes this research intends to examine 
into one category, acquisition justification The process view is also a model which 
llaspeslagh and Jemison (1991) think, ought to solve some of the problems they see in 
the acquisition process, rather than reflect current reality The need at this stage of the 
research is for a framework to divide the predictions of the decision literatures on the 
actual acquisition process rather than prescribe what is desirable.
Figure 1.4 Hasneslagh and Jemison's Conventional 
View of Acquisitions
( Strategic Objectives )
(Search and Screening)
(Strategic Evaluation )
(Financial Evaluation )
(  Negotiation )
(  Agreement )
(  Integration )  
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 13__________
16
I'iiiurc 1.5 HasDcsIiigli And .Icmison's Process View of Acquisitions
(  Idea )
(Acquisition justification) 
(Acquisition Integration )  
(  Results )
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:12
Birley (1974, 1976) focused on examining what was actually going on, during the 
acquisition process at companies in the sixties rather than providing a model of what 
should happen. Birley (1976) found that half of the companies she interviewed had a 
low level of planning when financial controls were excluded. Since this is the frame 
from which an acquisition strategy would emerge it suggests the merger boom of the 
late sixties was based on the availability of candidates and fashion rather than any 
plans Though executives had a general notion of a strategy they could not be pinned 
down on it She found a general lack of agreement over what had triggered 
acquisitions. The key factor claimed to be behind acquisitions was the need for 
profitability. Few however, could quantify this. The review of strengths and 
weaknesses of the company and acquisition candidates tended to be post 
rationalisations rather than part of the pre-acquisition process.
Jemison and Sitkin (1986a) support Birley's view that acquisitions develop a 
momentum of their own. Birley states (1976:71), 'having taken the initial step,
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executives appeared too emotionally involved to consider not acquiring; analysis thus 
became superfluous ' This seems to imply the model illustrated in figure 1.6. Birley 
(1976: 71-72) concludes, 'It would appear that until pre-acquisition analysis and 
discussion within the boardroom of the acquiring firm improves, all proposed 
acquisitions whatever their nature will be equally risky.'
Figure 1.6 Model of Acouisition Process Based on Birlev's Work
0 feed to Raise Profitability
S _ . >Fits a Vague 
Concept of Strategy 
V v
)
c Commitment by Executb
i :
Financial Evaluation 
Becomes Superfluous ------------ 2 5 ----------
Ç  Acquire Company
/es)
Kitching (1973 1 54) presents a model of the acquisition process, shown in figure 1.7. 
The Kitching (1973) model has two failings as a framework to allow division of the 
literature, first, it is too complex for the purpose for which it is to be used, second, like 
Haspeslagh and Jemison's(1991) process view it is not intended to reflect reality
The two models presented as reflecting reality, the model based on Birley's work 
(1976) and Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) conventional view which presents the 
process as 'advocated by some management scholars' (Haspeslagh and Jemison
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Figure 1.7 Developing Systematic Procedures for 
Risk Reduction in Acquisitions
Steps in
Buying Company
/ -------------- \
Why don't \\ 
v
e buy X
Could make sense 
Look more closely
Do we approach Co ? 
Price bracket ?
Impact on our growth ‘
What data can we find ?
To determine negotiating 
strategy ?
To determine maximum price ?
Exact specifications of company ? 
What does seller want ?
What does our company want ?
Now we own i t ,
What do we do with it ?
Procedures l'or 
Reducing Risk
Review against 
Corporate Strategy
Narrowing Field
700 Rejects J
Review against objectivje es 200 Rejects J
a  I 50 Rejects
Coarse screen questions 1 v
Pre-negotiation checklist 
Methods for setting 
- Maximum price 
- Price 'package' outline
30 Rejects j
Factors in agreeing 
purchase price and terms 
Forecasts required 
Jre-acquisition checklist
—- 10 Rejects
[Offer to purchase7 6 Failed Negotiations
Kitching, 1973:154, Chart VIII-J
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1991:12) offer two contrasting views of the process Birley's (1976) data implies that 
acquisitions take place in a haphazard fashion, decisions being based on 'seat of the 
pants' management. Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) conventional model implies that 
acquisitions result from a rigorous classical strategic management approach The 
model based on Birley's (1976) work seems to be difficult to use as a structure as it 
hypothesises that the process has little structure
Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) conventional view therefore seems an appropriate 
starting point to develop a model o f the acquisition decision process. To this a number 
of changes were made.
First, the negotiation phase was excluded. This was primarily because of difficulties in 
gaining access to what is a highly sensitive phase within an already sensitive process. 
This research, however, already covers a wide range of issues and has resource and 
time constraints. Additional scope, therefore, would have had to have been at the 
expense of depth or sample size. This leaves 3 phases; search and screening, strategic 
evaluation, and financial evaluation.
Second, Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) fail to specify what is in their conventional 
view 'Search and screening box'. They see the key problems as (Haspeslagh and 
Jemison 1991: 58):
A) 'Fragmented perspectives, of many specialists during analysis and decision making '
B) 'Increasing momentum, to consummate the transaction '
C) 'Ambiguous expectations, about key aspects of the acquisitions between both sides 
in the negotiation'
D) 'Multiple motives among acquiring managers.'
This perspective, however, does not provide a subdivision of the 'search and screening
box'.
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I lie prescriptive authors see the searcli and screening processes as a series of filters 
This can be seen in Figure 17, (Taken from Kitching, 1973:154), where of 700 
potential targets, 6 reach the negotiation stage. Jones (1982: X) divides his chapter on 
'searching for potential acquisitions' into 'identifying acquisition prospects', and 'the 
selection of acquisition prospects', the latter including: 'Initial screening', 'secondary 
screening', 'Information needs for deeper evaluation', 'using an information check-list' 
and, 'the acquisition case study ' Jones' (1982) approach seems to imply the model 
outlined in figure 1.8
Figure 1.8 Information Collection and Screening
Based on Jones, 1982
That is, the initial search and screening phase is followed by progressively more 
detailed searches and screening until a detailed evaluation of one candidate occurs
Detailed Evaluation 
of One Candidate
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Given the above, the search and screening phase will be specified to include an 
examination of the filter proposed in the prescriptive literature This will inevitably 
incorporate much of the strategic analysis The search phase will also be taken in the 
wider sense to include all searching and information collection
Third, the financial evaluation and the strategic evaluation not included in the first 'box' 
will be treated as one linked process, as in Haspeslagh and Jemison's (1991) process 
view This results in a base model, figure T9. This model (figure 19) focuses on the 
process and does not incorporate the environment in which an acquisition takes place. 
This will be considered next.
Figure 1.9 Adapted Model of Acquisition Process
Search and Screening 
Including Information 
Collection and Filtering 
Using Strategic Criteria
\ ___________Z.__________ J
Detailed Evaluation 
Of Few Candidates 
Primarily Financial ^
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1.7 Organisational Context
Examining all elements of an organisation to see if it influences the acquisition process 
is beyond the scope of this research. The researcher, therefore, needed to explore the 
literature to decide on which issues to focus An issue that has received attention in 
the limited literature that exists is experience Even here the results are, however, 
varied (Kitching, 1972, 1973, 1974, Lubatkin 1983, Kusewitt, 1985, I.ubatkin and 
Shrieves 1986, Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991)
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) found that given time constraints and high levels of 
secrecy, responsibility for acquisitions inevitably centred on a few people. The 
experience of these managers thus became important: (Haspeslagh and Jemison 
1991 53) 'Moreover, our research found that whatever the extent of experience at the 
broad corporate level, crucial aspects of the decision-making process devolve on 
individuals like Wirtz and Wilcke (two managers involved in their case studies) who, 
like most managers, are not familiar with the intricacies of acquisition decision making, 
negotiation and analysis. Thus because of the sporadic nature of the process, managers 
must often make acquisition decisions with less and less insight into the possible 
results of those decisions than they expect when making routine resource allocation 
decisions 1 This seems to imply that work will be carried out by a few managers The 
experience of these managers is therefore important to the process. They conclude 
that, (Haspeslagh and Jemison 1991: 53) ’mechanisms are needed to bring group wide 
experience to the setting of acquisitions without taking responsibility for the 
acquisition away from line management1
This contrasts with Lubatkin (1983:223), who considers corporate experience to be 
important, 'Acquiring firms that pursue a strategy of higher activity in the external 
acquisitions market may outperform acquiring firms that follow less active strategies'
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Business International in an update of Kitching's (1973) work found, (Business 
International, I992 VI) 'Our latest research confirms that more experienced acquirers - 
not surprisingly-report a high success rate.'
Kusewitt (1985:162) supports both views stating 'Less frequent acquisition (less than 
1 every 4 or 5 years) would probably result in excessive loss of corporate memory and 
experienced acquisition staff.' That is, firms and individuals who have greater 
experience of acquisitions and the problems they pose should perform better His 
results do not support this He found a strongly negative linear relationship between 
acquisition rate and return on assets and market return That is, the more acquisitions 
completed per year the lower the success rate. This result was based on a range of 
acquisition rates of between .3 to 15.3 per year. Acquisition rate, however, includes 
two elements, experience level and a time available element A high acquisition rate 
may limit the time available to conduct the acquisition process If the number of people 
available to work on a project is restricted, because of the secrecy surrounding most 
acquisitions, this will limit the management resources available. Considering this, 
Kusewitt (1985) posited that two opposing factors were affecting success: experience, 
which would increase with acquisition rate, and lack of management resources which 
would lower success levels at higher acquisition rates. However, he could not 
establish a peaked relationship between success and acquisition rate
This view that management resources are important in acquisition success is 
supported by Kitching (1972) He found that the presence of managers of change 
(1972 44) and the availability of sufficient management resources were factors in 
success(l 972 54), 'The sum of management skills must be greater than the joint 
management task ' He acknowledges the problems of lack of time and states that in 
the early stages of appraisal 'the greater danger at this stage is to consume too much 
expensive time'( 1973 :112) This seems to imply that a high rate of acquisition would
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reduce success as acquisition management resources become stretched This factor 
swamps the lack of experience in companies except at very low acquisition rates The 
lower success levels of companies with high acquisition rates may be exacerbated by 
the large number of potential acquisitions being reviewed In Kitching's sample (1973), 
for every completed acquisition an average of 100 was screened and the total average 
time cost per completed acquisition was 3000 hours (1.5 man years work)
The issues of experience and resources available therefore seem to deserve further 
investigation, particularly as most equity market based studies have had to exclude 
companies which make multiple acquisitions for methodological reasons Individual 
and company experience thus seem valid areas to explore within the wider literature 
Thus this researcher proposes to examine management resources, and the acquisition 
experience of both individuals and the company Therefore, this researcher proposes to 
use the model below as a basis to review the literature (Figure 110)
The literature review for this thesis will therefore be broken down into three basic 
areas:
- Information collection and search behaviour (that is looking for a potential 
acquisition target) including initial screening using strategic criteria,
- Evaluation phase focusing on the financial elements
- Two major influences on the process; material which focuses on, and the experience 
and expertise of, the decision makers and companies, and the management resources 
available
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l i m i l e  1.10 Framework lo Allow I .¡teinture lo lie Examined
^Search ¡uni Screening Including ^
Information Collection And 
i  Filterinu Usine Stralcine Criteria./
Detailed evaluation 
Of A Few Candidates
Individual and Company ------- Primarily Financial
Experience and 
Management Resources
Acquisition
The empirical chapters will mirror this structure expect that, the evaluation phase will 
be split into 2 The first chapter (chapter 8) will describe which decision criteria 
companies are using and how they are applied The second chapter (chapter 9) will 
examine whether the use of specific criteria and their application influences success 
This framework, however, ignores several external factors which have been explored 
by the finance literature, including form of consideration, nature of bid, relatedness, 
relative size However, to fully incorporate these variables with a finance methodology 
would exclude examination of many of the internal variables on which this work 
intends to focus To ignore the research from a capital market perspective, however, 
would miss the opportunity to use the insights it might provide on internal behaviour 
and, the ability to standardise for some external variables This thesis will therefore 
review this research in chapter 2, separately from the main literature review chapters 
which will focus on the internal acquisition process
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I'lie development of the framework (shown in figure 1.10) in the last three sections has 
also illustrated the lack of material on the acquisition process, the researcher’s third 
reason for looking at the acquisition process There is, however, extensive material on 
external variables as the next chapter will show The researcher will now present a 
brief outline of the content of each chapter
1.8 Thesis Structure
Given the above framework and the need to place it in context of the financial 
paradigm on acquisitions, this thesis will follow the structure below With each 
chapter, a brief summary of the main points the chapter covers is given
Chapter 2 - Review of Finance Perspective on Acquisitions.
This chapter explores the factors that the finance perspective, the dominant 
perspective on acquisitions, has examined. These factors, however, are viewed as not 
examining what is going on inside companies This literature is therefore insufficient as 
a basis for this thesis. However, it offers some insight into internal variables Chapter 2 
thus proposes several variables to incorporate into this research and a number to 
standardise for
Chapter 3 - Development of hypotheses on information collection and search 
behaviour.
Chapter 3 concludes that, although the classical view expects companies to review all 
potential acquisition targets, more recent models of decision making stemming from 
Simon's (1958) bounded rationality model would predict companies limiting their 
search areas It thus hypothesises that, by using limits to its acquisition search area, a 
company will reduce its acquisition success.
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I rom the classical decision model it also develops the hypothesis that the use of larger 
numbers of information sources increases success levels in acquisitions The decision 
literature, however, does not consider the sources of any potential solution The 
prescriptive literature is thus examined to produce the hypothesis that acquisitions 
resulting from ideas generated by the seller or third parties will perform worse than 
acquisitions resulting from internal ideas
Chapter 4 - Development of hypotheses on decision criteria and application.
This chapter concludes that although, the finance literature proposes the use of 
discounted cash flow methods as decision criteria in investment decisions, empirical 
research suggests they are not universally used It therefore hypotheses that the use of 
discounted cash flow techniques increases success levels and the use of other methods 
reduces success levels in acquisitions. It goes on to examine the application of these 
methods In particular, contrasting the use of fixed hurdle rates, which the empirical 
literature has found to be used in practice, to the finance literature's prescriptions that 
for large investment decisions interest rates should be specifically developed to take 
account of that project’s risk The application of fixed hurdle rates is therefore 
hypothesised as reducing success rates.
Chapter 5 - Development of hypotheses on management resources and 
management experience.
Chapter 5 examines how the literature predicts that experience affects decision 
making It presents a variety of conflicting evidence, and proposes the hypotheses that, 
decision maker and company experience increases acquisition success levels It also 
examines how the level of management resources, including consultants, available 
might affect success and the process.
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Chapter 6 - Development of methodology.
This explores the potential methods available to examine the hypotheses developed in 
chapters 3 to 5 It concludes that the best data collection method for this research is 
interviews, and that a qualitative success measure is the only type which would allow 
analysis of success, without biasing the sample frame to companies which do not 
regularly acquire, or, to large acquisitions It will also show that: those companies 
interviewed are significantly larger than the sample frame, but that this is the product 
of two very large companies being interviewed, and that the group interviewed 
includes a disproportionately large number of petro-chemicals and food companies and 
a disproportionately small number of financial service companies and utilities.
Chapter 7 - Empirical testing of hypotheses on information collection and search 
behaviour.
Chapter 7 concludes that the number of information sources used does not appear to 
affect success levels. It is hypothesised that this is due to variations in the quality of 
information. However, no adequate measure of this could be developed. The source of 
an acquisition idea was found to have an influence on success levels Ideas bought to a 
company by external parties were found to perform worse than internally generated 
ideas.
Chapter 8 - Examination of what decision criteria companies were using and 
how they were applied.
The majority of companies were found to be using discounted cash flow (DCF) criteria 
(41 companies, 80.4 per cent). However, only 6 companies used only discounted cash 
flow criteria and not other capital budgeting criteria Twenty-four companies used 
payback, 33 change in earnings per share and 22 accounting rate of return. Thirty-two 
companies said they used fixed hurdle rates However, they varied in terms of how 
rigidly these were applied.
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Chapter 9 - Empirical testing of hypotheses oil decision criteria and their 
application.
The empirical results presented show that the use of discounted cash flow techniques 
and earnings per share were significantly correlated with lower performance on one 
success measure. The use of payback and accounting rate of return were found not to 
be correlated with the success measures used. A number of explanations of this lower 
level of performance by companies using discounted cash flow methods (DCF) are 
proposed and examined
Chapter 10 - Empirical testing of hypotheses on management resources and 
management experience.
Individual and company experience of acquisitions were found not to influence success 
levels. Individual experience of the company and industry were found to have a 
positive correlation with success. The level of management resources and the level of 
use of consultants in general did not affect success levels
Chapter 11 Conclusions
Chapter 11 reviews this thesis and presents a series of directions for future research
1,9 Summary
This chapter established that this research will focus on the acquisition decision 
process, from idea to decision, within companies which make acquisition decisions in 
the United Kingdom Secondly, it has established that there is a need for research on 
this area Finally this chapter has briefly reviewed the literature on the acquisition
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process, concluding that a three part structure would be a valid way to subdivide the 
literature:
1) search and information collection,
2) strategic and financial evaluation, and
3) individual and company experience and management resources
The importance of the finance paradigm on acquisitions is accepted, however, and 
thus it is proposed to examine this literature in the next chapter
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Footnotes
Hunt's sample of 40 British acquisitions between 10X0 and 10X5 produced 4 conglomerate 
acquisitions. Over half Kuching's (1072) sample of late sixties acquisitions of 1X1 eases were 
diversifications
This article is referred to in the rest of this thesis as being published in 1072 This is a reprint of the 
original article The author is unsure whether any changes were made to the 1067 article so the 
author has referred to the article lie has used 
1Thousand million
' For a review of the period up to 10X7 see Gray and McDcrmott( 10X0) and for a brief look at the 
number of acquisitions and the level of hostile take-overs in the United Kingdom see Jenkinson and 
Mayer (1004)
'See Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 1000:246-60 for an examination o f the efficient market 
hypothesis
6 The three models being :
A) Using the model Cjt = «j + lijrnit
with ix and IJ being established using a sixty month period
li) Using the same equation as the first method but setting the a  and I) at zero and one respectively 
C) CAPM where beta is established over a sixty month period and the risk free rate is the yield on a 
three month treasury bond converted to a one month return 
Benchmarks 2 and 5 generated positive significant returns to both sets of shareholders 
The benchmarks used were the CRSP equally-weighted index, the CRSP value-weighted index, 
eight portfolio benchmark incorporating 4 portfolios based on size , 1 on dividend yield and I on past 
returns, and a 10 factor benchmark provided by Lehmann and Modest For more details sec Franks, 
Harris and Tittuan (1991 :X6)
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Chanter 2 I MF. FINANCE PARADIGM AND ACQUISITIONS
2.0 Introduction
This chapter will review the finance literature on acquisitions, and explain how the 
variables identified were incorporated or standardised
The finance literature has mainly focused on a single variable contingency approach, 
between success, and capital market characteristics of acquisition transactions 
Success in this literature is measured in terms of returns to shareholders using an event 
study methodology. This eliminates the need to access unpublished data. The variables 
which have received most attention within this paradigm are: the effect of the form of 
consideration, method of bid, whether the bid is contested, the related hypothesis (that 
acquisitions by companies into related areas should perform better), and relative size 
A few authors have examined other variables using a single variable contingency 
approach These studies have tended not to use an event study methodology This may 
reflect methodological difficulties outlined in the examination of acquisition success 
levels in chapter 1, rather than the importance of the variables
This chapter will now examine the capital market research relevant to acquisitions 
Each section of this review will focus on a specific variable and conclude by explaining 
how it was incorporated into this research. The researcher will begin by examining the 
form of consideration, and offer
2.1 The Korin of Oiler and Consideration
l-.arly research on the effect of the method of bid, tender oiler or merger, suggested 
that tender oilers performed better than mergers 1 Jensen and Ruback's (1983) review 
found bidders via tender oilers gained significantly, while returns in mergers to 
bidders were approximately zero franks and Harris (1989) supported Jensen and 
Ruback (1983), finding that bidders do better in tender oilers
Later work by Agrawal et al (1992) found no unusual performance for tender oilers 
and Loderer and Martin (1992) found that performance over a 5 year period is zero 
regardless of acquisition form Loderer and Martin (1992), however, did find under­
performance in the first 3 years of a merger during the sixties and seventies but this 
disappears for the eighties. This result is supported by Bradley, Desai and Kim 11988) 
who suggest that gains to tender bidders have decreased over time
This could explain the results of earlier studies (Jensen and Ruback 1983, Franks and 
1 lari is 1989) which tended to cover less than 3 years aller the acquisition The periods 
their data cover (Frank and Harris, 1955-1985, Jensen and Ruback included studies 
covering the period 1941-1980) mean that proportionally more of their data is from 
the sixties and seventies In conclusion, it seems there may have been a difference 
between mergers and tender oilers in the sixties and seventies but this seems to have 
been eroded If this is correct it may limit the value of studies based on older data for 
interpreting the present situation
Hansen (1987) proposed that the differences between mergers and tender oilers may 
be due to the greater use of cash in tender oilers The relationship between type of 
consideration, cash or equity, however, is not clear It has been posited (Franks, Harris 
and Titman, 1991, Kusewitt, 1985, Travalos, 1987) that cash bids should perform
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better as they provide positive information about the bidder's cash reserves and its 
ability to generate funds from banks The latter factor is taken to imply that the banks, 
usually with greater information than is publicly available, think the company is sound 
Kusewitt's (1985) research did not support this hypothesis He found a negative 
relationship between cash offers, and return on assets and his market return measure 2 
This is supported by Agrawal et al.(1992) who, using an event study method, found 
that in the long run cash tender offers performed worse than equity tender offers In 
contrast Travalos (1987) found cash offers were associated with normal returns and 
equity offers where found to have negative abnormal returns This was independent of 
the type of take-over. Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) similarly found equity offers 
performed worse than cash offers, though this, however, was not statistically 
significant
Thus the effects of acquisition type (merger or tender offer) and type of consideration 
(cash or equity) are unclear with evidence for and against relationships existing The 
date of the research may prove to be an important factor in the results generated. The 
benefits of tender bids may have been eroded, as the advantages have become more 
widely known and accounting rules have changed
The author's research did not attempt to standardise for cash or equity deals Many 
transactions involve a mixture of cash and equity, some escrows, bonds and other 
differed payment vehicles Cash is sometimes raised immediately before a transaction 
or through trombone rights issues around the transaction, few deals involve only 
equity The use of cash may be influenced by relative size with cash payments being 
more prevalent in smaller acquisitions. Establishing the method of payment in smaller 
private transactions, may be impossible, particularly where the main consideration in 
choice of the payment method is to minimise the tax liability of the seller
The issue of a transaction being a merger or acquisition was not considered as all deals 
in the sample frame were acquisitions
The bidding process has also been cited as a major factor in the returns to the 2 groups 
of shareholders That is, are multiple bidders involved, is it a hostile bid or friendly 
This hypothesis is based on the assumptions that, the bidders will pay the minimum 
possible to acquire a target up to a pre-decided maximum and that total gains involved 
are not affected by the bidding process. The researcher will now examine this
2.2 Nature of The Bid
Bradley, Desai and Kim (1988) found that in cases where there were multiple bidders, 
returns to the acquired company were greater, and the returns to the acquiring 
company were reduced but this was not significant. Unsuccessful bidders in multiple- 
bidder contests lost 8 per cent of their pre-bid value.
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991) found no significant difference between contested 
and uncontested bids and opposed compared to unopposed transactions for bidders 
But returns to target shareholders were greater This supports Franks and Harris 
(1989) who found that gains to bidders are slightly smaller but that this is not 
statistically significant
Jensen and Ruback (1983:36) report that, Kummer and Hoffmeister (1978) found if 
the bid were successful gains to target shareholders were greater when, the offer was 
opposed by the incumbent management But if the bid failed, the target company 
shareholders incurred losses. Jensen and Ruback (1983 37) also report Dodd's 
evidence (1980) that, opposition by the present management of a target firm, harms 
their shareholders as it may result in termination of the bid The research seems to
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imply, that gains to the target company shareholders are greater in completed opposed 
or contested bids. However, if the bid fails the target company's shareholders may 
incur loses. This does not appear to be a zero sum game with the bidders losing by an 
amount equal to the target's gains, bidder's returns appear to be unchanged
There could be an intuitive explanation for this Managers in a friendly acquisition may 
agree not to make people redundant in return for the target board's support This may 
reduce the value of the target, which is reflected in the price bid That is, in a friendly 
bid, value may not be transferred from employees, in the form of loss of employment 
and job security, to shareholders as a capital gain This issue could be associated with 
that of relatedness. Companies in the same industry may not be prepared to cut work 
forces by as much as outsiders because of personal associations Equally there may be 
higher potential gains.
The author's research focused on friendly bids It did not exclude hostile bids 
However, only 2 cases covered by the research were hostile The researcher expected 
this because of the greater sensitivity of information in high profile hostile bids. The 
nature of the bid process may have implications for how the decision process takes 
place. Unopposed friendly mergers may allow greater access compared to other types 
of bid The results of this research may therefore not reflect hostile bid behaviour The 
hostility of a bid may be associated with relatedness, conglomerates making more 
hostile bids Research on this is discussed below
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2 .3 Kelalcclucss
The relatedness issue has received extensive attention, given the 'common sense' 
nature of the hypothesis that acquisitions of companies operating in a similar area to 
the bidder ought to perform better than conglomerate acquisitions., because there are 
greater opportunities for synergy gains The evidence is divided though. Seth (1990a) 
reporting the results of other papers found that, Chatterjee (1986), Elgers and Clarke 
(1980) and Wansley et al (1983) found unrelated acquisitions have higher returns 
Lubatkin (1987), however, found no difference. Shelton (1988) and Singh and 
Montgomery (1987) found related acquisitions have higher returns, and Choi and 
Philippatos (1983) found that conglomerate mergers, where there is no increase in 
debt, do not perform as well as non-conglomerate mergers
Other papers have produced equally conflicting results. Kusewitt (1985) found that 
the percentage of assets in the same industry was positively related to accounting 
return on assets at a 98 per cent significance level and market returns at 94 per cent 
level Thus supporting the related hypothesis, as does Kitching's (1972) work using a 
managerial measure of success Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker (1992) found non­
conglomerate mergers performed worse than conglomerates although the results were 
not statistically significant for all event periods they used
Lubatkin's (1987) work subdivided his sample of acquisitions further into 4 groups, 
product concentric4, horizontal and market concentric4, conglomerate and vertical 
integration He found related acquisitions do not create more value for bidding 
company shareholders. He concludes, 'The results did not show that some product and 
market relatedness is better than none ' (Lubatkin 1987:50) Hunt (1990) similarly 
found no statistically significant differences in success levels of different levels of
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Shelton (1V88) examined the issue from a strategic fit perspective He found that 
acquisitions where assets were used more intensively created value More value 
though was created when expansion into new markets with similar products, but new 
customers, took place
The evidence as a whole though, is unclear, with papers supporting the hypotheses 
that both, related acquisitions have superior performance and that unrelated 
acquisitions have superior performance.
The level of relatedness has clear implications for the acquisition decision process 
Companies buying operations in closely related fields should be able to rely more on 
internal information, and less on merchant banks and consultants Such acquisitions 
may also be conducted at a lower level in the organisation than conglomerate style 
acquisitions, as the skills exist to conduct financial analysis in operating units. The 
researcher concentrated on related acquisitions as he did not expect to be able to 
construct a sample frame of conglomerate bids in the nineties in the United Kingdom 
There were 3 reasons for this expectation:
A) There have been fewer diversification acquisitions. Hunt's (1990) sample of 40 
acquisitions produced only 3 cases of diversification
B) The rare conglomerate bids in the United Kingdom during the nineties have 
involved few purchasing companies.
C) The centralised nature of the acquisition processes at conglomerates will reduce 
the number of potential interviewees at each conglomerate Thus restricting the 
number of cases per company. The researcher therefore concluded there were 
insufficient potential interviewees to develop a sample frame
relatedness This contrasts with Kitching (1973) who found that concentric
acquisitions performed worse than conglomerate, vertical or horizontal acquisitions
This research thus focused on related acquisitions It did not exclude unrelated 
acquisitions but only 2 acquisitions covered in interviews for this research were not 
related One was concentric, the other conglomerate The researcher used 
Lubatkin's( 1983) definition of related acquisitions, where related acquisitions were 
defined as horizontal and market concentric acquisitions That is, acquisitions which 
involved the same product but different markets and the same product and same 
market were treated as related
The final variable that has been regularly examined by the capital market literature to 
see if it affects acquisition performance is relative size.
2.4 Relative Size
The non-finance literature has suggested that exceedingly small and exceedingly large 
acquisitions should perform worse than other acquisitions Kitching (19725), using a 
qualitative methodology, found a 85 per cent failure rate, where size by sales was less 
than 2 per cent. Hunt (1990) examining this finding found that 67 per cent of 
acquisitions below Kitching's threshold failed Kitching's (1973) later work found 
performance peaked in his 2 categories covering acquisitions between 10 and 50 per 
cent of the buyer's sales These categories however contained only 4 1 acquisitions out 
of a sample of 395 Fifty-one per cent of the sample was below I per cent of the 
buyer's sales Kusewitt (1985) (using both return on assets employed and market 
returns) found relative size to be negatively correlated with return This is 'not 
necessarily inconsistent with their findings if their data sets were confined to smaller 
relative sizes and if a peaked relationship does in fact exist' (Kusewitt, 1985 :159)
Franks and Harris (1989), using an event study methodology, found that returns for 
the bidder during the event month, and the 6 month period starting 4 months before 
the event month, were the same for their 3 size groups.1’ This view is supported by 
Franks, Harris and Titman (1991:93) who examined returns over the 3 year period 
beginning the month after the final bid. They state, 'the multi-factor benchmark 
indicates no significant dilferences in returns based on the relative size of the 
combining firms ' Agrawal, Jalfe and Mandelker (1992) and Loderer and Martin 
(1992) split their samples into quintiles by size and found no relation between size and 
post-merger abnormal returns over the 5 years after an acquisition
The evidence on size is thus conflicting with different studies generating different 
results although more recent studies tend to find no difference between size groups 
There, however, appears a distinction between the events study based literature 
(Franks and Harris 1989 Franks, Harris and Titman 1991, Agrawal, Jaffe and 
Mandelker 1992 and Loderer and Martin 1992) who found no difference in returns to 
bidding company shareholders by relative size, from those using other methods 
(Kitching 1972, 1973, 1974, Hunt 1990, and Kusewitt 1985) who found very small 
acquisitions performed badly. This may be the result of the event studies method being 
unable to detect effects of small acquisitions, where other methods have found poor 
performance Loderer and Martin (1992:71) excluded all acquisitions under 10 per 
cent of the acquirer's market value Given the divided evidence on relative size the 
researcher decided to incorporate relative size as a variable in this research
The researcher thus proposes the hypothesis that:
2:1 ) Relatively small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisitions.
In addition the researcher will test the hypothesis proposed by Hunt (1990 71) that: 
2:2) There is a size mismatch if the seller's turnover is less than 2 per cent of that 
of the buyer and that failure will be above the norm
This researcher thought there was no advantage in using asset or market based 
measures over sales based relative size measures in these hypotheses T he former 
would have restricted the sample7 while sales data would be more easily available 
even if only the occurrence o f the acquisition was reported
The use of divisional rather than total acquirer sales was also considered by the 
researcher The advantage o f considering only the division involved is that it focuses 
the attention on the size o f the acquisition relative to, the units it will he merged with 
It, however, removes the element of size compared to the total company and hence the 
relative importance of the decision to the company An acquisition may be the same 
size as the division it is to be integrated into thus posing problems for integration It 
may, however, only have a hundredth of the sales and thus be relatively unimportant 
for the entire company on this measure. Two problems were also perceived with using 
divisional data It would have been more difficult to obtain data and deciding what 
divisions or units were affected may have been a problem As the focus of this 
research is the pre-decision phase, total sales of the acquisition divided by total 
acquirer sales was used
The author thought that a possible problem with this variable was that, by asking the 
exact relative size of the acquisition, he would remove the possibility of the 
interviewee keeping the case anonymous To avoid this the researcher chose to collect 
categorical data This required a choice of categories
The number of categories chosen had to balance the need to generate sufficient cases 
in each category to allow valid statistical analysis and the loss of information in the 
data For the chi-squared tests to be valid a minimum of 5 cases must be expected per 
square 1 Thus if success was used as a dichotomous variable, this would require ten
cases per size category A maximum of 4 relative size categories thus seemed prudent 
as the researcher thought he was unlikely to conduct many more than 50 interviews 
The 4 relative size categories chosen were, 0 to 2 per cent, 2 to 5 per cent, 5 to 10 
per cent and above 10 per cent of total buyer sales The reasons for these choices 
were
A) Kitching's (1972:45, reprint of 1967 article) data found 'size mismatch (where 
acquired company sales were less than 2 per cent of the parent company sales volume 
before the merger) occurs in 84 per cent of acquisitions considered failures ' From 
this evidence it would appear rational to have one division at 2 per cent of acquirer's 
sales
B) Kitching's (1973) later work on acquiring in Europe found a marked change in 
failure rates between the I to 5 per cent group and the 5 to 10 per cent group Thus 
suggesting divisions of categories at 5 and 10 per cent would be relevant A figure 
larger than 10 per cent would start to result in the category becoming irrelevant, for 
some companies. For example 25 per cent of Nestle's sales would be 6 billion pounds, 
or Shell 17.5 billion pounds
C) It will allow comparison with Flunt's(1990) British results
Data on relative sales will thus be collected using the categories of; 0 to 2 per cent, 2 
to 5 per cent, 5 to 10 per cent and above 10 per cent of total buyer sales The results 
on hypotheses 2 I and 2 2 will be reported in chapter 8 Several other variables have 
received less widespread attention within the finance literature The researcher will 
examine the literature on these next
2,5 Acquisition Rate and Mo men turn
Several variables measuring features of acquisitions which can be externally measured 
have received less widespread attention This may be due to several methodological 
difficulties associated with capital market methodologies ' This category includes,
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acquisition rate, momentum, timing, acquiree profit, price paid, growth of target, and 
the Williams amendment 1968. 10 The last factor will not be reviewed as it is an 
American piece of legislation and thus is not relevant to this research as data was only 
collected in the United Kingdom.
Acquisition rate appeared pertinent to this research as it partly reflects the experience 
of the organisation, and those individuals who have remained at that company A 
company with a high acquisition rate may be expected to have more established 
procedures and rules of thumb concerning acquisitions Kusewitt (1985), found a 
negative relationship between acquisition rate, and success. This was related to 
acquirer size. Larger firms were able to make more acquisitions, possibly because 
some acquisitions may have been conducted at divisional or business unit level The 
integration process in larger companies may also only affect individual divisions or 
business units.
Associated with acquisition rate is the issue of momentum. Amburgey and Minner 
(1992) found that, the number of acquisitions a company had made increases the 
future probability of making an acquisition. However, they do not examine whether 
the number of prior acquisitions affects returns. That is, whether experience increases 
success, not just the future probability of acquiring another company.
fhe limited research on acquisition rate may be because of methodological problems 
of using an event study method to examine highly active acquirers Recent event 
studies have tended to use long event periods (Agrawal et al 1992). This requires 
long periods when no other major events specific to that company occurs. Companies 
that have made more than one acquisition in the period are thus excluded from the
The number of acquisitions conducted in the last 5 years will be included in this 
research as acquisition rate is relevant to building up a detailed picture on acquisition 
experience and the success method used in this research does not exclude it Detailed 
hypotheses on acquisition numbers and rate will be developed in chapter 5 when 
company experience is examined This leaves several variables relevant to this research 
which have only been explored by Kusewitt (1985). He utilised a capital market and an 
accounting approach to success, but did not use an event study method This research 
is summarised below
2.6 Other Variables
Kusewitt (1985) examined several other variables not explored by others Those which 
initially seem relevant to this research are: market cycle, target profitability, and ratio 
o f net income to consideration. Kusewitt's (1985) findings on these variables were
a) Market cycle Returns for acquirers were negatively correlated with the market 
cycle That is, returns were higher when the market was below its long term trend line. 
Thus the tendency to overpay in boom times seems to negate the advantages of lower 
costs of capital
b) Target profitability The acquisition of profitable companies led to statistically 
significant better performance for the acquiring company for both accounting and 
market measures 11 This compares to Morck and Shliefler and Vishny (1990) who 
found that buying growth was negatively correlated with bidder returns and that this 
was significant The acquisition target’s growth was measured using sales growth over 
the 5 years before the acquisition
c) Acquiree net income to price paid Acquiree net income to price paid was not 
statistically related to performance Kusewitt (1985) suggests the data on price paid 
may not be that reliable particularly regarding the valuation of payments spread over
time
The researcher chose not to incorporate the 3 variables above into this research 
because
a) The data required would remove the ability for the company to maintain the 
anonymity of the acquisition
b) Data on price paid may not be available, and requesting it may restrict further data 
collection
c) Tests based on market cycle would not yield insightful data as most acquisitions in 
the sample were from the same period
The external variables examined in this chapter, which use a contingency approach 
with success offer limited insight into the internal acquisition decision process. They 
provide the starting point to build up a wider picture of the factors that influence 
acquisition success.
2.7 Chanter Summary
The finance methodology based literature has made few concrete conclusions about 
what makes one acquisition more successful than another Tender offers appeared to 
be more successful than mergers but this has recently been challenged Relative size, 
the related hypotheses and the type of considerations influence on success are still 
disputed with studies not consistently finding evidence for or against them
While these variables affect the process of acquiring, the effects arc uncertain Thus 
the author's research focuses on related acquisitions, made through tender offers The 
sample included only 2 unrelated acquisitions Related acquisitions were defined, as 
acquisitions into product areas in which a company already operated
Mergers were excluded from the study and acquisitions were not differentiated by 
financing methods This was because the informational content of using cash may be 
diluted if companies have a rights issues close to the acquisition, or use both cash and 
paper as consideration Relative size and acquisition rates were included as variables in 
this research The former resulting in the following hypotheses:
2:1 ) Relatively small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisitions 
2:2) There is a size mismatch if the seller's turnover is less than 2 per cent of that 
of the buyer and the failure will be above the norm
The author will now move on to examine the literature on the core areas identified in 
chapter 1, beginning with the search and screening phase
I outnoles
For a definition of merger under companies Act 1980 see Samuels, Wilkes and Braysliasv 1989 009 
Average return on equity between 1968 and 1977
I Similar product same market
' Same product new geographic market 
Reprint of 1967 article.
flic divisions of relative size or the equity market value of the merging firms used were less than 50 
per cent, 50 per cent to 100 per cent, and greater than 100 per cent 
Data on acquisitions of parts of organisations may not be available 
* Fisher exact tests can be conducted where the minimum frequency is below 5. This is, however, 
valid only for tests using 2 dichotomous variables 
‘ These problems were outlined m section 14.
10 flic Williams amendment is an American Act which changed the bidding process It is claimed it 
reduced bidder gains, Franks and Harris (1989:236), however, dispute this
II The return on assets employed measure was significant at 99.99 percent and the market measure 95 
percent (Kusewitt 1985:160).
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( 'lianter 3 INFORMATION COLLECTION
ANI) ACQUISITION SI ARC III S
3.0 Introduction
Chapter two reviewed the finance literature and stated how this research incorporated 
the variables it explored
This chapter will explore the literature relevant to the information collection and 
search phase Figure 19 (in chapter 1) presented a subdivision of the information 
collection and search processes into initial information search, screen and information 
search This gives rise to three basic questions;
1) Where are companies searching ? That is, what are the limits of the initial search or 
screening criteria?
2) Who is the source of the idea?
3) How are companies collecting information on these potential acquisition 
candidates9
This chapter will address each of these questions in turn, beginning with, the limits 
companies might place on where they search for potential acquisitions
3.1 Where Are Comnanies Looking?
As stated earlier the academic research on the acquisition process is sparse To 
compensate, this review will use a broad range of literatures including literature 
directly on acquisitions, the strategic decision literature, and general management 
literature But it will begin by using the literature with the broadest focus of all, the 
general decision literature
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The central feature of social science decision theory until the fifties was rational 
economic man Rational economic man makes optimising decisions based on perfect 
knowledge Simon (1976: xxvii1) in his introduction to Administrative Behaviour 
describes economic man as 'a complete and consistent system of preferences that 
allows him to choose amongst the alternatives open to hint He is always completely 
aware of what these alternatives are, there are no limits on the complexity of the 
computations he can perform to determine which alternatives are best, probability 
calculations are neither frightening nor mysterious to him ' The reason for examining 
rational economic man, is not that it might reflect reality There is extensive evidence 
to suggest its assumptions are flawed, (Edwards 1967, Tversky 1967, Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1974), but that this is seen by the 'Classical' strategic management view as 
being an ideal to aim at: 'The most pervasive contribution of economics to strategy is 
the philosophical core of assumptions summed up in the ideal type of 'Rational 
Economic Man " (Whittington 1993: 16) That is, the dominant view of strategic 
management see rational economic man as an ideal to aim for.
If it is assumed that 'classical' strategic management aims to increase success, and this 
viewpoint is taken at face value, it seems that from the 'classical 'strategic management 
perspective, that the nearer to the rational economic man ideal a process is, the greater 
the success should be
Given that rational economic man assumes that a decision maker is completely 
informed about all options, it seems reasonable to hypothesise that 
A complete search of all possible options would increase the probability of 
success ?
Unfortunately, it is impossible to test this hypothesis as there may be infinite options 
In most cases it is only possible to prove not all options have been examined not that
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3:1) The greater the number of options formally considered the higher will he 
the level of acquisition success ?
Equally it appears that this view implies that no options should be excluded by simple 
search rules. All options should be examined
This contrasts with Simon's attempt to mirror reality, (Simon 1976: XXVII)’ 
administrative man. Administrative man is different from rational economic man in 2 
key areas:
a) Administrative man satisfices and does not make optimal decisions.
b) Administrative man does not examine all possibilities. He is content with 
simplifications because most facts are not considered relevant at a given time He 
accepts solutions that perform satisfactorily (Simon 1976: XXIX and 81-84).
The concept of satisficing is closely tied to that of bounded rationality. The concept of 
bounded rationality is different from the concept of rationality included in economic 
man in three ways:
a) Knowledge of the consequences that will follow any decision is fragmented
b) The future cannot be perfectly anticipated
c) Only a few alternatives arc considered (Simon 1976: 39 - 41, Taylor 1970: 33)
The key change from economic man is that it replaces the assumption that the decision 
maker can examine all information and all options, but instead concentrates on a 
bounded area of information to search
Bounded rationality accepts that a human can only process so much information at 
one time and so cannot have complete information in many decision making situations
they have If all decisions are assumed to have infinite options and more options is
nearer to infinite options than less options The greater the number of options
considered the nearer the ideal Thus it is proposed to hypothesise that:
A decision maker will intend to be rational, but is limited by his or her cognitive 
powers A decision maker therefore has to concentrate on a bounded area of 
information to search, as limited information searching and processing capacity would 
make the consideration of a very large number of sources of information and options 
difficult
The concept of focusing on a bounded area to make decisions is supported by the 
'popular' American management 'guru' book, In Search of Excellence, (Peters and 
Waterman 1982) as an effective decision making strategy for companies They state, 
'The numerative, rationalist approach to management dominates the business schools 
It teaches us that well-trained professional managers can manage anything It seeks 
detached, analytical justification for all decisions It is right enough to be dangerously 
wrong, and it has arguably led us seriously astray .' One of their key conclusions is that 
companies should stick to their knitting They claim that, 'Organisations that do branch 
out but stick very close to their knitting outperform all others' (Peters and Waterman 
1982: 293) This implies that companies should focus on what they already do and 
know Search areas should be limited to industries a company already operate in, as 
acquisitions in these areas are more likely to be successful
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991) focus on the process by which a company limits its 
search area They propose the view that 'formal screening exercises do not bring the 
wider benefits to ongoing business thinking that flow from considering acquisitions in 
the context of regular business planning ' (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991:83) That is, 
they see one off formal screening processes as a bad idea because, 'They are likely to 
introduce a more isolated analytical perspective and unnecessary momentum as 
pressure builds on those heading the screening project to come up with acquisition 
candidates that can get through the screen ' Thus implying screening processes may 
not be desirable in certain cases
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I he results on the related hypothesis, outlined in chapter 2, seem to mirror this split, 
with some evidence supporting related acquisitions as producing greater success 
(Shelton 1988, Singh and Montgomery 1987) and other research showing that 
conglomerate acquisitions have performed better (Seth 1990a, Chatterjee 1986, Elgers 
and Clarke 1980, Wansley et al. 1983). Thus it is difficult to state an obvious 
direction for a hypothesis, as it is possible to argue that, both limiting an acquisition 
search to the areas in which a company already operates, and searching through all 
possible candidates will result in superior performance This researcher chose to state 
the hypothesis in the form:
3:2) The existence of an established limitation to the area of acquisition search 
will increase success levels.
The measurement of success will be explored in chapter 6 which will present the 
methodology to be used in this research This researcher expects hypothesis 3:2 to be 
difficult to tests as, few companies are likely to have no limitations to their acquisition 
search area
The evidence from Peters and Waterman (1982) and the related hypothesis refers 
directly to the industry a company operates in as the factor that should limit the area it 
searches for acquisitions. Thus a sub-hypothesis examining this seems relevant:
3:3) Companies that place a limit on the industries in wdiicli they look to make 
acquisitions will perform better than those that do not.
There are, however, many other factors that a company might chose as a boundary to 
its search behaviour, if it chooses to limit its search The general decision and 
management literature fail to offer much illumination of what to expect The 
prescriptive literature on acquisitions though suggests some potential limits. Allen and 
Hodgkinson (1989A 38) sec the first task in searching for an acquisition as being to 
'draw up an acquisition profile.' They see these as covering 'Industry, size and
location, the criteria could relate to trading profitability, the scope for integration with 
current operations, signs of under valuation, tax status, growth prospects, riskiness 
relative to the existing business, corporate image, depth and quality of management 
and employee characteristics ' (Allen and Hodgkinson I989A 38-39) These criteria 
provide detailed limits to the area a company is willing to examine for an acquisition 
Given that the book's aim is to 'be a real "guide to decisions" for managers' (Allen and 
Hodgkinson 1989A: XVI), it must be assumed that the items included in the profile 
are aimed at improving acquisition decisions and success
Other prescriptive works suggest similar screening criteria (Jones 1982, Sandler 
1988 21 and Kitching 1972, 1973, 1974) Kitching (1972:108) states: 'It saves time 
and improves the results to have some systems and procedures developed ' He sees the 
choice of industry and country as crucial These authors (Jones, 1982 , Sandler 
1988:21 and Kitching 1972, 1973, 1974), however, unlike Drucker (As examined by 
Paine and Power, 1984) do not propose that companies must look at the same 
technology, markets or industry in which they already operate 
Thus this researcher proposes:
3:4) Imposing a limit on the geographic areas a company examines for 
acquisitions will increase success.
The use of a size filter as a search limitation will not be considered directly. This 
researcher, however, will examine hypothesis 2:1 that: Relatively small acquisitions 
will perform worse than larger acquisitions
The more specific potential boundaries to searches proposed appear to be individual to 
each company and subjective They are, therefore, difficult to examine This 
researcher, therefore, will not propose hypotheses concerning: scope for integration, 
signs of under-valuation, corporate image and quality of management. It is, however,
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The concept of search used so far in this chapter has assumed that the company is 
actively looking for an acquisition. The limits, however, proposed could equally be 
used as filters applied to acquisition proposals brought to the company by outsiders 
No distinction will be made between strategic filters which are used to filter out ideas 
which arrive and those which are used to act as a limit to internal search behaviour 
The next section will address this division between internal ideas and external ideas 
and how the source of the acquisition idea may affect its success, and the process that 
takes place.
3.1.1 Section Summary
This section has examined the proposition that companies might limit the areas they 
search for acquisitions It generated 2 specific hypotheses covering limiting a search by 
geography and industry Other possible search criteria were not made the subject of 
specific hypotheses, but data will be collected using open questions, so if other factors 
are used as filters, their existence will be detected.
X2  Who Looks ?
The general decision literature does not address the issue of using other people to 
look for an option The prescriptive literature, however, sees 2 main sources of 
acquisitions, using brokers or carrying out search work internally (Allen and 
Hodgkinson I989A, Kitching 1972, 1973, 1974, Jones, 1982) Stallibras (1989 17) 
further divides internal sources into '!) The individuals responsible for the business 
units which make up the organisation, 2) the acquisition unit itself.' Besides these 
sources it is possible that a seller may approach a company directly This gives three
not intended to only use closed questions to generate data on acquisition searches
Therefore if a company uses these as search limits, data will be collected
basic sources of an acquisition idea the company, the seller, and a third party broker. 
Of these three groups, Allen and Hodgkinson (I989A 41) suggest that internal ideas 
and processes should be more successful,' Only by following the research method can 
buyers really be confident that they will end with a good deal' and, 'a further problem 
with broker (including merchant banks) proposed acquisitions is that many brokers 
will be on win fees and therefore keen to see an acquisition even if it is not in the 
interests of the buyer ‘
I laspeslagh and Jemison (1991 64) support this view that brokers may not be working 
in the best interests of a buyer 'Many outside advisers, especially investment bankers, 
have a major interest in consummating a deal because they are compensated on a 
transaction basis Because bankers' fees do not vary dramatically whether a deal takes 
three weeks or nine months to close, it is in their interest therefore to conclude the 
process quickly ' ' The situation creates a serious problem Companies use these 
outside advisers to provide objective, professional advice, yet these advisers face a 
conflict between representing their own interests and those of their clients.'
Jones (1982:57) argues that, 'Caution must nevertheless he exercised when a company 
is offered for sale The potential acquirer should seek to discover the real motives for 
sale, these may include a business down-turn leading to loss-making, management 
friction, liquidity difficulties, or the desire of the owner to retire ' This view scents to 
be accepted by large companies. Norburn and Schoenburgf 1994 29) found, 'The 
effectiveness of external advisers was seen as marginally lower than that of internal 
personnel' They further found that in their sample, of British companies acquiring in 
France, Germany, Spain and Holland in 1988 and I9894, only 20 per cent of the 
companies used a mergers and acquisition broker and I 5 per cent banks in the initial 
search phase These companies were, 'typically publicly quoted companies with 
turnover in excess of £100 million '(Norburn and Schoenburg 1994 29) That is
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file empirical evidence on British data does not, however, support the proposition that 
ideas resulting from outside the organisation perform worse. Hunt(1990 69), 
generating hypotheses from Kitching's European study (1973), proposed that, 'Seller- 
initiated acquisitions are more likely to fail than buyer initiated acquisitions ' He 
(1990:71) though found that 'the British study did not replicate this finding ' This, 
however, seems to suggest that this may be an option which can affect the success of 
an acquisition
The above evidence implies there are three basic sources of an acquisition idea, the 
company itself, a seller, and third party brokers including merchant banks and that, 
which of these is used may effect the success of an acquisition. Given this, this 
researcher proposes that:
3:5) Acquisitions stimulated by brokers will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:6) Acquisitions stimulated by the seller will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:7) Acquisitions stimulated within the company will perform better than other 
types of acquisitions.
Further subdivision of internal sources into head office and operating units would also 
appear to be interesting but exploring it in a statistical way may not be possible If a 
binary success measure is used for a chi-squared test to be valid at least 305 cases 
within the internal category, implying 90 cases in total if there was an even distribution 
between the three main categories. Secondly accurately determining whether an 
acquisition idea was the result of a head-office prodding an operating unit or the other 
way round may be difficult and depend on who is interviewed within an organisation
brokers were viewed as less effective than internal staff in the search phase and
therefore companies rarely used brokers in the search phase
Examination of any hypotheses concerning whether the source of an acquisition idea 
affects information collection will be explored within the section of this chapter on 
information collection
This section has explored the source of acquisition ideas. The author will now move 
on to explore how companies collect information on these ideas to develop them into 
more formal propositions
3.2.1 Section Summary
This section examined the source of acquisition ideas. It proposed that external ideas 
from sellers, and third parties will perform worse than ideas generated within the 
company
3,3 Information Collection
This section will examine how the literature expects companies to collect information 
to evaluate potential acquisitions. The researcher will begin by examining the classical 
strategic management's use of rational economic man as a goal.
If the classical strategic management perspective, that rational economic man is an 
ideal a company should aim at, is accepted (Whittington 1993. 16) it might be 
expected that the more information sources we examine the greater the success of an 
acquisition The model which replaced economic man at the centre of decision theory 
Simon's (1976) administrative man, seems to support a different position Given the 
central assumption of administrative man, that man has finite information processing
Thus qualitative data which is collected in this area will be explored but no statistical
work will be carried out
powers, he cannot examine all information, and therefore at some point additional 
information starts to have negative value, as the decision maker no longer can process 
information effectively That is, additional information no longer always produces 
additional benefit
This is illustrated in Figure 3 1 which plots the number of information sources against 
success levels for the decision based on them, for the rational economic man and 
'Administrative Man' models
Figure 3,1 Volume of Information Sources and Success l.evel
Laboratory evidence on this is unclear Dukerich and Nichols (1991 120), reporting 
laboratory research on information searches, state 'Snyder and Swann (1978) and 
Shaklce and Fischhoff (1982) have characterised information searches as primarily
confirmation seeking, with decision makers truncating searches early ' Dukerich and 
Nichols (1991:120), though, found that information searches were influenced by the 
nature of information presented and that, ' The present research, which provided 
answers, indicated that truncated search does not always occur' The evidence thus 
does not exclude the possibility that managers might use many information sources, as 
hypotheses generated from the perspective that rational economic man is a goal to be 
aimed at might lead us to expect.
llaspeslagh and Jemison(1991) state that managers have access to less information in 
acquisitions than in other capital budgeting decisions This is for 2 reasons because, 
(1991:54) 'Managers in target firms are not willing to share this information with 
potential acquirers' and that, 'Operating managers who could better understand and 
interpret the data are frequently left out.' (1991 55) This could result in Simon's (1976) 
'Administrative Man' model predicting the same as the rational economic man model 
for acquisitions, as the point at which information overload occurs and information has 
negative value is never reached.
The finance textbooks give little attention to how information is collected though 
detailed attention is given to how to identify the relevant cash flows for a project if all 
information is available.(Lumby 1989 Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw 1989). Samuels, 
Wilkes and Brayshaw (1989)state, 'In quantitative assessment it is vital that all and 
only all relevant cash flows are included in the analysis ' This assumption of all 
information being available is rarely valid in 'real' situations and thus offers little 
illumination of how finance theory expects managers to collect information.
Higson’s finance text-book (1986) suggests that the decision maker should collect 
information until the marginal cost of the information is equal to the marginal benefit, 
that is the net benefit of the information is at its maximum. The method by which the
information is valued is not widely discussed, Higson (1986:51) states 'At this stage 
we ask the reader to acecpt that decision-makers may make judgements about the 
value of information ' The marginal benefit of information in acquisitions should be 
high because of the size and potential liabilities If we accept that information will be 
difficult to obtain ( llaspeslagh and Jemison 1991 54,58) then the administrative man 
model would appear to be consistent with the rational economic man model fhis 
would seem to imply the hypothesis that
3:8) The greater the number of information sources used the greater the 
probability of success.
Mint7.berg (1975:52), however, found, 'Managers strongly favour the verbal media - 
namely telephone calls and meetings.' That is, managers favour verbal information and 
tend to ignore reports It would therefore seem worthwhile also to test the following 
hypothesis:
3:9) The more people requested to provide information the higher the 
probability of success.
I ligson's ( 1986) position would lead us to expect information with a low cost and high 
value to be collected first This would primarily be internal information obtained from 
routine reporting and informal networks. Later in the process more expensive external 
information will be collected
Thordsen et al (1990) found that, if information was not easily accessible, decision 
makers did not acquire it This supports the view that too some degree decision 
makers appear to be behaving as if they were following Iligson's (1986) marginal cost 
rule This researcher therefore proposes to examine this issue through the hypothesis 
3:10) Managers who are regularly circulated with information arc more likely to 
use more information sources.
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3:11) Managers at companies which collect market share data on markets which 
they do not currently operate in will use more information sources.
3:12) Companies which have corporate information libraries will use more 
information sources.
3:13) Companies that have arranged access to external corporate information 
libraries will use more information sources.
This researcher expects that most companies will collect information on the markets 
they are already present in This would make tests invalid of the hypotheses that 
Managers at companies which collect market share data on markets which they 
currently operate in will use more information sources
This will, therefore, not be included as a specific hypothesis although data on it will be 
collected
The prescriptions by the finance textbooks on information collection primarily relate to 
the relevance or not of certain information, or assume perfect rationality. This lack of 
advice by the finance literature may lead to a greater variety in search procedures as 
the one literature which provides clear prescriptions on certain areas of acquisition 
decision making does not do so on information collection Thus experience may be 
more important
Rasmussen (1993) found that experts would choose an information economic strategy 
only when the cost of observation was high Time rather than information was the 
important criteria Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) examining the ability of various 
groups to predict stock prices and earnings found that experts used more cues that 
produced more useless variation This seems to be particularly relevant to this research 
since a key task in acquisition decisions is to generate predictions of future earnings
Even if information is not circulated, it should be easier to obtain if tlte organisation
has already collected it Thus it is proposed that
Unfortunately the experts they used were MBA students Shanteau (1992:253) reports 
though that 'Various studies, however, have reported that models of experts retied 
surprisingly low information use (Goldberg 1970) Under use of available information 
has been reported for criminal court judges (Ebbesen and Konecni, 1975) medical 
pathologists (Einhorn, 1974) and clinical psychologists (Goldberg 1970)' Hershey et 
al (1990) similarly found that their novice decision makers collected more 
information though this was only significant at the 93 per cent level
Devine and Kozlowski (1995:302), in contrast, state: 'With regard to past 
discrepancies in the expert-novice literature these findings suggest that high 
knowledge individuals in a given domain may perform better and access less 
information than low knowledge individuals only when the task environment is 'user 
friendly' (e g highly structured and or cast in terms familiar to the knowledgeable 
individual).... On the other hand, when tasks are ill structured or phrased in language 
that fails to facilitate recall, high knowledge individuals may resemble low knowledge 
individuals in terms of information search and performance.' Most acquisitions in 
comparison to Devine and Kozlowski's(1995) tasks appear to be ill structured as 
information may be collected from a variety of sources (Birley, 1976, Kitching, 1974, 
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991). A company which is actively being sold, however, 
might provide detailed structured information
The evidence presented here contrasts with the classical model which would predict no 
différence between novice and experienced decision makers as they both would collect 
all relevant information Shanteau's (1992) reporting of others work suggest 
experienced individuals used less information than other decision makers. Yates, 
McDaniel and Brown (1991), in contrast, found they used more sources of 
information Devine and Kozlowski's(1995) found that it depends on the task
Kxpertise, however, seems to have an influence on the number of information sources 
used The nature of this relationship is, however, unclear This research however 
cannot control the precise nature of the data collected as its data collection method 
will not be a laboratory experiment The relationship will, therefore, be explored by 
examining the hypotheses
Kxpert decision makers use a greater number of information sources.
Kxpert decision makers ask more people for information
The definitions of expertise to used in these hypotheses will be specified in chapter 5, 
where the researcher will expand the hypotheses to take account of the experience 
measures developed The contents of this chapter will now be summarised
3.4 Chanter Summary
This chapter has examined the areas in which companies search for acquisitions and 
what information sources they use to base their decisions It has proposed that the 
existence of limitations to a search area regarding both industry and geography may 
affect success The second part of this chapter argued that the source of the stimulus 
to examine a specific company might affect the success of an acquisition Third, this 
chapter considered that the number of information sources used might affect 
acquisition success and that the availability of information may effect the number of 
information sources used Finally, it examined the effect o f the experience of the 
person running the project and the number of information sources used As a result of 
this review, the following hypotheses were generated
3 .5 Hypotheses Proposed in This Chapter
N umher of Options
3:1) The greater the number of options formally considered the higher will be 
the level of acquisition success ?
Search Area
3:2) The existence of an established limitation to the area of acquisition search 
will increase success levels.
3:3) Companies that place a limit on the industries in which they look to make 
acquisitions will perform better than those that do not.
3:4) Imposing a limit on the geographic areas a company examines for 
acquisitions will increase success.
Source of Idea
3:5) Acquisitions stimulated by brokers will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:6) Acquisitions stimulated by the seller will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:7) Acquisitions stimulated within the company will perform better than other 
types of acquisitions.
Sources of Information Available and Used
3:8) The greater the number of information sources used the greater the 
probability of success.
3:9) The more people requested to provide information the higher the 
probability of success.
3:10) Managers who arc regularly circulated with information are more likely to 
use more information sources, this will be tested as:
3:11) Companies which collect market share data on markets in which they do 
not currently operate will use more information sources
3:12) Companies which have corporate information libraries will use more 
information sources.
3:13) Companies that have arranged access to external corporate information 
libraries will use more information sources.
Experience and Information Collection 
Hypotheses to be fully specified in chapter 5;
Expert decision makers use a greater number of information sources.
Expert decision makers ask more people for information.
This author having examined how the literature proposes companies do or should 
search for information and acquisitions, will next examine the literature concerning 
criteria by which companies are expected to evaluate acquisitions and how these 
should be applied.
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Footnotes
1 This is the third edition, it was originally published in 1945. The third edition however has an 
additional introduction, which is referred to here
2All hypotheses to be tested will be number using the chapter number they arc generated in followed 
by a number These will be used in the empirical chapter to allow the sources of the hypotheses to be 
found.
1 Originally published in 1945. The edition cited in this research was published in 1976 which 
includes additional material This book will be cited as Simon (1976) in this thesis 
'T h eir response rale was 70 completed questions out of 188 companies - 37 per cent 
5 The minimum expected frequency for a chi-squared test to be valid is 5 The researcher however 
thought that assuming a perfect distribution between the categories would be risky
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I his chapter will examine the literature on the evaluation phase of acquisitions. The 
researcher will start by considering the financial appraisal literature that makes 
prescriptions about what techniques should be used to decide whether to proceed with 
a project Acquisitions will be treated as a specific case of a capital investment 
decision It will then examine the literature on the adoption of sophisticated techniques 
by companies. The decision literature will not be surveyed here as it offers little advice 
on precisely what criteria decision makers should use in a given situation
4,1 Finance Literature
This section will review the financial appraisal literature concluding that it supports the 
use of the Net Present Value (NPV) method as the only evaluation technique that 
always produces a value maximising result.
The financial investment appraisal textbooks usually present 5 methods for making 
decisions on capital investment projects Those commonly presented by the textbooks 
are payback period, accounting rate of return (ARK), earnings per share (EPS) 
internal rate of return (IRK), and net present value (NPV) Option pricing methods 
are not considered Textbooks, only mention the possibility of using option pricing as 
a tool to analyse investment decisions involving physical assets Limited empirical 
work has been done on option pricing o f investment decisions involving physical 
assets Data collection techniques, however, will be sufficiently open to allow data to
4,2 Payback
The payback period is rejected by the finance literature as a method for evaluating 
financial investment decisions. The reasons behind the rejection of payback are 
twofold, it fails to take account of; I) cash Hows after the payback period, and 2) the 
time value of money. The latter problem can be overcome if a discounted payback is 
used, this still though does not take into account the cash flows after the payback 
period
The problem of not taking into account cash flows after the payback period is a 
particular problem if there are negative cash flows after the payback period such as at 
the end of the life of an oil rig or quarry A further problem with payback period as a 
criterion is that it has no clear fixed objective decision rule It may be possible to 
rationalise longer payback periods for longer projects.
The traditional textbook view on payback is best summarised as: 'Clearly the payback 
investment appraisal method does not meet the requirements of our decision rule 
the reason being that - even allowing for the fact that it can be adapted to allow for the 
time value of money - it uses sp eed  o f  return, rather than rate of return as its criterion 
of project desirability.'(Lumby, 1988:53)
There are some advantages to this method First, ease of use It requires shorter term 
projections than other methods. Second, it is also a precaution against over optimistic 
cash flow projections as these are likely to be concentrated in later years.
be collected on the use of option pricing This review will now examine the textbook
view on each of the methods listed above
The textbook view thus appears to be divided into two. Some argue that the payback 
period should not be used as it hinders decision making because it may offer a 
contradictory view to NPV 'The trouble with simple rules of thumb like payback is 
that they may not give results that are consistent with NPV' (Higson, 1991:143) 
Others see it is a useful secondary measure to guard against the effects of biased 
forecasting. Franks, Broyles and Carleton, (1985:71) conclude: 'The payback period 
should be considered mainly as a measure of liquidity and as an extra safeguard against 
the effects of biased forecasting.’
If it is assumed that the textbooks aim is to provide organisation with tools to help 
them be successful, the above rejection of the use of payback seems to imply that, the 
use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce acquisition success. This researcher 
therefore proposes:
4:1) Use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success.
4.3 Accounting Rate of Return
The second measure commonly considered by textbooks is accounting rate of return 
The accounting rate of return (ARR) as an investment decision criterion has two main 
advantages
1) It is simple to operate (Higson 1991:146).
2) It focuses on measures that are used to report a firm's operating performance Pike 
and Dobbins (1986:281) state, 'Part of the case in favour of retaining the ARR lies in 
the fact that its absence leads to an inconsistency between methods commonly used to 
report a firm's operating results and the techniques most frequently used to appraise 
investment decisions ' Lumby (1988:34) says, 'management's success or failure in 
taking financial decisions in aggregate  is judged on the basis of the company's return
The main disadvantages of ARR are:
1) It is not based on cash flows (Sizer 1989:277)
2) It fails to consider the timing of returns (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw 1990 123, 
Sizer 1989:277)
3) Accounting rates of return are based on accounting data which is not prepared for 
decision making purposes.
4) Lack of definition of capital employed. (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw 1990 123) 
The lack of definition of capital employed is particularly open to abuse in an 
acquisition situation where the write-down of asset values may be taking place A 
solution to this is to use a value based on consideration plus necessary corrections for 
asset sales and changes in working capital. This though may not give a value 
comparable to a company's normal accounting practice, one major benefit of the 
accounting rate of return.
Lumby (1988:34) sums the textbook view on payback and accounting rate of return, 
'In sum these two techniques may be suitable as initial screening devices or to evaluate 
small, short-lived projects However, they should not be used otherwise, with the 
possible exception of discounted payback.'
Acquisitions clearly do not fit into the category of short-lived projects and are usually 
not that small. In conclusion, the attitude of finance textbooks to payback is that it 
should only be used as a measure of liquidity, and that ARR should not be used 
Higson (1991:147) states ' We firmly believe that the decision maker should use the 
best rule available, nor do we think the DCF (D iscounted Cosh h'low) rule is too
on capital employed (amongst other things). Therefore it appears sensible that
individual investment decisions should be taken on the same basis '
sophisticated for the manager to employ '' Given the above it seems to reasonable to 
hypothesise that:
4:2) IJsc of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce success
4.4 Karuings Per Share
learnings per share as a decision criterion in the eyes of the finance textbooks suffers 
from the same problems as ARR: 'Again, this calculation ignores cash flow, timing and 
risk It does not tell us whether the cash flows generated by the project are worth 
more than the present value of the cash outlays' (Pike and Dobbins, 1986:47). EPS is 
not considered by Carsberg (1974), Higson (1991), Luinby (1988), Sizer (1989) and 
Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw (1990) as a technique for appraising capital projects 
in their textbooks on financial decision making Pike (1983) examining the use of 
capital appraisal techniques, did not ask about the use of earnings per share. This 
researcher, therefore, hypothesises that:
4:3) Use of Earnings per share dilution as a decision criterion will reduce success 
This leaves the manager with discounted cash flow methods to evaluate projects.
4.5 Internal Rate of Return and Net Present Value
The textbook view on IRR is that as a method it will give the correct (Value 
maximising) answer if used properly. Higson( 1991:92) defines IRR as, 'IRR measures 
the yield of a set of cash flows in percentage terms and is the discount rate which 
makes the NPV {N et Present Value) of the cash flows equal zero Mathematically it is 
R in the following formula:
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ClnNPV = Z
(  =  0 ( 1  +  « ) '
=  0
Where C( = cash flows in period t ’
There are four problems with the application of IRR:
1) If a project has more than one change of sign in the cash flows there may be more 
than one solution or none at all. This is illustrated in figure 4 1, where the net present 
value of the cash flows of project A shown in table 4 1 are plotted against the discount 
rate.
Table 4.1 Cash Flows For A Project A
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
-1 2 0 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
44 4 4 44 4 4 -2 5 0
Figure 4.1 Discount Kate Against Net Present Value for Project A
£ 1 0 .0 0  
£5 00  
£ 0.00 
NPV £5.00 
£ 10.00 
£15 .00 
£ 20.00
> ----------- — ------------ ------------------- T
Net Present Value Equal to Zero
0  0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.12 0.14 0 .16  0.18 0.2 0.22 0.24
Discount Rate
2) If a project has negative cash flows after positive, a project should be accepted if 
IRR < opportunity cost of capital. This is illustrated in figure 4 2, where the net 
present value of the cash flows for project B shown in table 4.2 are plotted against the 
discount rate
Table 4.2 Cash Flows for A Project B
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 year 5
50 50 50 50 50
Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
50 50 50 50 -400
Figure 4.2 Net Present Value Against Discount Kate For Project B
£ 140.00
£ 120.00
£ 100.00
y
£80.00 \
NPV
£60.00
£40.00 Net Present Value
£ 20.00
£0.00
Equal to Zero - IRR
0 .0 2  0 .0 4  0 .0 6  0 .0 8  0.1 0 .1 2  0 .1 4  0 .1 6  0 .1 8  0 .2  0 .2 2  0 .2 4
Discount Rate
3) Use of correct rates for comparison. Short term projects should be compared to the 
short term cost of capital and long term projects to the long term cost of capital.
4)The IRR does not take into account the size of projects so where two projects are 
mutually exclusive an IRR may give an incorrect indication
The view of most textbooks is that IRR is acceptable but not as theoretically correct as 
NPV Some, however, take a more rigid position: 'The strong conclusion is that for 
several reasons the IRR investment appraisal technique is - just like payback and 
ROCE ( Return on C apita l Em ployed) /ARR - unsatisfactory Therefore, only NPV 
remains as an investment appraisal technique which will give consistently reliable 
advice which will lead to shareholder wealth maximisation ’’ (Lumby, 1988:110) This 
leaves net present value as the only technique the finance literature supports to 
evaluate investment decisions. The reason for using NPV, given the decision rule of
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In conclusion, the position of most textbooks on these measures is clear Companies 
should use NPV, and if necessary, IRK but not payback or accounting rates of return 
lligson (1991 147) concludes 'We firmly believe that the decision maker should use 
the best rule available, nor do we think the DCP rule is too sophisticated for any 
manager to employ1 and Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw (1990:162) ’The correct 
procedure is of course discounted cash flow methods, preferably NPV but also if used 
appropriately, yield(JU R )''
Thus the finance literature would expect companies not using discounted cash How 
techniques to perform worse The more rigid would also expect those companies 
using other criteria besides discounted cash flow techniques to perform worse than 
those only using discounted cash flow
Considering the above, this researcher proposes that the use of discounted cash flow 
measures as decision criteria will increase acquisition success as they are the valid 
criteria supported by the finance literature Therefore the following hypothesis is 
proposed:
4:4) llse of DCF measures as a decision criterion will increase success
As NPV based measures have been implied to be superior to IRR measures it is also 
proposed that:
4:5) Use of NPV as a decision criterion will increase success rates
taking all projects with a NPV greater than zero, are that it maximises the wealth of
shareholders.
4:6) The use of only NPV as a decision criterion will give an increased success 
level.
This is supported by Pike's (1988) empirical work, which found significant positive 
associations between the use of DCF techniques and higher levels of capital investment 
effectiveness.
This leaves the question as to what discount rate should be used to calculate net 
present value.
Finally the use of only NPV as a decision criterion is proposed by Lumby (1988 I 10)
while other authors have implied it is superior to 1RR (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw,
1990:162 and Higson 1986:147) It is proposed, therefore, that:
4.6 Discount Rates Used
The textbook finance approach states the discount rate used should be the cost of 
capital relevant to the acquisition That is, it should reflect the specific risk level of an 
acquisition Schlosser (1992:323) states 'the discount rate we recommend you to use 
for screening strategic alternatives is the cost of unlevered equity, the return expected 
by the financial markets when they provide equity to the industry in which you are 
investing' This approach, the adjusted present value (APV), requires the financing 
side-effects of a project and the project to be evaluated separately, the calculation of 
this though is problematic. The recommended method to establish a discount rate that 
reflects the risk involved in a project has been to use the capital asset pricing model to 
establish the return required by the market for a quoted company operating in the same 
industry as the acquisition This rate should then be ungeared.
This though raises problems of finding a quoted company in the same market, and 
being able to ungear the beta. A problem with acquisitions compared to capital 
investment projects is that the target may operate in more than one market, thus 
requiring the cash flows to be divided and appropriate rates applied to each set Cash 
flows should also be divided by country if the target operates in more than one country 
and different discount rates applied for each country reflecting their individual risk 
Thus an acquisition should not be discounted at a fixed established rate, unless that 
rate has been established specifically for that industry and country
An alternative to this is to use the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). This 
incorporates the values of financing side-effects by using a lower discount rate. This 
assumes a constant target mix of financing which remains constant over time
The main problem with WACC though is that it is an average for the whole firm, the 
capital for an individual project may have different risk levels, and the project may 
bring different financing costs and benefits including tax shields Schlosser (1992:319) 
states, 'The WACC approach is simple and popular but it makes a very strong 
assumption about the existence of a target capital structure, a notion which is 
intuitively appealing but challenged by a number of theoreticians and practitioners.... 
We would therefore recommend that you use the APV approach, which has the 
advantage of forcing you to make an explicit assumption about the financing side 
effects in each situation you analyse. When a problem is complex, it is always 
preferable to remain aware of the assumptions you make ' Schlosser concludes 
(1992:324) 'You will probably use the cost of equity as the discount rate for 
calculating the net present value of strategic alternatives '
The problem with the APV approach, that of using an ungeared beta to establish a 
return and then evaluating financing benefits separately is that it is complex, time
consuming and may well require to be done at head-office level Higson (1991:288) 
states ' We suspect that APV will only be attractive when the project in question is 
sizeable and the firm believes its financing costs - tax advantages, issue costs and so 
forth - are significantly out of line with the rest of the firm ' This may be the case for 
all but the smallest acquisitions.
An alternative approach is to calculate a divisional beta and use this for projects The 
extent to which this reflects risk will depend on how homogeneous the divisions are in 
terms of factors which cause business risk. This reduces the time costs while 
maintaining accuracy.
The most theoretically sound position is to use an adjusted present value discounted 
using a rate established specifically for that project from ungeared equity rates.
Fixed hurdle rates should not be used in most acquisitions, the rate should be 
established for each project, and reflect the project risk not that of the organisation as 
a whole This researcher therefore hypothesises that:
4:7) The use of fixed hurdle rates will lower success levels.
This chapter so far has examined what theoretically companies should do. It will now 
examine what researchers have found companies are doing.
4.7 Kinnirical Evidence on Use of Capital Budgeting Techniques
There has been extensive work in the United States on the use of sophisticated 
budgeting techniques: Gitman and Mercurio (1982), Haka, Gordon and Piches (1985), 
Klammer (1972), Klammer and Walker(1984), Petry and Sprow(1993) and Pruitt and 
Gitman (1987) These, however, may not be relevant to the British environment This 
review will therefore focus on recent British studies in this area: Carr, Tompkins and 
Bayliss (1991), Neal and Buckley (1992), and Pike (1983, 1988) Older British papers 
Rockley, (1973), and Scapens and Sale, (1981) will not be used in the light of Pike's 
(1983,1988) findings that use of discounted cash flow techniques has increased 
markedly since the early seventies. It also should be noted that the only study which 
explicitly examines acquisitions is Petry and Sprow (1993). This, however, is an 
American study.
Pike (1988) by following up his previous work on the adoption of sophisticated 
investment analysis (1983) gives a picture of the rate of adoption of discounted cash 
flow techniques without taxing mangers memories as to what methods they previously 
used The sample frame is, therefore, limited to those companies that responded to the 
first survey, large companies, which should make Pike's( 1983, 1988) research more 
relevant to this work as this research focuses on large companies
The main results of Pike's (1988, 1983) work are shown in table 4.3 and table 4.4 
Table 4.4 clearly shows that discounted cash flow techniques are being increasingly 
adopted by large British companies but that a significant minority of companies are not 
using discounted cash flow techniques (16 per cent). No company only used NPV as 
the strictest theoretical interpretation would recommend and only two per cent used 
only IRR
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I'able 4.3 Percentage of Companies lisina Capital 
Investment Evaluation Methods
Appraisal
Technique
Pike's British Data Petry and Sprow 
US Data 1990
1985 1980 1975 Industrial and 
Retail Firms
Financial
Services
Payback 92 81 73 88 7 814
Average 
Accounting 
Rate of 
Return
56 49 51 47.8 61.8
DCF 
Methods 
(IRR or 
NPV)
84 68 58
IRR 75 57 44 86.3 85.2
NPV 68 39 32 88.6 88 9
Part of Table 2, P345 Pike, 1988. Part of Table 2, P363 Petry and 
Sprow, 1993
Other recent British literature does not offer any comparable figures. Petry and 
Sprow's (1993) American results are of a similar magnitude although they show 
greater adoption of DCF techniques and lower levels of use of payback, in the United 
States in 1990 This may, however, be a factor of either, later date or a different 
country These results seem to suggest that although discounted cash flow techniques 
have been adopted by most companies a minority do not use them Very few 
companies use DCF techniques exclusively, while the less theoretically preferable IRR 
is more common in the United Kingdom and about as common as NPV in the United
States
I able 4,4 Percentages t)f Companies I sinu ( 'omhiiiatioiis of Capital 
Budgeting Techniques as Found by Pike (1988)
1985/1986 1980/1981 1975
No Method Used 0 0 2
Single method
PBK 6 12 14
ARR 0 7 12
1RR 2 4 5
NPV 0 1 0
8 24 31
Two Methods
PBK and ARR 10 13 14
PBK and IRR 8 14 14
PBK and NPV 5 6 4
ARR and IRR 2 2 0
ARR and NPV 1 1 1
IRR and NPV 3 4 1
29 40 34
Three Methods
PBK, ARR and IRR 5 10 7
PBK ARR and NPV 3 4 4
PBK, IRR and NPV 11 9 10
ARR, IRR and NPV 10 1 1
29 24 22
Four Methods
PBK ARR IRR and NPV 34 12 11
Total 100% 100% 100%
P346, Table 4, Pike 1988
1RR - Internal Rate of Return ARR - Average Accounting Rate of Return
DCF- Discounted Cash flow NPV - Net Present Value
PBK - Payback
Pctry and Sprow's(1993) data on acquisitions, shown in table 4 5, does not consider 
the use of such techniques as Payback, EPS dilution or ARR Its results are thus 
difficult to compare to Pike's( 1983,1988) work and Petry and Sprow's other data 
Discounting methods however, are the most commonly used in all three of their 
groupings
Table 4.5 Percentage of Comnanics lisine Technique 
to Value Potential Acouisitions
Technique Industrial/Industry linancial/Services Utilities
Discounted future 
firm cash flow
63.8 64 53.8
Discounted future 
firm free cash flow
57.5 36 73.1
P/E comparisons 
with similar firms
56.3 80 57.7
Discounted future 
dividends
3.7 12.0 23.1
Court determined 
model
2.5 3.8
Miscellaneous 11.3 12 11.5
P373, Table 12, Pctry and Sprow, 1993
Hunt et al's (1987) results on the reasons for acquisitions are likewise difficult to 
compare to Pike (1983, 1988) Hunt et al (1987) found that I company out of 40 
mentioned improvement in earnings per share (EPS), 13 improved return on 
investment (ARR), 6 assets, and 13 management capability as reasons for their 
acquisitions This though does not directly address the issue of whether and which 
capital budgeting techniques were used
Another area which Pike (1983, 1988) examined is the effect of size of company on 
adoption rate The theoretical literature would not expect any difference by size of the 
bidding company, industry, or experience of the people involved The evidence, 
however, collected by Pike (1983:206, Table 5) would suggest otherwise, 'The use of 
DCF methods is strongly associated with size, particularly in the case of the internal 
rate of return method (IRR)' (Pike 1983:205) Thus this researcher proposes the 
following hypothesis
4:8) Larger companies in terms of sales will show an increased propensity to use 
discounted cash flow measures.
The value of an investment should affect the process although this should only occur 
for small acquisitions where the value and potential costs of an acquisition do not 
warrant the investment of time in information collection or the use of the net present 
value technique This should be rare in an acquisition as the potential costs include 
potential liabilities which may be much larger than the initial investment This section 
has examined the empirical literature on use of capital evaluation techniques. Larger 
companies were found to adopt discounted cash flow measures earlier than smaller 
companies The author will now briefly refer to the strategic evaluation proposed by 
the practitioner aimed literature.
4.8 Strategic Evaluation
Strategic lit is a topic which is much talked about in the practitioner aimed literature 
(Jones 1982, Kitching, 1972, 1973, 1974 ) It though primarily concerns the related 
hypothesis, which was considered in chapter two As stated in chapter two, it is 
unlikely that the sample in this research will contain sufficient unrelated acquisitions to 
allow an investigation of this
The use of strategic filters covering the industry and country a company acquires in 
was considered in chapter 3 within the search process The other potential filters 
proposed size, trading profitability and signs of under valuation, were not made the 
subject of direct hypotheses but will, along with the hypotheses on industry and 
geographic area, be considered in the empirical chapters within the chapter on 
acquisition searches, rather than within the chapter on the evaluation phase.
4,9 Chanter Summary
This chapter has examined which decision criteria the financial literature recommends 
to be used and which criteria empirical studies have found companies are using
It has concluded that (Pike and Dobbins, !986:47)'Payback period, discounted 
payback period, ROCE (an accounting rate o f  return measure) and EPS effect have 
serious shortcomings as techniques for assessing capital projects1,1 'The correct 
procedure is, of course, discounted cash flow methods, preferably NPV but also if 
used appropriately, yield (//(/(),5(Samuels , Wilkes and Brayshaw, 1990 162)
The empirical work has found that DCF techniques are increasingly being used (I’ike, 
1983, 1988) However, they have not been adopted by all companies and they have 
rarely been adopted as the only method as the strictest interpretation of the theoretical 
literature would recommend The literature expects these methods (discounted cash 
flow techniques) to be applied whatever the size of the company Some evidence 
however, contradicts this (Pike 1983)
Finally, the author considered that the use of strategy as a decision criteria was 
effectively covered by the previous chapter when it considered the limits companies 
might place on the area it searches for acquisitions
As a result of this examination of the literature the following hypotheses were 
proposed :
Criteria Used
4:1) Use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:2) Use of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:3) Use of earnings per share as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:4) Use of DCF measures as a decision criterion will increase success
4:5) Use of NPV as a decision criterion will increase success rates
4:6) The use of only NPV as a decision criterion will give an increased success
level.
Use of Hurdle Rates
4:7) The use of fixed hurdle rates will lower success levels.
Differences in Behaviour Between Comjtanies
4:8) Larger companies in terms of sales will show an increased propensity to use 
discounted cash flow measures
This chapter has examined what criteria the finance literature expects companies to use 
and what criteria companies have been found to be using in empirical studies The next 
chapter will examine how experience, management resources and the use of 
consultants affect the acquisition process and the success of acquisitions

( l imi ter  5 EXPERTISE. MANAGEMENT kISOIRCES  
ANI) THE IISK OF CONSULTANTS
5.0 Introduction
Chapters 3 and 4 examined how companies look for an acquisition, and how they 
collect information and then process it into a form in which they can make a decision 
This chapter will focus on 2 issues, expertise and management resources Within 
expertise the researcher will include both company and project manager's experience 
The researcher will also take a broad view of management resources and include the 
use of consultants as substitutes for internal resources The researcher will begin by 
examining the literature on the effect of expertise and experience on decision making
5,1 Expertise and The Acquisition Process
This section will examine 2 general decision theories that have focused on experience; 
Klien's (1993) rapid primed decision model and Abelson's (1976) script processing 
model It will then review the evidence provided by the literature on expertise, to 
generate hypotheses In those areas where there is an external measure available, for 
example chess, the distinction is clear, in other areas it is not Yates, McDaniel and 
Brown's (1991) study used graduate students compared to undergraduate students, 
Day and Lord (1992), Chief Executive Officers, and MBA students This researcher 
will use the terms used in each paper Before precise hypotheses are presented the 
researcher will specify the definitions of experience to be used in this research
Script Processing Model
Experience is the central element of Klien's( 1993) Rapid Primed Decision (RPD) 
making model This model sees decision makers as recognising the situation, then 
assessing the feasibility of the typical response before implementing it This relies on 
the decision maker having previously experienced a similar situation A key element of 
this model is, however, the time scale involved. Klien (1993) tested this model on tire 
commanders, platoon leaders and design engineers using a case study methodology on 
'real' decisions He found that between 46 and 80 per cent of decisions fitted the RPD 
model Analytical strategies were more frequently used by less experienced decision 
makers.
Doherty (1993) critiquing Klien et al.'s (1993) naturalistic perspective sees the use of 
case studies as a problem He states (Doherty, 1993: 384) 'The fire ground 
commander's assertion that he only thought of one way to put out a fire cannot be 
taken as evidence against the hypothesis that alternatives were weighed and dismissed 
by unverbalized, preattentive processes.' This methodological argument between 
laboratory based decision research and the naturalistic perspective is not relevant to 
this work It is impossible to examine the acquisition decision in a laboratory The 
factors which separate it from textbook finance approach would be lost, particularly 
time pressure and uncertainty
If Klien's (1993) RPD model is compared to Simon's (1976) administrative man, the 
importance of experience becomes more explicit To recognise a situation requires 
having already experienced a similar situation This would imply that extensive 
experience of other decisions would not be particularly valuable in an acquisition 
situation Simon's model in contrast appears to assume analytical processing that could 
be learnt in another decision environment.
5.1.1 Mien's Rapid Primed Decision Model ami Aholson's
Klien's( 1993) model, however, assumes a very short time-span Acquisitions tend to 
occur rapidly but not as rapidly as the decisions required by firemen or soldiers Thus 
models that focus on a longer time span seem to be more relevant to the acquisition 
situation
Abelson's (1976) script processing appears to retain a focus on experience, and has no 
implicit time-frame, unlike Klien's (1993) model, which explicitly focuses on rapid 
decision making By script, Abelson means 'a coherent sequence of events expected 
by the individual, involving him either as a participant or as an observer' (Abelson 
1976:33) Scripts, in Abelson's view, can be used in 3 ways in decision making: 
episodic, categorical and hypothetical. Abelson gives the example of use by an 
admission's tutor to explain each. 'In the episodic version, a past single case would be 
recalled similar to the present applicant.' 'In the categorical version a generic type 
would be invoked by assimilating the application to a category' 'At a more abstract 
level, the applicant can be seen as a bundle of pros and cons where success is a 
hypothetical variable darkly contingent on all the important innumerable features.' 
(Abelson 1976:37) The first 2 of Abelson's models seem to closely mirror the process 
that Klien’s(1993) rapid primed decision maker would go through, assess the situation 
and find a historic example of it The main difference, as mentioned above, seem;; to be 
the time scale
5.1.2 Empirical Evidence on Individual Experience
The indirect evidence, on Abelson's (1976) models and Klien's model, is divided 
Calderwood, Klien and Crandall (1988) examining time pressure and skill level in 
chess players found that time constraints have a greater detrimental effect on less 
skilled players They suggest rapid holistic processing becomes increasingly important 
at higher levels of skill. This study is particularly relevant to the acquisition situation as
it compared skilled and highly skilled players, unlike many studies, which used 
students Chase and Simon (1973) comparing masters, class A players and beginners 
found that (1973:273) 'Chess skill depends in a large part upon a vast, organised long­
term memory of specific information about chess board patterns.' They conclude that, 
'the overriding factor in chess skill is practice' 'The organisation of the master's 
elaborate repertoire of information takes thousands of hours to build up, and the same 
is true of any skilled task.'
Shanteau (1992:254) summarising the cognitive-science research literature states 
'Studies within this tradition have shown expert superiority over novices in nearly 
every aspect of cognitive functioning from memory and learning to problem solving 
and reasoning (Anderson, 1981) ... experts in physics, mathematics and computer 
programming reveal similar superior skills (Mayer, 1983)'
This contrasts with how he sees the judgement and decision making literatures' view of 
experts, (Shanteau, 1992:253); 'the judgement and decision making literature paints a 
dismal picture of the ability of experts' Yates, McDaniel and Brown, (1991) found 
less expert subjects performed better in predicting stock price and company earnings 
They found (1991:77) that, 'although we might expect that greater experience will lead 
to demonstrably greater accuracy, it instead simply results in more useless variation in 
judgements' This they see as a product of the experienced forecaster adding more 
cues to their decision making without disregarding erroneous ones, because of the 
complex nature of the causality, and hence limited feedback, unlike chess Experienced 
forecasters thus make worse decisions because they overload their limited processing 
power How expert or experienced the graduate students used in this work were, is 
open to question. This contrast between Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) and 
Shanteau's (1992) view of the decision making literature that experts use only limited 
information and that this is not ideal, led the researcher to propose in section 3.3 the
Yates, McDaniel and Brown, (1991) result that experienced decision makers are more 
variable in their conclusions is supported by Day and Lord (1992), who found experts 
to be significantly more variable in their categorisation to sort problems. They found, 
however, their experienced decision makers (Chief Executive Officers) to be 
significantly faster than their inexperienced decision makers (MBA students) If 
general decision ability were a factor, the MBA students would be expected to 
perform no slower than the chief executive officer's (C.E.O.'s), which they did Day 
and Lord (1992:43) found 'it appears that well-developed knowledge structures allow 
C.E.O.'s in this industry (machine tools) (i e , experts) to make relatively quick 
decisions about which problems belong (or do not belong) together.'1 They, however, 
state (1991 45) that, 'It is important to note that those with little experience also might 
reach effective solutions to such problems.'
To study the conflicting evidence on the effect of experience and expertise Devine and 
Kozlowski (1995:303) setup a test relating to basketball In this, the participants were 
divided into high and low knowledge groups using a paper test. They were then asked 
to predict team behaviour in a series of scenarios Devine and Kozlowski (1995) 
found that,' (1) high knowledge individuals were more accurate than low knowledge 
individuals for well structured decisions but no better when decisions were ill- 
structured, (2) high knowledge individuals reduced information search when decisions 
were well-structured decisions and alternatives were descriptively labelled (in 
comparison to information search for ill-structured decisions and when alternatives 
were nominally labelled) and (3) high knowledge individuals utilised contextual 
information considerably more than low knowledge individuals' The problems used 
in this research, however, had a definite correct solution, unlike the situation managers
hypotheses that: A) Expert decision makers use a greater number of information
sources, and B) Expert decision makers ask more people for information
face when conducting acquisitions further the problems were fairly simple in 
comparison to the acquisition situation. The researcher, however, cannot modify the 
structure of the acquisition decision that companies face Acquisitions are complex and 
ill-structured in comparison to tasks set in experimental studies
Eisenhardt (1989) found fast-decision makers' used more information than slow 
decision makers', and fast decisions were associated with superior company 
performance That is, fast decision makers use more information and perform better 
(Eisenhardt 1989) and experts are faster and more variable at categorisation Where 
there is limited feedback or structure to the information, as in the acquisition situation, 
experts appear to use more information rapidly resulting in more idiosyncratic and 
variable results than novices This seems to imply some form of individual decision 
tool, as in Abelson's script processing, but that experience becomes more relevant in 
decisions where little time is available as in Klien's (1993) model The only work 
directly on Abelson's (1976) script processing is Hershey et al (1990) who conclude 
that 'Our results suggest that both search and selection strategy vary markedly as a 
function of expertise' and 'the use o f these scripts we believe, leads to decreased 
solution times and more efficient patterns of information processing '
Zakay and Wooler(1984) found that, under time pressure decision makers, abandoned 
the normative decision rule they had been taught to use, and those that had not been 
taught the multi-attribute utility model performed better than those that had This 
would suggest that under time pressure learnt rules are abandoned and replaced by 
other experiences. If an acquisition were therefore conducted under greater time 
pressure than other decisions, learnt rules might be dropped in favour of knowledge 
built up through experience
Thus the researcher proposes that expertise will effect the decision process The 
literature however falls into 2 groups, as illustrated by Shanteau (1992), the decision
Expertise in acquisitions will increase success levels.
There is, however, a clear problem in defining what expertise is Research using chess 
has used its class A, master, and grand-master ratings This is not applicable to 
acquisitions nor is the test approach used by Devine and Kozlowski (1995), as it is 
unclear what knowledge is relevant. Similarly the use of professional qualifications in 
accountancy or an MBA, as a standard assumes the process is about only using 
accounting data or skills learnt in a business school Given that, Day and Lord (1992) 
found those experienced in an industry performed better than MBA students, this 
would seem invalid
Shanteau( 1992:255) proposes that the domain should define the expert and that 
expertise is reflected in 'consensual acclamation' This is not an option for this 
research, as it would require revealing who has agreed to be interviewed to the very 
people that companies would least wish to release information The evidence put 
forward by Yates, McDaniel and Brown(1991) and Day and Lord(1992) seems to 
imply they are focusing on experience as does Klien's (1993) model and explicitly 
Tubbs( 1992) work on auditors organisation and amount of knowledge This removes a 
problem of defining expertise as instead experience is measured The above hypothesis 
thus becomes
Experience of acquisitions will increase success levels.
Shanteau's (1992 254) review of the cognitive science literature states that' first, 
expertise is domain specific.' This could imply 2 facets of experience as relevant, 
acquisitions or the organisation and industry environment
literature which views experts as poor decision makers and the cognitive-science
research which produces positive results. Thus the researcher proposes the hypothesis
that
The importance of lack of feedback proposed by Yates, McDaniel and Brown, (1991) 
and Shanteau(1992) implies that both completed acquisitions and those acquisitions 
which were considered but not completed, are relevant to the level of experience I'he 
researcher therefore proposes to test the above hypothesis as:
5:1) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
probability of an acquisition being successful.
5:2) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater probability of an acquisition being successful.
Given Day and Lord's(1992) evidence that executives experienced in an industry 
performed differently to those with general management decision making skills, the 
researcher proposes that the experience of a manager within in an industry will also 
influence success Much literature including Haspeslagh and Jemisonf 1991:143) 
proposes that matching corporate cultures is important in acquisitions If the manager 
conducting the project has only limited knowledge of the company this could be 
difficult The researcher thus hypothesises that:
5:3) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater probability of an acquisition being successful. 
5:4) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater number probability of an acquisition being 
successful.
Given the above proposal of 4 measures of managerial experience, (number of 
acquisition reviews, number of acquisitions completed, years at company and, years 
spent in industry) the researcher will now restate the hypotheses developed in section 
3 3, and discussed in this chapter, to a testable form The hypotheses, Expertise will 
increase the number of information sources used and; Expertise will increase the 
number of people asked for information, can now be stated in eight forms
5:6) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the number of people asked for information.
5:7) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:8) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
5:9) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the number of information sources used.
5:10) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the number of people asked for information. 
5:11) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the number of information sources used. 
5:12) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the number of people asked for 
information.
The above discussion and in particular Day and Lord's (1992) evidence on speed of 
categorisation suggests that experienced decision makers can perform more rapidly 
This is supported by the work on chess (Calderwood, Klien and Crandall, 1988, Chase 
and Simon 1973) and implicitly by Klien's (1993) model The researcher, therefore, 
proposes that as experienced decision makers can make more rapid decisions, and as 
time has a value, experienced decision makers will make more rapid decisions This 
generates the hypothesis that, Experience will lend to greater speed in acquisition 
decision making.
5:5) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater
the number of information sources used.
The researcher, however, considers that only to use elapsed time as a measure of time 
fails to capture its full nature. The researcher wished to capture the balance of activity 
and inactivity, as the decision maker has greater influence on the active decision 
making time whereas the elapsed time may be set by a seller's merchant bank or the 
date of the next board meeting. Hickson et al (1986) examining strategic decisions 
used elapsed time, and a scale of the number of impediments This researcher did not 
use Hickson et al's (1986) scale because:
1) It would have required extensive time in the data collection process, which might be 
better used elsewhere
2) The use of a limited item scale would limit the nature of statistical testing which 
could be carried out on it.
3) It fails to capture whether large numbers of people were used to bring the decision 
process back on schedule.
4) The researcher was interested in activity not delays, particularly as Hickson et al. 
(1991) found that committees do not slow decisions down in the acquisition situation. 
They, however, would consume the scarce resource of senior management time
Given this wish to capture active time the researcher chose to use man weeks work 
involved This measure may not be totally accurate but it should give some idea of the 
management resources devoted to a project Two measures of decision making speed, 
elapsed time and man hours work involved will, therefore, be used
Given that it has been proposed to measure managerial experience in 4 ways 
(acquisitions completed, acquisition reviews completed, time spent at a company, and 
time spent in an industry) this gives rise to the following hypotheses 
5:13)Tlie greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the shorter 
the elapsed time taken.
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5:15) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager 
the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:16) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager 
the fewer man hours work involved.
5:17) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:18) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the fewer man hours work involved.
5:19) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:20) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the fewer man hours work involved.
5.1,3 Corporate Experience
The acquisition literature is unclear whether it is company or individual experience that 
is relevant to acquisitions. It is though an area that has received attention (Kitching, 
1972, 1973, 1974, Lubatkin 1983, Kusewitt, 1985, Lubatkin and Shrieves 1986, 
Haspeslagh and Jcmison 1991)
llaspeslagh and Jemison (1991:53) found that responsibility for acquisitions inevitably 
centred on a few people: 'Moreover, our research found that whatever the extent of 
experience at the broad corporate level, crucial aspects of the decision-making process 
devolve on individuals.' This contrasts with Lubatkin (1983: 223) who considers 
corporate experience to be important 'acquiring firms that pursue a strategy of higher 
activity in the external acquisition's market may outperform acquiring firms, that 
follow less active strategies '
5:14) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the fewer
man hours work involved.
Kusewitt (1985:159) found that acquisition rate was negatively correlated with 
market return and return on investment. He concluded that (1985:166) 'The rate at 
which acquisitions are made through time should be sufficiently high to develop and 
maintain expertise but not so high that acquisitions cannot be given the attention they 
require for proper assimilation and integration Such a preferred rate is relatively low, 
with a maximum of approximately 1 per year and probable minimum of around I every 
4 or 5 years. Very large acquirers could probably acquire at a slightly higher rate if 
acquisitions are done by multiple organisational elements.1 That is, he interprets his 
evidence to mean that there is an advantage from corporate experience but at high 
acquisition rates this is overshadowed by assimilation and integration problems It 
therefore seems worthwhile to examine corporate experience.
The only measure used to examine personal experience, which could be applied to a 
company is the number of acquisitions completed. The 3 other measures of individual 
experience do not seem applicable to the company level. Establishing the number of 
acquisitions a company has ever conducted appears almost impossible. This 
researcher, therefore, proposes to examine the last 5 years. This should allow 
comparable data to be collected from databases, removing the need for the researcher 
to decided which acquisitions are counted
The number of acquisitions reviewed would be difficult to estimate for companies 
where many people are examining acquisitions both at corporate and operating unit 
level The numbers of years experience of the industry is difficult to determine For 
example, if a company has taken over another company in a new area, I year ago, 
with 100 years of experience of that industry, what experience has the parent 
company? It could be argued that company experience of the industry has received 
attention in the literature as a binary variable through the related hypothesis
Given the above, the researcher proposes the following hypotheses, referring to 
company experience:
5:21) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the probability of an acquisition being successful
5:22) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:23) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
5:24) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:25) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the fewer 
man hours work involved.
Given the definition of corporate experience to be used, hypothesis 5:21 resembles 
Kusewitt's(1985) hypothesis that, acquisition rate, defined as the mean number of 
acquisitions per year over a ten year period, is directly related to the post acquisition 
financial performance of the acquiring firm. Further to this, Kusewitt's (1985) evidence 
on acquisition rate and size would seem to imply that corporate management resources 
are also relevant This will be examined in the next section.
This researcher, however, thinks that the company experience hypothesis should also 
take account of this. He, therefore, proposes to test hypotheses 5:21 to 5 :25, with the 
variable number of acquisitions conducted over the last five years divided by current 
sales This will not replicate Kusewitt's (1985) work exactly, as he used acquisition 
rate divided by 1976 assets compared to a market return for the whole company and 
return on assets Some comparison, however, may be possible.2 As a check on the 
effects of 'corporate indigestion stemming from acquisition fever', (Kusewitt,
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5.1.4 Section Summary
This section has proposed 5 measures of experience which seem relevant to 
acquisitions experience of acquisition reviews, acquisitions, the industry and company 
by the individual and experience of acquisitions by the company The effect of these 
on success, number of information sources used and speed of decision will be 
examined in chapter 10.
5.2 Resources Available and Used
This chapter has so far examined the experience of companies and staff involved in the 
acquisition decision This final section of the literature review will address the 
management resources available to carry this work out.
Kitchingf 1972) proposes that management resources are important in the acquisition 
decision process He found that the presence of managers of change (1972:44) and the 
availability of sufficient management resources were factors in success (1972:54), 'the 
sum of management skills must be greater than the joint management task ' He 
acknowledges the problems of lack of time and states that in the early stages of 
appraisal 'the greater danger at this stage is to consume too much expensive time 
’(1973:112) This appears to imply that a high rate of acquisition would reduce success 
as acquisition management resources become stretched This factor swamping the lack 
of experience in companies with all but very low rates of acquisition In Kitching's 
sample (1973:111) for every acquisition completed an average of 100 were screened
1985:159) this researcher will also examine the maximum, minimum and range of the
number of acquisitions conducted per annum in the five year period examined in
comparison to success
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and that the average time cost per completed acquisition was 3000 hours (1.5 man 
years work;
Allen and Hodgkinson (1986A41) support this view that an internal search for an 
acquisition consumes large volumes of management time, 'the research method is not 
just more exhaustive than the broker method, it is also more exhausting ' Haspeslagh 
and Jemison (1991) and Birley (1974) do not explicitly examine the issue of 
management resources
The prescriptive literature is equally limited. Sandler( 1988:22) states that, 'few private 
companies have the internal staff resources to undertake the detailed planning and 
searching for acquisition targets ' This could be viewed as saying the maximum 
acquisition rate a private company can support is zero. The same factors might affect 
larger companies when relatively large acquisitions are attempted or when many 
acquisitions are being attempted at once. It is proposed therefore that:
5:26) The greater the volume of management time devoted to a project the 
greater the success level.
5:27) The greater the number of people dedicated to working on acquisitions the 
greater the success level.
Hunt (1990 75) proposed that:' rushed acquisitions have a much greater failure rate 
than longer time frames.' This researcher takes this to imply that the elapsed time taken 
should influence the success He, therefore, proposes that:
5:28) The greater the elapsed time spent on an acquisitions the greater the level 
of acquisition success.
The number of people available for acquisitions work may purely be a product of the 
company's total size Hence the hypothesis
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5:29) The larger the sales of a company the more people available to work on an 
acquisition.
If the last hypothesis is established, it would seem worthwhile to examine the level of 
resources available, in terms of staff dedicated to mergers and acquisitions work, 
compared to the work load, and the number of acquisitions being conducted 
Kitching's (1973:110-112) work suggests that the work required to conduct an 
acquisition is not linked to size as many tasks in the process are the same whatever 
the size of an acquisition. It is proposed, therefore, that:
5:30) The greater the measure, number of staff divided by the total number of 
transactions reported in the last five years, the greater the probability of 
acquisition success.
Measuring activity over the last 5 years acts as an average of the level of demands on 
resources. This, however, fails to take account of the peaks and troughs in work load 
which may stretch resources Therefore, it is proposed that:
5:31) The greater the measure, number of staff divided by the highest number of 
transactions reported in any of the last five years, the greater the probability of 
acquisition success.
This focuses on internal resources However Allen and Hodgkinson(1989A) see 
consultants as substitutes for internal management resources even if not ideal 
Stallibras (1989:27) is more enthusiastic about the use of consultants, 'the role of the 
intermediary will prove to be important not only in the identification of targets and the 
execution of transactions.' Sandler (1988) is equally enthusiastic about using 
consultants This is possibly because they are both consultants The examination of the 
advantages of consultants is plagued by the problem that many of the writers are
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consultants, and therefore their prescriptions are of dubious value There is, however, 
only a limited substitute literature to base hypotheses on
llaspeslagh and Jemison(1991) paint a gloomy picture of using consultants. They see 
the lack of common experience between consultants and internal managers as a 
problem (1991:60)'.. as a result top managers often focus their attention on more 
easily and quickly communicated issues that can be quantified.' A further problem they 
found was that the investment bankers they interviewed concentrated on issues where 
they could defend their position in a court These issues were not always one's 
requiring attention. Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991:64) also state that, 'many outside 
advisers, especially investment bankers, have a major interest in consummating a deal 
because they are compensated on a transaction basis. Because bankers' fees do not 
vary dramatically whether a deal takes three weeks or nine months to close it is in their 
interest to conclude a deal quickly.' This seems to imply that consultants will reduce 
the time taken to conclude a deal and further pressure internal management resources, 
thus potentially reducing the possibility of success Considering the above evidence 
the researcher also proposes that:
5:32) The greater the number of different consultants used the lower the success 
level.
5:33) The greater the number of different consultants used the shorter the 
elapsed time taken.
This section has found that although many consultants propose their use, evidence 
from other authors paints a poor picture of their use The use of consultants, however, 
seems to be a potentially significant influence on the process.
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5.3 Chanter Summary
This chapter has examined 2 areas: how experience and management resources may 
affect the acquisition process. The former included: experience of the manager of the 
company, industry and acquisitions, and company experience of acquisitions The 
latter includes both internal management resources and consultants who can be viewed 
as a substitute for internal resources As a result this review the following hypotheses 
were proposed:
Experience and Success
Experience of acquisitions will increase success levels.
This will be tested as:
5:1) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the probability of an acquisition being successful.
5:2)Thc greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater the probability of an acquisition being successful.
5:3) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the probability of an acquisition being 
successful.
5:4) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the probability of an acquisition being 
successful.
Experience and Information Sources
Expert decision makers use a greater number of information sources.
Expert decision makers ask more people for information.
These can be stated in eight forms:
5:6) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the number of people asked for information.
5:7) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:8) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
5:9) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the number of information sources used.
5:10) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the number of people asked for information. 
5:11) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the number of information sources used. 
5:12) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the number of people asked for information.
Experience and Time taken
Greater experience will lead to a shorter elapsed time being taken.
Greater experience will lead to fewer man hours work being required.
These will be tested as:
5:13)The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the shorter 
the elapsed time taken.
5:14) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the fewer 
man hours work involved.
5:15) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager 
the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:5) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater
the number of information sources used.
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5:17) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:18) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the fewer the man hours work involved.
5:19) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:20) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the fewer man hours work involved.
Company F.xncrience
5:21) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the probability of an acquisition being successful
5:22) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:23) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
5:24) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:25) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the fewer 
man hours work involved.
Management Resources and Success
5:26) The greater the volume of management time devoted to an acquisition the 
greater the success level.
5:27) The greater the number of people dedicated to working on acquisitions the 
greater the success level.
5:16) The greater the number of acquisition reviews carried out by a manager
the fewer ntan hours work involved.
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5:29) The larger the sales of a company the more people available to work on an 
acquisition.
5:30) The greater the measure, number of staff divided by the total number of 
transactions reported in the last five years, the greater the probability of 
acquisition success.
5:31) The greater the measure, number of staff divided by the highest number of 
transactions reported in any of the last five years, the greater the probability of 
acquisition success.
5:32) The greater the number of consultants used the lower the success level.
5:33) The greater the number of different consultants used the shorter the 
elapsed time taken.
The last 3 chapters of this thesis have proposed hypotheses to be explored The next 
chapter will examine how the data to do this was collected
5:28) The greater the elapsed time on an acquisition the greater the level of
acquisition success.
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Chanter 6 Methodology
6.0 Introduction
This chapter will face the realities of how data was collected on what is a very 
sensitive issue for companies. It will present the methods used to explore the 
hypotheses outlined in the previous 3 chapters and how success was measured, a 
factor that has constrained much of the research in the acquisition area. It will focus 
on 2 main areas:
First, the data collection method, including how success was measured, which 
variables were standardised for, and the construction of the interview schedule.
Second, the sample frame including how companies were approached and tests for 
bias in the sample.
The first section will examine how data was collected, the primary objective of which 
was to obtain valid and accurate data on the substantive hypotheses. The researcher, 
therefore, chose to use structured interviews. The reasons for the rejection of other 
possible methods, published data, real time methods and questionnaires, are given 
below starting with published data as a data source.
6.1 Data Collection Methods
Published Data
Published data was rejected as the main data source as the information to examine the 
hypotheses developed in the previous 3 chapters was not available Published data was 
used for establishing the sample frame, total company sales and the number of
acquisitions completed by a company over the last 5 years Total sales were taken 
from the ‘One-source’ database The number of acquisitions completed by a company 
was taken from Extel This database may exclude some small acquisitions It, 
however, provided an external standard on the inclusion of acquisitions
6.2 Real Time Methods
Real time methods, as proposed by Van de Ven (1992), were rejected for this research 
because:
A) It would have only produced a few cases. Testing many of the hypotheses 
proposed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 would therefore be impossible. Only 1 year was 
available for fieldwork and in Hickson et al's (1986:143) sample, boundary decisions, 
which included acquisitions, took from 2 to 18 months. Even if all acquisitions 
observed took 2 months and were completed, which is unlikely, (Kitching 1973:110) 
this would produce a sample of 6.
B) Access problems. Companies were unlikely to allow the researcher access to price 
sensitive information during the analysis and negotiation phases
C) It would be difficult to determine success close to the completion of an acquisition 
The researcher, therefore, rejected this method
6.3 Questionnaire
A large scale questionnaire approach offered a number of advantages for this research 
It would have allowed rapid data collection, and would not have placed a geographic 
limit on the sample frame
It was rejected for this research for the following reasons:
a) The researcher would have no control over who completes the questionnaire Thus 
whether the respondents have a detailed knowledge of the acquisition process is 
unclear
b) A questionnaire involves less commitment to answering questions than an interview, 
thus reducing the value of individual answers (Birley, 1974 :26)
c) Senior managers may be unwilling to answer questions about acquisitions without 
meeting the person conducting the analysis and establishing the degree to which 
answers would be treated as confidential. (Birley, 1974:26)
d) All questions must apply in all cases (Mallory, 1987:95). Thus categories in closed 
questions would have to be very clear cut, so only 1 interpretation can be made. This 
reduces the detail that can be expected from such questions. It would also be difficult 
to clarify questions if a company operates in an unusual way.
e) It is ill-suited to exploring areas where detailed hypotheses do not exist as 
interesting idiosyncrasies cannot be followed up.
f) Few executives would fill in a questionnaire large enough to answer the hypotheses 
posed in chapters 3, 4 and 5. (c.f. Mallory, 1987:92)
g) Datta and Grant(1990) reported a response rate of 27 per cent. If this were 
replicated in this study it would have produced approximately 80 responses if all 
United Kingdom companies with sales over 200 million pounds which had completed 
any acquisition between January 1990 and December 1993 were mailed 1
This method was, therefore, rejected. The researcher thus decided to conduct 
personal interviews with companies that agreed to participate.
6.4 Interviews
Having chosen interviews as the primary data collection method this left 3 main 
questions concerning data collection: how to structure the interviews, how many
6.4.1 Interview Structure
An unstructured approach to interviewing was rejected as examining the specific 
hypotheses developed in the previous 3 chapters from descriptions might be difficult 
Unstructured interviews would have reduced the sample size for each question and 
introduced unnecessary researcher bias in interpreting and categorising data Thus the 
researcher chose to use a structured interview schedule.
6.4.2 Number of Interviews at a Company
Having determined that structured interviews were to be used as the data collection 
method, the researcher decided to aim at only 1 interview at each company The 
reason for this was that gaining access to individuals responsible for acquisitions 
would be difficult, and that requesting multiple interviews might exacerbate this In 
many cases, very few people were involved in the pre-decision process, Board 
involvement only occurring at the decision point. Offers of further interviews at a 
company were not, however, declined. This resulted in 2 interviews at 2 companies 
and 3 at 1, all with different people
The next 2 sections of this chapter, sections 6.5, and 6 6, will explain how the 
interview schedule was developed The first of these sections, will examine how 
success was measured Section 6 6 will then explain how the interview schedule was 
constructed Thus the researcher will now explain how this research measured 
success, and why this method was chosen.
interviews, and with whom This section and the following 3 sections will examine
how the interviews were structured and the questions asked
)
i
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6.5 Measuring Success
I lie measurement of acquisition success has many difficulties. The most common 
method of measurement has been to compare aggregate returns to the equity holders 
of the bidding companies, to a model of normal performance, often the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, the difference in aggregate performance being attributed to the 
acquisition.
Singh and Montgomery (1987:380-382) is typical of many finance based studies on 
acquisitions. They used the period 800 to 551 days before the acquisition to determine 
the normal return. This data was aggregated to a portfolio and the residuals from the 
normal return for the portfolio plotted for the period 50 days before to 100 days after 
the acquisition to establish if any abnormal return existed. This method has several 
disadvantages:
First, it requires that no major events specific to the share occurs in the period used to 
develop the normal return. This is unlikely for active acquirers. It is these companies 
though which are most interesting to this research, as they will have had greater 
experience of acquisitions to learn from.
Second, it assumes the event was of sufficient size to alter the share price to a 
measurable degree. This limits the sample to acquisitions that are relatively large 
compared to the acquirer. It was shown in chapter 2 that those studies that have not 
used an event study based method have found poor performance in very small 
acquisitions, (Kitching 1972 reprint of 1967 article, 1973, 1974, Kusewitt 1985) while 
those that have used an event study method have not. (Franks, Harris and Titman 
1991, Agrawal, Jaffe and Mandelker 1992, and Loderer and Martin 1992)
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Third, it assumes the market has not already discounted the benefits of future 
acquisitions into a company's share price The discounting of acquisition returns before 
the acquisition has been considered is likely to be related to a high level of acquisition 
experience and prior success. Hence experienced acquirers may show lower returns at 
the event point as the capital markets may have already discounted returns from the 
acquisition based on the expectation that the company would acquire and acquire 
successfully. Thus this method may systematically understate returns to extensive 
acquirers such as Hanson, who have based their earnings’ growth on acquisitions
Fourth, 'Bidders may time take-overs to coincide with favourable performance by their 
own stock' Franks and Harris (1989:247) Thus, post-merger performance will appear 
to be worse than it actually is because the normal returns are based on a period of 
abnormal returns.
Two other more general criticisms of the type of work have been raised First, the 
validity of CAPM as a model to generate normal returns have been questioned 
Halpern states (1983:302) 'using an equilibrium constrained version of CAPM (The 
Capital Asset Pricing Model) relies on the assumption that CAPM (in one of its 
versions) is the correct process to explain the underlying distribution of returns over 
the event period ' Second, Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987:221) challenge the validity 
of all market based measures stating ' the market was demonstrably and massively 
wrong in its enthusiastic reaction to conglomerate mergers at the peak of sixties' 
activity' and they continue, 'at the very least, the experience from times past advises 
caution in using event study findings as an intellectual foundation for generalised 
merger policy.' Franks, Harris and Titman (1991:86) in response to some of the 
criticisms, used 4 benchmarks, because' A potential problem with this methodology 
was pointed out by Roll (1978) who argued that estimates of abnormal performance
can be sensitive to the choice of the benchmark, and that estimates generated with 
inefficient benchmarks are generally not meaningful' This implies earlier studies may 
be suspect because the portfolios they use generate abnormal returns that are related 
to size and dividend policy,' thus they (previous studies) are likely to generate negative 
performance for larger than average acquiring firms even if performance is 
favourable'2(Franks Harris and Titman 1991:86). To resolve this problem they used an 
8 portfolio benchmark that corrected for the above errors, as well as a ten factor 
benchmark, an equally weighted and value weighted index, covering the 36 months 
beginning the month after the acquisition. Even this does not correct for errors 
resulting from returns of extensive acquirers where future unknown acquisitions are 
already being discounted into the share price and for problems of small acquisitions 
and multiple events. The event study method was, therefore, rejected as a success 
measure because of the 6 problems listed above.
Other market based measures suffer from many of the problems of the event method 
that compare returns to normal returns. Morck, Sheifer and Vishny (1990) base their 
success measure on changes in market capitalisation around the bid point. They 
compared the capitalisation 2 days before the first bid announcement in the Wall Street 
Journal to the capitalisation on the first trading day after the acquisition. To overcome 
problems of relative size they compared the value of the bid to the change in market 
capitalisation of the acquirer. Thus a company that acquires a company for 400 and 
loses 100 in equity value results in a measure of - 25%. This method fails to overcome 
problems of noise, where changes resulting from small acquisitions are not discernible 
from ordinary market variations in share prices. Second, it assumes all change in 
capitalisation occurs in the short period covered, thus only covering benefits 
immediately visible but not already discounted into the price. Thus adapted market 
based methods were rejected as a success measure.
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Published accounts based measures according to Datta (1991), 'are typically available 
in aggregate form and isolating the performance of the acquisition after controlling for 
the performance of other units and impact of other events is difficult, if not 
impossible.1 Other problems with published accounts based measures are:
a) Standardising accounting practices
b) Scale problems Small acquisitions will make very little difference to a quoted 
company.
c) Data may be difficult to obtain for private companies and purchases of part of 
companies.
Mason, Stark and Thomas(1994), however, used published accounts based measures. 
To overcome the problems listed above, they:
1) Excluded all transactions where only part of a company was purchased
2) To maintain standard accounting practises all acquirers and acquirees had to be 
British companies
3) ’The acquirer did not take part in any other significant activity in the period prior to, 
or following the take-over1 Mason, Stark and Thomas (1994:11). This reduced their 
sample by 31, from 97 to 66
4) Data had to be available on Datastream. This removed a further 28 from their 
sample
These decisions to avoid the problems of standardisation, and data availability reduce 
the sample size markedly. Given the problems of access this researcher thought that 
reducing the number of companies that could be targeted may have prevented valid 
statistics on other variables being carried out.
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Kusewitt's(1985) use of total accounting return on assets, similarly had a number of 
problems:
1) This assumes any acquisition program is sufficiently large to have an effect on 
overall organisation performance. To allow for this, Kusewitt (1985) used companies 
which had made 2 or more acquisitions which involved assets over 10 million dollars 
This resulted in a sample frame of 155 for the period 1965 to 1975. If Datta and 
Grant's(1991) response rate were replicated this would have resulted in about 42 
responses, when investigating a 10 year period of intensive activity.
2) It attributes changes in performance to acquisitions and not other events.
This method was hence rejected. Methods using management accounts were rejected 
because access was unlikely. Thus no finance or accounting method appeared to be 
appropriate.
Porter (1987) used subsequent divestment as a measure of failure. The problem with 
this is that it requires a long time gap between the date the research is carried out and 
point when the acquisition was carried out for it to be a valid measure. Porter(1987) 
examined acquisitions made between 1950 and 1975, and 1950 and 1980 which had 
been divested by 1987 That is the acquisitions included in the first failure measure 
were at least 12 years old, when it was constructed and in the second measure they 
were at least 7 years old. A time gap of 7 years, however, would reduce the value of 
other information collected as it is based on the memories of those involved Second, 
this measure fails to distinguish between a profitable intended exit, a fire sale because 
other operations within the buyer are performing badly, and a divestment at a loss
Using a measure similar to Mason, Stark and Thomas (1994) would have also
removed the possibility of the company maintaining anonymity of the acquisition and
the interviewee's freedom to talk about any acquisition of their choice
Strategic management research has used a variety of methods for determining 
organisation success. Dess (1987) lists methods used to measure success These 
include: profitability, return on net assets, long term profitability and Bourgeois's 
(1980) factor index based on 5 year growth in return on total assets, capital net 
assets, EPS, and return on sales These instruments measure total performance 
Determining an acquisition's contribution to these measures is likely to be difficult and 
subjective Thus no objective measure appeared valid for this work given the sample 
size involved and that many acquisitions will have small effects on overall organisation 
performance variables. This leaves measures based on subjective opinions of either 
managers or external analysts with a knowledge of the acquisition
The use of external analysts has the advantage of not being tied to the management 
who may have a vested interest in the acquisition being successful Bruton, Oviatt and 
White (1994) used a panel of 3 members of staff from 3 universities who based their 
view on company accounts press releases and stock brokers reports. The use of an 
external panel to judge success has 2 disadvantages:
1) It requires a group of people with sufficient knowledge of the acquisitions and 
performance since the event Access to such a group was likely to be difficult. The 
researcher considered the cost of obtaining such a group of people to make a 
judgement on acquisition success would be beyond this research.
2) It is still subjective even if there is less reason for an expert group to have any 
systematic bias.
This method was therefore rejected for the purposes of this research It would,
however, be an interesting measure to use on the data in 4 to 5 years time
This left the use of subjective measures based on the management of the acquiring 
companies opinion's. In his seminal article on the acquisition process, Kitching (1972’) 
used this method. Exact details of his method, however, were not given Respondents 
though were asked questions about performance post acquisition compared to 
expectations
Birley (1974), in order to measure acquisition success, asked 'Do you feel that the 
acquisition was successful?' This was followed this up with 'give reasons' (Birley 
1974:45) She found executives agreed on success but not on the degree or criteria 
This suggests it may be better to impose a frame of variables on which success can be 
judged. This allows the researcher to know the frame within which success is being 
considered It however, imposes a frame that may not match that of the respondents, 
hence reducing the validity of the results.
Dess and Robinson's (1984) review of performance measures in the absence of 
objective measures, highlights 3 major approaches to conceptualise organisation 
performance: a) The goal approach. This seeks to define performance in terms of an 
organisation's goals either implicit or explicit; (Etzioni 1964)
b) The systems resource approach, this sees performance in terms of what the 
organisation needs to survive;
c) The constituency approach, this views an organisation's performance in terms of 
fulfilling constituent needs.
The framework chosen, however, does not eliminate the problem that organisation 
performance is multifaceted. Thus there is a need to use multiple measures. To 
examine the value of subjective measures they compared them to objective self 
reported measures. The measures they (Dess and Robinson, 1984:268) used were
return on assets, overall performance, and total company sales The respondents were 
asked to rate performance for each variable on a scale from 1 to 5, 1 being in the 
lowest 20 per cent in the industry for that variable, to 5 in the top 20 per cent The 
study concludes that 'these subjective perceptions of relative improvement were 
strongly correlated with objective measures of the absolute changes in return on assets 
and sales over the same period.' (Dess and Robinson 1984 271) They also found a 
high degree of correlation between the measures and thus they suggest subjective 
measures may be a method of operationalising the wider non-economic elements of 
organisation performance.
This implies that subjective measures are a valid measure of organisation performance 
but not a substitute for economic measures if they are available The method outlined 
by Dess and Robinson (1984) has been used by Smith, Guthrie and Chen (1989) to 
examine performance of Miles and Snow's(1978) strategic types. They found it to be 
reliable
A similar approach to Dess and Robinson (1984) was taken by Datta and Grant (1990) 
and Datta (1991) examining acquisition success They asked respondents to assess 
success or failure on a 5 point scale for 5 variables, ROl, EPS, stock price, cash flow, 
and sales growth and to assign weights to each variable These weights were then used 
to construct an index of acquisition success. They also asked respondents to assess 
overall success and found a high correlation between the 2 measures This measure 
has 2 main disadvantages: first, it is subjective and, second, it is carried out by those 
with a vested interest in the outcome. It does, however, have several advantages over 
other measures Those making the assessment are fully informed and neither take into 
account exogenous variables nor exclude returns because acquisitions are part of the 
normal management process There are also no scale problems This method thus
appears the best suited to this research However, it does have a few faults It 
excludes no acquisition from the sample because its effects are too small to be 
detected or because the company has acquired too often
To generate some variation in success levels, a success measure needed to be near the 
beginning of the section asking about a case in the questionnaire. Datta and Grant's 
(1990) 5 item method appears to be too cumbersome for this Its length at the start of 
an interview may seem over aggressive, reducing the openness of later responses 
Thus a more basic tool is required Given Birley's (1974) approach, the section of the 
interview schedule on a specific case, began by asking: 'How successful would you 
describe the process of reviewing this company as an acquisition target ?' This was 
used to attempt to generate less successful cases where an interviewee had been 
involved in a number of acquisitions This did not prove effective. It generated only 1 
additional case of a poorly performing acquisition. This may have been because the 
interviewer was reticent to ask the interviewee to change cases, often because by the 
point in the interview that the question was asked, interviews looked like they would 
over run the time available.
This left the problem that the proposed main success measure would impose a frame 
of reference. Avoiding this by only using a success measure based on the respondents 
frame of reference would reduce the value of any measure constructed since each 
result would be based upon different variables To avoid these problems the researcher 
used 2 main success measures The first was based on the respondent's reference frame 
using the following series of questions:
IVhcit criteria  were used  to examine this acquisition?
Which o f  these cr iteria  were the 3 m ost im portant ?
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('ou ld  yo u  rate on  a  scale from I to 5 how the acquisition has perform ed on these 
criteria  ? (1 being very poor)
This follows a similar method and form to the measure proposed by Datta and Grant 
(1990) but without imposing a reference frame Second, it fits neatly into an interview 
schedule because asking about the main criteria for a decision is central to this 
research. It also adds an idea of how important the respondent viewed the 3 key 
criteria and acts as a check, on the other success measures.
The final question in both sections of the questionnaire was the success measure 
method proposed by Datta and Grant (1990) This gave 2 results; one referring to the 
overall success of acquisitions for the company, and the other to the specific case 
explored in the interview. The success measure based on Datta and Grant(1990) was 
implemented by asking the interviewee to fill in the form presented in figure 6.1.
The analysis of the results for the 2 types of scale was carried out in the same way as 
Datta and Grant (1990). That is, for each variable the scale value was multiplied by the 
weight. These were summed and divided by the sum of the weights, giving a weighted 
average
6,5.1 Section Summary
This section has explained why 2 subjective measures based on specific variables, 1 
subjective scale based on the respondent's reference frame and a simple question 
about success, were used in this research to measure success The next section of this 
chapter will now explain how the data collection instrument was constructed
Could you  assign weights out o f  10 to each criterion based on how important you
think they were?
Figure 6,1 Main Success Measure
Could you please fill in the following two questions
A) Could you rate the performance of the acquisition for the following variables? 
( 1 being very poor performance)
Return on 1 
Investment
2 3 4 5 Don't know
Effect on Earnings 1 
per share
2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't Know
Effect on group 1 
Share Price
2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't
Know
Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 Don't Know
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 Don't
Know
B) Could you assign a number out of 10 for each factor based on how important you 
think each is in determining the success of the acquisition9
Return on Investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Effect on Earnings per Share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Effect on group Share Price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
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6 .6 Interview Schedule (onsliiiclion
The main objective of the interview schedule design was to obtain the data required to 
examine the hypotheses proposed in chapters 3, 4 and 5 The main considerations 
were length, it was unlikely that the researcher would be able to get over 1 5 hours of 
an executive's time, and sensitivity, some questions were unlikely to be answered and 
obtaining access to the individuals responsible would be difficult
Given this the researcher aimed at only 1 interview at each company Requesting more 
than 1 interview with a person would probably have exacerbated the access problem 
The researcher however, followed up suggestions by interviewees to interview 
someone else at an organisation about another acquisition This resulted in 2 
interviews at 2 companies and 3 at another.
The interview schedule was structured to follow the chronological order of events in 
an acquisition It started with closed questions covering less sensitive issues. For 
simplicity the questionnaire was divided into 2 with questions concerning general 
practice and behaviour, first, followed by a section asking about a specific case The 
researcher used a variety of books on interviewing and questionnaire construction to 
modify questions (Moser and Kalton, 1978, Belson and Duncan 1976, Boyd and 
Westfall 1978, Bryman 1988). Individual questions were piloted on other doctoral 
students for clarity A complete schedule was given for review to 2 individuals with 
experience of the acquisition area, after which minor modifications were made. This 
resulted in the schedule in Appendix A
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This chapter has, so far, discussed how the data collection instrument was constructed 
and how it was used. It will now examine on whom it was used
6.7 Sample Frame
The main limiting factor on the sample frame in this research was access Interviews 
could only be conducted in the United Kingdom Therefore, the decision to acquire 
must have been made in the United Kingdom. Hence only 4 foreign companies with 
decision making centres within the United Kingdom could be approached
To gain valid information the companies must have made an acquisition in the last few 
years, but not so recently that the buyer has no experience of operating the acquisition 
and cannot assess how successful it has been. The researcher, therefore, chose to limit 
the sample frame to companies that had according to Extel4 made an acquisition 
between January 1990 and December 1993. The interviews were conducted between 
April 1994 and January 1995.
A size limit was placed on the sample to increase homogeneity of the sample frame A 
threshold of sales of £ 200 million pounds was chosen Market capitalisation was not 
used because of potential rapid changes in market capitalisation and it would have 
been more difficult to obtain in some cases.
The aim of the size limit was to the reduce the variance caused by markedly different 
organisation and size structures It effectively excludes shell companies, investment 
vehicles, oil exploration companies with 1 or 2 employees, all but the largest private 
companies and with a few exceptions companies dominated by 1 shareholder or 
family
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The sample frame thus consisted of United Kingdom companies with sales over £ 200 
million, according to FAME, which had, according to Extel, made an acquisition 
between January 1990 and December 1993. To this, 7 companies were added because 
access was available These consisted of 4 foreign food companies which had decision 
making centres in the United Kingdom and where the researcher expected to gain 
access All 4 of these were interviewed.
During interviewing several people were suggested that 1 might contact. These 
included 3 people at companies which had sales below £ 200 million These were 
approached and 1 was interviewed.
Thus the sample frame consisted of 272 companies who had made an acquisition 
between January 1990 and December 1993 and were British or were known to have a 
large decision making office in the United Kingdom.
This section has explained how the sample frame was constructed. The next section 
will discuss how the companies were approached.
6.8 Approach To Companies
The first stage in approaching companies was to obtain addresses The addresses of 
the companies in the sample frame were obtained from the FAME database. Names of 
people responsible for acquisitions were obtained from published sources including 
Acquisitions Monthly, contacts, conference attendance lists, and merchant banks If 
no name was available, company switchboards were rung to confirm the name of the 
finance director.
129
a) fhe objective of the research
b) Who was conducting the research and the institution involved
c) That they would receive a copy of the findings
d) The letter concluded: M ay I phone yo u  in the next few  days in order to answer any  
queries you  have a n d fix  an appointm ent in the next few  months.
With this was included a letter of support from Professor Gray, shown in appendix C. 
Suggestions to use postscripts and include hand corrections of mistakes were ignored 
(Mallory, 1987:97)
Each letter was followed up between 3 days and a week later with a phone call. This 
often took several attempts to get through to the targeted person. This process 
resulted in 4 responses, yes, no, that the letter had been passed on, or that I should 
write to someone else within the company. The first response resulted in an interview 
date being arranged and the latter 2 responses were followed up.
The letters were sent out in batches of between 10 and 20 at regular intervals over the 
period April 1994 to January 1995, by which point agreement to conduct 52 
interviews had been obtained. Interviews took place over the same period
This section has explained how companies were approached, the next section will 
discuss selection bias introduced because of differences between those who were to 
be interviewed, those who declined to be interviewed and those who were not asked.
The method of approach to companies was to write a letter5 on business school
headed paper to the individual identified at the company stating,
6.9 Tests for Bias
The choice of companies and how companies in the sample frame were approached 
inevitably introduced bias in the final sample. The selection of the sample resulted from 
2 stages, first out of the universe given, the selection of companies from whom 
interviews were requested, second, the response of the company, whether they were 
willing to be interviewed. This is illustrated in figure 6 2.
Figure 6.2 Sample Selection
Sample Frame 
British companies with 
sales over £200 Million 
which made an acquisition 
between January 1990 and 
December 1993 plus 4 
foreign companies which made 
acquisition decisions in the 
United Kingdom and 4 
smaller companies.
^ Total 271 CompaniesZ3
^ Sample of 120 companies ^
^ 48 Companies Interviewed J
The companies were approached in the order they appeared on the list produced by 
the database Thus the 120 companies approached were the first 112 companies listed 
by the database which had made an acquisition between January 1990 and December 
1993, plus the 4 smaller companies and 4 foreign companies suggested by other
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interviewees. The list produced by the database did not seem to be by sales or 
industry
The sample consisted of 5 1 acquisitions at 47 companies and 1 interview covering a 
programme of divestments. Four of these companies were foreign owned
Three areas were examined to check for bias in the sample:
a) Total sales over the last 3 years
b) Profits before tax for the last 3 years
c) 2 digit Standard Industry Codes
Data was taken from the One-source database Where data on sales and profit figures 
for a company was missing, it was taken from company accounts. Companies for 
which no 2-digit SIC code was listed were excluded from that analysis to maintain 
consistency.
The last 3 sets of sales and pre-tax profit figures, available from the One-source 
database in January 1996° were used to reduce effects of extraordinary items in the 
accounts
The next section will conduct a comparison of sales and pre-tax profits between the 
companies asked for interviews to those not asked for an interview. The section 
following that will compare the total sample frame to those asked for interviews on the 
2-digit SIC code.
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6.10 C '0111 n:)rison of Profits and Sales of Those ( oiniiaiiics Asked lor  
Interviews and Those INol Asked for An Interview
Analysis of variance and means tests were conducted on the sales and pre-tax profit 
figures to compare those asked for an interview and those not The results of these 
tests are shown in Appendix B, tables B I to B 6 These show that the companies 
who were asked for an interview had larger sales and pre-tax profits for their last 3 
sets of accounts compared to those not asked.
I he few very large companies in the sample frame, however, exerted a significant 
influence on these results To examine the effect on the tests of means and variances of 
these very large companies, the tests were repeated with the company with the 
largest sales in the sample frame removed as shown in Appendix B, fables B 7 to B. 12 
and with the 2 largest companies, removed in 'fables B 13 to B. 18 Both these 
companies had sales of over 3 5 standard deviations above the mean for their last set 
of accounts The very long tail of the distribution is also illustrated by the standard 
deviation of the sales, which is approximately 2 4 times the mean for the 3 years 
examined
The statistics, in appendix B, show that with the largest 2 companies removed those 
asked for interviews and those not have approximately the same mean sales, with 
mean sales of those not asked marginally larger in the penultimate and anti-penultimate 
sets of figures (£50 408 million = 2.5 per cent and £ 76 million 4 per cent) The 
standard deviation is still over 1 5 times the mean indicating a skewed distribution
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I'lie T-tests on pre-tax profits show that the 2 sets of companies have statistically 
similar profits for the last set of accounts but that those asked for interview had larger 
pre-tax profits in the previous 2 years It is proposed therefore that although the mean 
sales and profits of those companies asked for interview is significantly larger than 
those not asked for an interview this is a product of the inclusion of 2 very large 
companies in the group asked for interviews When these companies are removed the 
mean sales and profits for the last 3 sets of accounts are similar
The SIC codes of those asked for interviews and the sample frame as a whole will now 
be compared
6.11 Comparison of 2-Digit Standard Industry Codes Between
Sample Frame and Those Asked For Interviews
The 4 charts presented below (figure 6.3 to figure 6.6) compare the percentage of 
those asked for an interview in an industry to the percentage in the sample frame. A 
visual presentation is used as the large numbers of categories in comparison to the 
number of data items render Chi-squared tests on this data invalid The key facts it 
illustrates are:
a) The extraction of mineral oil and natural gas sector, mineral oil processing sector, 
processing of rubber and plastics sector, manufacture of motor vehicles and parts 
sector, and food, drink and tobacco sectors are markedly over represented in the 
companies asked for interview
b) The retail distribution sectors, financial services sectors and business distribution 
sectors are markedly under represented.
In summary, the companies asked for interview includes a disproportionate number of 
manufacturing companies and a disproportionately small number of service companies
134
The last 2 sections have compared the group of companies asked for interviews to 
those not asked for interviews with regard to sales and profits for the last 3 availble 
sets of accounts, and compared those companies asked for interviews to the total 
sample frame on an industry basis It concluded that those asked for interviews were 
larger than those not asked, but that this was a product o f the 2 largest companies 
being asked for interviews When these companies were removed the mean size of the 
companies asked for an interview was approximately the same as those not. The 
comparison of SIC codes shows that those asked for interviews are not typical and 
include a disproportionate number of manufacturing companies.
The next section will conduct a comparison of those interviewed to those not 
interviewed on sales, pre-tax profits and industry.
6.12 Comparison of Profits and Sales of Those Companies Interviewed
and Those Not Interviewed
This section will compare the variance and means of the sales and pre-tax profit 
figures between those interviewed and those not. The results of the comparison 
between those interviewed and those not, are shown in tables B 19 to B 24 in 
appendix B These tables show that the companies who were interviewed had larger 
sales and pre-tax profits, for their last 3 sets of accounts, than those that were not 
interviewed
This comparison was also subject to significant influence by a few very large 
companies in the sample frame. To examine the effect on the tests of means and 
variances of these very large companies, the tests were repeated with the company
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with the largest sales and pre-tax profits in the sample frame removed, as shown in 
fables B 25 to B 31 in appendix B, and the largest 2 companies removed, as shown in 
Tables B 32 to B 37 in appendix B The results of these tests ( fables B 25 to B 37) 
show that the mean sales and pre-tax profits of the companies interviewed were 
larger than that of the companies who were not interviewed (either not asked for an 
interview or declined to be interviewed) The researcher will now compare the 2-digit 
Standard Industry Codes of those interviewed with the whole sample frame
6,13 Comparison of 2-Digit Standard Industry Codes Between Sample
Frame and Those Interviewed
The 4 charts presented below (figure 6.7 to 6.10) compare the percentage of those 
interviewed in an industry to the percentage in the sample frame as a whole 
The key facts they illustrate are
a) The mineral oil, manufactures of metal goods, manufacture of motor vehicles and 
parts, food drink and tobacco, processing of rubber and plastics and other transport 
sectors are over-represented in the sample.
b) The production and distribution of electricity, gas and other, water supply, metal 
manufacture, electric and electronic engineering, construction, wholesale distribution, 
retail distribution, banking and insurance are sectors under-represented
These categories are, however, analysed by the primary industry a company operates 
in Five companies that are categorised as being in the building materials sector by the 
stock exchange were interviewed, their 2-digit SIC sectors arc: production of rubber
A problem that affects this analysis is the small size of the sample. Those categories 
with only 1 company in are either under represented or over represented if the 
company was interviewed, as 1 company is approximately 2 per cent of the companies 
interviewed
In summary, those companies that were interviewed included a disproportionately 
large number of manufacturing companies, and a disproportionately small number of 
electricity, water companies and financial service sector companies.
The researcher, therefore, concluded that the comparison between companies asked 
for interviews and those not asked, shows the companies have similar mean sales and 
profits when the 2 outliers are removed. The group asked for interviews includes an 
over-representation of manufacturing companies and an under-representation of 
utilities and service sector companies.
The average sales and profits of the group of companies interviewed is larger than 
those not interviewed. This group also contains a disproportionately large number of 
manufacturing companies and a disproportionately small number of service companies 
and utilities when compared to the whole sample frame. The sample may therefore be 
taken as typical of large British based manufacturing companies
6.14 Chanter Summary
This chapter has explained the methodology to be used in this research. It has 
presented the success methods used, 2 subjective itemised scales with known reference
and plastics, timber and wood furniture production, extraction of mineral products and
for 2 companies, manufacture of non-metal mineral products
frames, 1 subjective itemised scale using the respondent's reference frame, and 1 
simple question It has also explained why interviews were used, and how the sample 
was constructed. It has concluded that the companies interviewed are not typical of 
the sample frame but are on average larger, and include a disproportionate number of 
manufacturing companies. This thesis so far has explained why the researcher thought 
the problem to be examined was important, developed a series of hypotheses and 
explained how these are to be investigated. The next 4 chapters will test the 
hypotheses developed in chapters 2 to 5 This will begin in the next chapter which will 
explore the data on the information collection and search process.
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Footnotes
1 The reasons for the narrow sample period arc given in section 6 7
2 Italics added
3 Reprint of article in Harvard Business Review, Novcmber-Dcccmbcr 1967.
4 Extcl includes all acquisitions by companies quoted on the International Stock Exchange (London 
Stock Exchange) and stock exchanges in the United Kingdom and Ireland including the Unlisted 
Securities Market and Third Markets. The number of acquisitions conducted by a company was taken 
from the database in April 1995. The 5 accounting years used were therefore either 1990 to 1994 or 
1989 to 1993. For the 4 foreign companies this data was taken from the last 5 sets of accounts 
available in English at that point in time.
3 For a copy of the letter sec appendix C.
6 The last update before this was December 1995.
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(  banter 7 ACOUISmON SKARC Ill' S AND
IM  OBIVIATIOIN COLLECTION
7.0 Introduction
This chapter will examine the information collection and search processes involved in 
an acquisition Chapter three examined the literature on this and discovered that the 
literature direetly on these processes is sparse. It therefore widened its focus to include 
the decision literature To carry this out it used a 3 part structure, based on figure 18 
in chapter I
A) Where are companies searching? What are the limits of the initial search?
B) Who is the source of ideas?
C) How are companies collecting information on these potential acquisition 
candidates? Does the amount of information collected influence success'^
This chapter will mirror this structure. Before this the author will recap the literature 
reviewed in chapter 3 and the hypotheses developed.
7.0.1 Summary of Chanter Three and Hypotheses Generated
To develop hypotheses on where a company looks for acquisitions, the ‘rational 
economic man model’ was contrasted with Simon's ‘administrative man model’ 
(1958) The former in its most rigid form expects a complete search of all possible 
options The latter a limited search Given this, the prescriptive literature was 
examined from this it was concluded that industry and geography were the most 
likely factors to he used to limit a search area Thus it was proposed that 
3:2) The existence of an established limitation to the area of acquisition search 
will increase success levels.
3:3) Companies that place a limit on the industries in which they look to make 
acquisitions will perform better than those that do not.
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The second area where Simon's model, which attempts to explain actual behaviour, 
was contrasted with the rational economic man model, seen as an ideal by the 
'Classical' strategic management literature, was the number of options considered The 
latter implies that an infinite number of options be considered This resulted in the 
researcher proposing the hypothesis that:
3:1) The greater the number of options formally considered the higher will be 
the level of acquisition success ?
These hypotheses will form the central part of sections 7 1 and 7 2
The source of the solution to a decision making problem is not considered by the 
general decision literature. The author therefore focused on the prescriptive literature 
on acquisitions. This proposes that external agents may not act in a company's 
interest The researcher, therefore, hypothesised that:
3:5) Acquisitions stimulated by brokers will perform worse than other types of 
acquisition.
3:6) Acquisitions stimulated by the seller will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:7) Acquisitions stimulated within the company will perform better than other 
types of acquisitions.
These hypotheses will form the core of section 7 3.
The third part of chapter 3 focused on the number and type of information sources 
used and their effect on success. To develop hypotheses it contrasted the rational 
economic man model and Simon's administrative man It also examined how it has 
been proposed that the availability of information, and the experience of the person
3:4) Limiting the num ber  of countries a company examines for acquisitions will
increase success.
3:8) The greater the number of information sources used the greater the 
probability of success.
3:9) The more people requested to provide information the higher the 
probability of success.
3:10) Managers who are regularly circulated with information are more likely to 
use more information sources .
The empirical content of this thesis will therefore begin by examining these hypotheses 
starting at the chronological beginning of the acquisition process, searching for an 
acquisition
7.1 The Acquisition Search Phase
The model, shown in figure 18 proposes that companies conduct an initial information 
search and screen, followed by a more detailed evaluation of 1 candidate This 
requires that a company has a series of screening criteria to filter out those candidates 
that it is not interested in (Jones 1982). Thus the company must have an established 
limitation to the area it will search for an acquisition, contrary to the expectations of 
the rational economic model.
running the project, affects the number of sources used This generated the hypotheses
that:
All the companies interviewed limited their acquisition searches using preliminary 
filters
Thus it was impossible to test the most strict interpretation of the rational economic 
man perspective, namely, the hypothesis that
3:2) The existence of an established limitation to the area of acquisition search 
will increase success levels.
An extreme interpretation of the above could argue that the opposite approach, that 
proposed by the rational economic man model of searching all candidates, was A) 
impossible, U) so ineffective that everyone had abandoned it, or C) that companies that 
had used it had been so inefficient that they had died out Equally it is possible that 
companies were following the fashionable trend for focus, as a reaction to earlier 
conglomerate booms (Peters and Waterman, 1982) This leaves the 2 sub-hypotheses 
3:3) Companies that place a limit on the industries in which they look to make 
acquisitions will perform better than those that do not.
3:4) Limiting the countries a company examines for acquisitions will increase 
success.
7.1.1 Industry Search Limitations
All the companies interviewed placed a limit on the industry within which they were 
willing to acquire__________________________________
Thus it was impossible to test hypothesis 3:4, with a wide interpretation of what is an 
industry There was, however, wide variation in how narrowly these limits focused 
searches One company, company H, which was prepared to acquire outside its 
present product areas, stated:
'The first thing is to establish the nature of the business Is this the sort of 
thing that the group has the management to control9 In our case that does 
include a very broad range of basic industries '
Even this excludes all services and high technology industries All other companies 
were unwilling to acquire companies outside what they saw as the industry within 
which they already operated The researcher did not examine whether companies were 
willing to acquire outside the 2-digit SIC code areas they operated in because
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1) This would have required extensive time in an interview defining the SIC codes
2) The initial results suggested this was not worthwhile as most companies limits were 
narrower than this
3) It would have given an impression of rigidity to the filters which some did not have
Another company, company S, was willing to acquire outside its present product 
areas, though it still limited itself to the light engineering sector In a written brief to 
banks it stated:
'Acquisitions of some substance in new areas not directly related to the present 
businesses, but nevertheless having sufficient similarity in culture and 
management style, would fit well. The characteristics sought are: 
manufacturing of proprietary products avoiding the extremes of heavy 
engineering or high technology.'
This brief clearly limits this division of company S, to light engineering The other 
divisions of company S were more clearly limited to areas of current operation
Three industrial companies claimed to have no acquisition strategy to act as a search 
limitation, but rated fit with strategy or being within their current product areas as 1 of 
their 3 main criteria. Suggesting that although they may have no explicit acquisition 
strategy limiting search area, acquisitions were clearly limited by product market area
No other company was prepared to acquire outside the area in which it already 
operated Within this there was a range, however, of how broad the area was that 
companies were willing to consider.
A multinational food company stated:
'The second thing is to increase our branded position in the U K grocery 
market' 'That is limited by sector, we are not interested in coffee for instance '
A British service sector company stated:
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'Each of our businesses has a clear portfolio role ' 'If I received an acquisition 
proposition from certain profit centres I wouldn't even open it, I would just 
sling it in the bin.'
This company had been highly acquisitive during the eighties 
Another company:
'I am not saying that we would never look at anything outside of those areas 
we have clearly identified, because if, another business we are in, which might 
not be one that we want to expand, but an expansion opportunity comes along 
which is too good to miss we wouldn't want to miss it.'
A specialist retailer stated:
'We are not a business that is interested in diversification.... We consequently
typically acquire businesses similar to our own ' 'There would be 2 [criteria] I) 
is it a competitor and is that enabling us to remove a competitor and 2) are the 
sites in locations which would complement our existing portfolio of sites If 
they are all adjacent to our existing sites the target would be less attractive.' 
This use of industry limits even applied to a UK company, which had during the 
nineties diversified into gas operations; they were only willing to acquire natural gas 
production assets.
Some companies, however, were more vague, leaving themselves more flexibility 
'It needs to be adjacent it needs to be related '
'We are in the building and automotive markets so we wouldn't go and buy a 
textile company because we do not know anything about textiles'
One company had a clear hierarchy ranging from
'Doing what we do in the UK, through, doing what we do in the UK but doing 
it somewhere else, to doing something different which is targeted on the leisure 
area So as you go down the criteria they get more difficult to justify even 
before you get to take account of the financial performance.'
The widest of these search briefs are still a limitation on the industries in which a 
company is willing to acquire An example of a fairly typical search process, in which 
these types of filters were used, is given in illustration 7.1. This shows that the 
limitations on the industry they were looking at were used very early on in the process 
before any detailed information was collected Product area filters were used by all 
except one company to limit their acquisition search area. Some, however, were more 
explicit in delineating it than others The scope of these filters did not appear to be 
influenced directly by the size of the company. But the present level of diversification 
Companies limited themselves to growth within their current areas of operation This, 
however, may be related to size. The second filter used by most companies was 
geography
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Illustration 7.1 Description of Kilter Process Given hv Company Aloha
Our standardised process comes down to an iterative decision tree process First, docs 
on a prima-facie examination the acquisition fit our strategic plan requirements, 
because we have defined the criteria for the sorts of businesses we would be looking 
at They have to fit For instance, if someone rings us up and says they have a 
company for sale and they would like us to come and look at the company or someone 
has identified a company they think they we might be interested in, or we might have 
identified a company, if on a prima-facie investigation we find that, company is 
predominantly in the business of wine importation and selling it to supermarkets we 
would not take it any further It would not matter if it was the finest company in 
Britain if it doesn't fit our strategy, it would be out at that stage. That is a rapid 
strategic process, which is common to all our acquisitions, which determines whether 
we should devote any further resources to it Having decided there is a prima-facie 
strategic fit we then go through an information collection process that collects data 
from the company that includes its past accounting records all its corporate history, 
information about its management and its ownership structure, a lot of information 
about its business, the shape of its business, the kind of its accounts, the numbers of 
accounts, the products mix information and then armed with that we would do a 
preliminary valuation of the kind of impact it would have upon the assumption that we 
could acquire the business on our business. That would then mean looking at what 
integration opportunities there are with our existing businesses, what it will do to our 
buying power, what it will do in enhancing certain agreements we already have with 
suppliers, etc Having got to that stage and decided that this is looking better. All the 
time we are building up an increased commitment to the acquisition. We then have a 
very rigorous financial appraisal that is partly driven by our own board's requirements 
and partly driven by the fact that all Betas capital eventually comes from Alpha and to 
get the capital for the acquisition signed up we would have to meet Betas financial 
appraisal requirements. That is the final stage if it passes all those tests along the way 
So you are talking to the people who are in the business and it may well be at a fairly 
early stage that you establish that the people who own the business have expectations 
that you are never going to meet so in that case you withdraw If during this iterative 
process as we build up a picture of the business and its likely value and we continue to 
talk to the people as part of that process and are building up a view of their 
expectations if at the end we have a sort of marriage of our needs and our evaluation 
and their expectations that would then result in an offer that might lead to a successful 
acquisition_____________________________________________________________
7.1.2 Geographic Limitations lo Ac(iiiixilion Searches
Examining geographic limitations that companies imposed on acquisition searches did 
show a difference in behaviour Table 7 I shows the number of companies taking each 
of the 3 basic approaches:
A) Explicitly focusing on a geographic area - this varied from those companies that 
were looking at only specific areas of the United Kingdom, companies considering 
specific countries in Europe, those considering acquisitions in the United Kingdom and 
the United States of America, and some which were at present only considering 
acquisitions in a number of identified countries around the world Examples included 
Company H 'We then look at the complexity of the business, we prefer to buy large
Company S
units, large profit centres, mainly based in the UK and US.' 
'Acquisitions will be considered in any geographic area; however there 
is a strong preference for the UK, the USA and Northern Europe in 
that order.'
Company C 'We have market areas we wish to expand in_I am not saying that we
would never look at anything which is out of those areas.'
Company W 'Our area would be the whole of Europe, and clearly we would be 
more reluctant to make acquisitions the further east you go.'
Company L:
Researcher 'So the area you are currently looking at is limited geographically? But 
that is not a strategic decision but a pragmatic one?
Interviewee 'That's a pragmatic decision We had an argument with the chairman 
last time we went through all this He said but we are a global 
company, and we said yes chairman but that doesn't mean we are 
investing in Peru'
Researcher 'But if Peru suddenly becomes interesting you would look at it?'
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Interviewee 'Absolutely, it has got a long way to go though but the chairman has 
got his list of six countries we are looking at, at the moment, and those 
are the ones which 1 keep talking about, China, Vietnam, Mexico, the 
Far Fast and so on '
That is, many companies are targeting specific areas with other areas considered if 
other factors are particularly good The limits, however, are not as clear cut as an 
initial examination would suggest.
B) Companies which already operated on a global basis and had operations in most 
countries
C) Companies which had not explicitly limited the countries in which they would 
acquire.
Table 7.1 Number of Companies Limiting Acquisition
Searches to Geoeraphic Areas
Number of Companies
Specific limitation on target area 20
Companies which stated they operate on a 
global basis
15
Target countries not explicitly limited 10
No data 7
It was impossible to test hypothesis 3:4: Limiting the countries a company 
examines for acquisitions will increase success, with all 3 categories used in table 
7 1, no explicit limits, company considers itself global, or explicitly limits to the area a 
company will consider acquisitions 1 To produce valid results, the researcher divided 
the companies into 2 groups those that used geographic limits to filter acquisition
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to Search and Acquisition Success
candidates and those that did not This included those companies which considered
themselves to operate on a global basis The results of this are presented in table 7.2
fable 7,2 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Use ol Ucom anhic Limits
Use of geographic limits in search process 
and general success measure2 divided at:
Minimum 
expected 
frequency ’
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2.5 3.4 08768 * +
2.7 4.9 05991 * +
2.9 4.9 05991 * +
3.0 5.3 08763 * +
3.1 6 3 10562
3 2 7.3 02472 ** +
3.3 8.3 02752 ** +
3.4 8.3 .02752 ** +
3.5 7.8 13029
3.6 6 3 00989 *** +
3.7 5.3 05290 * +
3 8 4 9 02749 ** +
3 9 3.9 01777 ** +
4.0 2.4 12742
4 1 1.5 22727
Sample Size 35 with 1 degree of freedom
Use of geographic limits in search process 
and first specific success measure4 divided 
at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 2.9 63816
3 6 3.4 45395
3 7 4.3 44646
3 8 4.8 34450
3 9 5.8 34345
4 0 5 3 07185 * +
4 1 5.3 07185 * +
4 2 4 8 23646
4 3 4.8 23646
4 4 4 3 103 19
Sample size 27 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 7.2 (.'ont. Results of Chi-Smiarcd Tests between Use o f
Geographic Limits to Search ¡inti Acouisition Success
Use of Geographic limits in search 
process and second specific success5 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.0 3 7 04965 ** +
3.1 5 1 .02856 ** +
3.2 5 1 .02856 ** +
3 3 6 5 02125 ** +
3 4 7 .05499 * +
3 5 74 .02836 ** +
3.6 8 3 .13950
3.7 9 3 .27791
3 8 7 4 .30875
3.9 6 5 09708 * +
4.0 5.1 04021 ** +
Sample size 41 with 1 degree of freedom
* Significant at 10 per cent level
* * Significant at 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level
+ Companies that used geographic limits to searches had higher success levels.
This seems to support hypothesis 3:4 It is therefore possible to reject the hypothesis 
that the rational economic man model would propose, that is:
7:1) Limiting an acquisition search by country would reduce success levels. 
Associated with this is the question of the number of options a company considers If a 
company followed the rational economic man model this would result in the parallel 
examination of infinite options. It is also seen as a goal to aimed at by the classical 
school However, Simon's administrative man (1958) suggests that people do not do 
this Therefore, the hypothesis 3:1) The greater the number of options formally 
considered the higher will be the level of acquisition success, was proposed This 
will be considered in section 7.2.
7,1.3 Section Summary
This section has found that all companies limited the area they searched for 
acquisitions by industry and many by geographic area. The evidence presented 
supports the hypothesis that Limiting an acquisition search by geography 
increases success levels in acquisitions. This thesis will now examine the number of 
options considered by companies
7.2 The Number of Options Considered
Most companies interviewed, 34, said that when it came to the final decision they were 
only considering one option. Only 2 said they were considering as many as 6 options at 
this point. This is in line with the expectations of Simon's (19766) model and more 
recently Mintzberg's empirical work (1975). The evidence on hypothesis 3:1) : The 
greater the number of options examined the higher the level of acquisition 
success ? is presented in table 7.3 and is less clear.
Table 7.3 Kendall Rank Correlations between The
Number of Options Considered and Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure One
Specific Success 
Measure Two
Sample Size 37 30 45
Number of options 
considered
.2172* 0031 -.0218
* Significant at 10 per cent level
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients given not significance levels.
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The significant correlation between the number of options considered and the general 
success measure supports the perspective that the more options considered the better 
The number of options considered refers to a specific case, the success measure 
general results 7 However, not only is the relationship with the second specific success 
measure not significant it is also marginally negative 'file data was also very skewed 
as most companies only considered 1 option. It is therefore difficult to conclude there 
is sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis This consideration of only 1 option at 
a time may increase the importance of the source of the idea to consider an acquisition. 
This will be considered next.
7.3 Source of The Idea
The source of an acquisition idea, buyer, seller or third party is I area this research 
covers where prior work has been conducted in the United Kingdom Hunt (1990:69) 
proposed that ’seller initiated acquisitions are more likely to fail than buyer inidated1. 
However, he did not find evidence to support this Hunt (1990), Kitching (1972, 
1973, 1974), and the prescriptive literature (Allen and Hodgkinson, 1989A, Jones, 
1982, Stallibras 1989) led the researcher to propose in chapter 3 that:
3:5) Acquisitions stimulated by brokers will perform worse than other types of 
acquisition.
3:6) Acquisitions stimulated by the seller will perforin worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:7) Acquisitions stimulated within the company will perform better than other 
types of acquisitions.
It was not possible though to validly test these hypotheses, because the minimum 
expected cell frequencies in the chi-squared tests used were below 5* Bight
7:2) Acquisitions resulting front ideas generated internally will perform better 
than those resulting front cither approaches by a seller or a third party such as a 
merchant bank.
file results of these tests are shown in table 7.4.
The test results (in table 7.4) seem to support the hypothesis that acquisitions where 
the bidder was approached by the seller or a third party are less successful than those 
which result from internal ideas.
There are several possible hypotheses to explain this including;
A) Companies overpay in contested bids. These may be more likely where the seller, 
or a third party, approaches several buyers.
B) Third party advisers, such as merchant banks, are usually paid on a 'win' fee basis. 
Therefore, it is in their interest to complete the deal even if it is not good for the client.
C) Companies may get drawn into acquisitions that are peripheral to their search limits 
because it is available. Search limits are later expanded to post rationalise a deal.
D) External approaches may be made to board members who agree in principle 
without considering the implications and the company buys to save face.
E) External approaches may have fixed time-tables reducing the time available to build 
up a detailed picture of a company.
F) Companies which buy companies which were bought to them by the seller or a third 
party may be less rigorous in their information searches.
companies said the idea had been bought to them by an adviser, 15 the seller and 23
that it was an internal idea. Hypotheses 3:5 to 3:7 were therefore restated as:
T able 7.4 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Source of Idea
ami Acquisition Success
Source of acquisition and general 
success measure divided at
Minimum expected 
frequency9
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
2.5 3.3 .03653** +
2.7 4.7 .02479 ** +
2.9 4.7 .02479 ** +
3.0 5.2 .00581 *** +
3.1 6 1 .00728 *** +
3.2 7.1 .04826 ** +
3 3 8.0 .04685 ** +
3.4 8.0 .04685 ** +
3.5 8.0 04289 ** +
3.6 6 6 .07375 * +
3.7 5.7 .05895 * +
3.8 5.2 .11174
Sample Size 36 with 1 degree of freedom
Source of acquisition and first 
specific success measure divided at:
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3.5 2.9 .65243
3.6 3.3 .56277
3.7 4.0 .35432
3.8 4.4 .26622
3.9 5.1 02948 ** +
4.0 4.4 .12133
4.1 4.4 .12133
4.2 4.0 13951
4.3 4.0 13951
4.4 3.3 .41889
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 7,4 ( Outiiiiif>1 Clii-Sunmed Texts oil Source of 
Idea and Acquisition Success
Source of acquisition and second 
specific success measure divided at:
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3.0 4 0 67808
3 1 6 17573
3 2 6 17573
3 3 7.5 11179
3 4 8 06006 * +
3 5 8 5 03021 ** +
3 6 9 5 12807
3.7 11 07044 * +
3.8 8 5 12161
39 7 05214 * +
4 0 5.5 .01481 ** +
Sample size 44 with 1 degree of freedom
Key
* Significant at 10 per cent level 
** Significant at 5 per cent level 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level
+ The direction of the relationship positive, that is acquisitions resulting from an 
internal idea rather than an external approach were more successful.
There is no way of examining A to C above within the present research, all are 
plausible explanations.
This research found one example of an approach being made to the chairman who 
thought it was a good idea and, in spite of the analysis saying this was not a good idea 
the deal was concluded Material from this interview is given in Illustration 7.2.
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Illiixlralioii 7.2 An Acquisition Made Because of 
A Chairman's Coiiimitnienl
The idea came from the chairman
It was one of these typical chairman to chairman conversations On the whole, people 
would have said there was a degree of logic to it.
The criteria  g iven  f o r  the acquisition  were:
Primarily because we wanted it That is a serious comment The price, and the impact 
on the group was not at the time deemed to be that important We wanted the brand 
and we were prepared to get it, come what may.
Well, all the way along everyone was quite comfortable with the idea o f the purchase 
but only at the right price, and 1 think the final problem was the group making a 
decision on something the division would have to run In other words, the final yes or 
no decision was made at the group level, whereas the sector had a view on what they 
would have paid for it that was different, and lower, and therefore has been a source of 
some tension since then
Reviewing it was pretty good The final decision basically ignored the rest of the work 
on the development of the process
To test the proposal that external approaches are more likely to have fixed time tables 
reducing the time available to explore the acquisition the researcher examined the 
hypothesis that
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The researcher also proposes to check this with the hypothesis:
7:4) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take fewer man 
weeks work to complete.
The researcher, however, expected the relationship for this variable to be less clear cut 
as companies may use more people to compensate for the lack of time to complete the 
decision making process.
The elapsed time measure is aimed at capturing fixed time tables and delays. The man 
weeks worked measures how intensively the acquisition is worked on and the 
management resources devoted to the project. The reasons for using 2 measures of 
time were discussed in chapter 5 and will be examined in more detail in chapter 10
The elapsed time from approach, or idea, to conclusion of acquisitions stimulated by 
external parties was shorter than those resulting from internal ideas. This was 
significant for three divisions of time, as shown in table 7.5 This is in line with the 
expectations of hypothesis 7:3.
The relationship between the volume of management time spent on an acquisition and 
the source of the acquisition idea, was the reverse of the relationship between elapsed 
time and the source of the idea It was, however, not significant, as shown in table 
7 5 That is, acquisitions stimulated by internal ideas consumed less management time 
This may be because they were more clear cut or that information collection and 
analysis was easier as companies already had a competitive knowledge of the target
7:3) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take less elapsed
time to complete.'1
Table 7,5 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Source of Acquisition and Time
Source of acquisition idea ( 
internal or external) and 
elapsed time divided at
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3 Months 3 0 66515
4 Months 4 4 .72224
5 Months 7 8 46310
6 Months 8 3 29889
8 Months 9.2 04706 ** +
9 Months 8 3 04169** +
10 Months 4 9 07065 * +
5 and 10 months X 4 9 .11628 "
Sample size 45
Source of acquisition idea 
(Internal or external) and 
man weeks work divided at
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
40 9 0 20372
50 9 0 22555
28 and 75 X 6 2 16706
30 and 90 X 5.2 .12526
25.5 and 69 X 5.7 16700
25 5 and 101 X 12 4 8 .26659
Sample Size 42
X Tests had 2 degrees of freedom all other tests had 1 degree of freedom 
** Significant at 5 per cent level
+ Acquisitions resulting from internal ideas were longer
A second possible explanation is the data collected docs not reflect the actual volume 
of work Internally stimulated acquisitions may have had large volumes of management 
resources devoted to them by the person or unit proposing the acquisition, this work 
may then be passed on for the person interviewed to conduct the project This work at 
the operating unit may not have been included in the figures given by the companies 
In contrast, externally stimulated acquisitions may be rapidly passed to the manager 
who ultimately conducts the project without any major time input by anyone else
The quality of the management time must also be considered If large volumes of 
management time are used on an acquisition in a short period this requires more 
people who may not be familiar with the country, industry or acquisitions They 
therefore, have to learn about the operation within the acquisition time These results 
are not clear-cut. This, therefore, remains a possible explanation. This view that the 
involvement of external parties will affect the time taken will be further examined in 
chapter 10, in the section examining the use of consultants The proposal that an 
external idea may be subject to less rigorous information collection will be examined in 
the next section
7.3.1 Section Summary
This section has concluded that acquisitions resulting from either a seller or third party 
approach performed worse than those that resulted from an internal idea A number of 
possible explanations were proposed none of which could be rejected There was 
positive evidence that acquisitions resulting from external ideas took a shorter elapsed 
time.
The proposal that acquisitions resulting from external approaches will use fewer 
information sources will be considered in section 7.5. The researcher will first examine 
what information sources were used by companies and how many
7.4 Sources of Information Used
One key assumption of the rational economic man model is that the decision maker has 
all the relevant information available This is not the case in most acquisition decisions 
This section will describe what information companies said they used.
The two main sources of data used by companies as shown in table 7 6 were
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a) Internal records including records of competitive activity with the target, market 
share data and cost structures from similar operations the bidder already owns;
b) Data front the target either through direct access to the company's records or an 
information memorandum.
Twenty companies claimed to have had complete access, and 16 information 
memorandums, 3 of which later had access to 'data rooms' before making a final 
decision
fable 7,6 Types of Information Sources Used
Source of Data Number of companies that used source 
in specific case covered.
Internal Data 4613
Complete access to company 20
Information memorandums 16
Press or databases 10
Industry reports 9
Customers 9
Market research and specialist 
companies
9
Former employees 3
Data from merchant banks, and city 
sources.
3
Published accounts 14 2
Governmental sources including OECD,
and EC
2
Many companies primarily relied on data from these two sources. There was, 
however, variation in how many additional sources were used:
A) Company B: 'If I remember rightly in the indicative bid we didn't have access to
them,...just the information memorandum. 1 would say our internal 
sources, and at best, probably 1 external source.'
B) Company O: 'The patent section was an external issue but we have got our own
patent specialists and they organise the patent searches, so if you like, 
that is the only 1 that would involve outside sources the rest, chemistry
and stuff was done internally We looked at the process patent, plant 
facilities, we met all their people We had very good visibility because 
we knew the people there so we had excellent visibility. The key thing 
was testing out that the processes actually worked.'
through;
C) Company M: 'Internally there would have probably been principally 3 or 4 people,
consulted, all of them would have had a knowledge of the business and 
there would have probably been 1 or 2 others, who would also have 
had a knowledge of the business but were outside our business, who 
we would have probably consulted '
D) Company N: 'It was a mixture of the information provided by the vendor, and data
provided by our offices in those countries, from publicly available 
sources and industry sources.'
E) Company V: 'We did the normal sorts of searches, 1 remember using various
databases to see if we could find anything else and checking the offer 
document to various information we had already gathered '
to,
F) Company X: Interviewee, 'Well the vendor Q provided the sale document and we
also used Nielsen, but in this case it was mostly based on what the 
vendor Q gave us, because obviously they wanted to sell it.'
G) Researcher: 'Did you use clippings services and things like that?'
Interviewee 'Yes, 1 think we did.'
Researcher: 'You had internal market share data?'
Interviewee 'We didn't have share data on (product market), but we got it We also 
did a research in the trade, so we got Saatchi, someone like that, to do 
an assessment, a consumer and trade assessment of the product We 
wanted to find out that if we advertised that we would be able to grow
H) and less conventionally
'Eventually we were allowed access to the finance director of the 
company and the managing director of the company, when it looked 
like we were serious contenders. But the majority of information came 
from a big box. ’
'We were allowed to talk to the managing director of (the target) in a 
bar somewhere in Hollywood, I remember sitting there thinking this is 
bizarre '
Their internal information, however, was o f a more conventional nature:
'We knew how much we were paying (for raw material), and we were 
able to say that it is ridiculous, they can't possibly be paying that, they 
must be paying less than that. And the same applies to the number of 
employees, people from our place knew (target name), because they 
had been round it. The guy who used to run (target name), for a long 
time was a well-known industry guru and everybody knew him and we 
talked to him'
That is, most companies were relying on their own data and vendor's data with various
degrees of checks, and the due diligence process.
In two cases, where companies were buying companies in the former communist
states, very little information was available at all:
Company G stated: 'Sales weren't measured, we knew production We knew how big 
the volume was, yes '
Company R stated: 'Most of the information would be internal There was not a great 
deal of data available on this which is what you would expect in 
Eastern Europe.....So we consulted extensively with the company's
customers
Interviewee: 'A lot of sources were from the city research houses and so on, 
companies house, industry bodies, industry research, statistics.' 
Researcher: 'Did you learn anything from the target themselves? '
Interviewee 'Very little We checked up on a few facts just before we bid'
This reliance on internal and vendor data is further illustrated by figure 7 1 that shows 
the number of sources used by companies.15
Press and databases were used less frequently than might have been expected This is 
perhaps because companies included this in internal data:
'When we are talking about (Company's Name) data sources, I include all the 
databases we subscribe to as being internal to (Company's Name).'
Other companies stated there were no press sources on the company they were 
examining
Researcher 'What about sources such as newspapers, Datastream, and Extel? That 
type of thing?'
Interviewee 'Not for small deals.'
Only two acquisitions included in the sample were of British quoted companies
One company had to build its case primarily from external sources This was the
exception
f ig u re  7.1 Number of Sources of Information Used
Little illuminating was said about the use of market research companies, industry 
reports and specialist research companies. The number who used these, 15, is 
surprisingly low. However, it must be remembered that 32, companies had internal 
libraries and all companies, except the oil production companies, collected market 
research data on markets where they operated. It, therefore, seems likely that most 
companies had detailed market research and industry reports before looking at the 
company in question
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Customers were a source of information for 9 companies. In 1 case the reason for 
buying the company was to gain access to a new set of customers through the 
company's distribution system.
Company CPD16: 'In this particular thing the most overwhelming criterion was fit, in 
terms of geography and access to new customers. There were some 
seriously big German companies using this distribution system, and we 
thought that would give us access to them.'
In others, it was to check on data provided:
'We actually employed the same representative in a region, so we could 
by 1 way or another get information through that broker.' 
or check that the purchase of the company would not effect the parent's sales or sales 
of the target,
'A good example might be, say sandwiches. We have a company that 
manufactures sandwiches specifically for (Dak'1. We don't supply any other 
retailers. We could be offered a competitor business who just makes 
sandwiches for another retailer. Now having said that, I am just giving you a 
hypothetical answer, because it is not 1 we would do. We would certainly go 
and talk to <Dak18 before hand on such a proposition, because I would suggest 
that it is 99.9 per cent certain that they would say if you go and buy that 
business W okt9 you won't be making sandwiches for us the week after next'
Two companies collected specific information from suppliers. One expected to gain 
cost savings in the parent operation as well as at the target because of the purchase
'Armed with the likely increase in scale we went to all our suppliers and 
discussed with them, without telling them why at that stage. We did 
presentations to our suppliers and outlined our general strategy and we asked 
all our key suppliers to come back with an indication of the terms that would 
be available for us at volume 1, 2, 3. What we did was a series of steps getting
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us up to the actual volume because we did not want to alert them to what we 
were doing We didn't want to say if tomorrow we could double our sales of 
your products what would our terms be so we actually wrote to each of them 
and said, "at the moment we are here, if over the next 3 years we were able to 
develop our business to move from there to there, there to there, will you 
please indicate to us what impact that might have on our terms So we got 
them to some extent pre-committed and then we were able to say well we 
know that if we can get this acquisition instead of waiting 3 years to get to 
there we can do it next week and at today's prices that's going to be worth X 
The interesting thing is there is a double effect here This acquisition not only 
enabled us to improve the profitability of the acquisition, the acquisition 
enabled us to improve the profitability of all the businesses that we already 
owned '
That is, several companies discussed their acquisitions with their buyers or suppliers. 
For some companies, however, this was not relevant as they had no suppliers, and 
their customers were very diffuse.
Three companies had access to data from former employees of the target or its owner 
In 2 cases this was serendipitous. In the other, the former owner was approached.
The use of information produced by merchant banks or the city was only used by 3 
companies if information memorandums that were prepared by the seller are excluded 
This is lower than some groups would hope One reason for this appears to be that 
few of the acquisitions covered were for quoted companies. The 2 acquisitions of 
quoted companies did use city information sources, such as stockbrokers' reports 
Many o f the purchases covered were either from private owners, small parts of 
companies, and 2 purchases in the former communist block Second, it is possible this
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Two companies said government data was crucial, I to confirm that grants would not 
have to be repaid, and a second to confirm OECD and EU predictions about future 
agricultural production
This section has shown that although a variety of sources are used, most companies 
rely on internal information and information from the target backed up by a due 
diligence review by accountants to confirm the information is accurate. Many 
companies would also use internal information to check the costs of raw material, 
trade margins, and the number of people required etc.. There is thus heavy reliance on 
internal data. This would place a premium on industry knowledge and/or knowing who 
will know, abilities that are likely to be increased by experience of the sector This will 
be considered in chapter 10.
7.4.1 Section Summary
type of information is incorporated in to company libraries and not treated as an
external source
This section has briefly described the sources of information companies commonly 
used It has concluded that companies tend to rely on internal information and 
information from the target backed up by due diligence work Very few companies 
relied on outside data or used city information sources This, however, may be a 
misrepresentation, as some companies included the use of databases within internal 
data The researcher will now move on to examining the hypotheses presented in 
chapter 3 on, the effect of information collection on success levels
7 .5 Information Collection and Variation in Success Levels
One of the key assumptions of the rational economic man model is that the decision 
maker has all the relevant information available. It was shown in the last section that 
the levels of information available to base acquisition decisions in were variable, but it 
could rarely be described as complete Given that, the rational economic man model is 
seen as a target to aim at it was proposed in chapter 3 that:
3:8) The greater the number of information sources used the greater the 
probability of success.
3:9) The more people requested to provide information the higher the 
probability of success.
The evidence presented on these 2 hypotheses in Table 7.7 seems to indicate a 
rejection of these hypotheses.
Table 7,7 Kendall Rank Correlations between Number of 
Information Sources Used and Number of People 
Asked for Information and Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure One
Specific Success 
Measure Two
Sample Size 34 30 45
Number of sources 
of Information 
used
-.0821 0966 - 0318
Sample Size 33 29 40
Number of people 
asked for 
information
-.0945 1554 0105
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients given not significance levels
This, however, treats all information sources as equal, which they are not Many 
sources may have been used by companies who did not have access to the target 
companies financial records and, or physical assets to make up for this Those 
companies that did have access to the target's accounts may have used fewer sources, 
as they required only to check the data they had access to rather than create the whole 
picture. The researcher therefore adapted the above hypotheses to take account of the 
quality of information generating the hypotheses:
7:5) Acquisitions where the companies had complete access to the targets 
financial information and physical assets will perform better than other 
acquisitions.
7:6) Acquisitions where the companies had access to either an information 
memorandum or the targets financial information and physical assets will 
perform better than other acquisitions.
The results of testing the hypothesis 7:5 are presented in table 7 8, and hypothesis 7:6 
in table 7.9. Only one significant relationship was found when testing hypothesis 7:5 
(for one division of the first specific success measure). This showed acquisitions which 
did not have access to internal data from the target performed better. The researcher 
therefore concluded there was no evidence to accept hypothesis 7:5 No significant 
relationship between access to information from the target company and success was 
found (hypothesis 7:6).
That is, the companies that had complete access to the target company's data did not 
perform better than those that did not, and that companies that used more information 
sources did not perform better If, however, the companies that had access to 
information from the target company are using fewer information sources, as they are 
only checking the information, then these 2 factors might be counteracting each other 
Therefore to effectively examine hypotheses 3:8) and 3:9), the researcher divided the
3:8A) If a company has access to internal information from the target; the 
greater the number of information sources used the greater the probability of
success.
3:9A) If a company has access to internal information from the target; the more 
people requested to provide information the higher the probability of success. 
3:8A) If a company does not have access to internal information from the target; 
the greater the number of information sources used the greater the probability of
success.
3:9B) If a company does not have access to internal information from the target; 
the more people requested to provide information the higher the probability of
success.
Table 7.10 presents data on those acquistions where the bidder had either complete 
access or where an information memorandum was provided, and table 7.11 those that 
did not have any access to information from the target
There appears to be no significant correlation between the number of information 
sources used and success even when companies which had access and those which did 
not were subdivided. No way of further quantifying the quality of the information 
available to the buyer seems available. The researcher, therefore, proposes to reject 
hypotheses 3:8 and 3:9 in all the forms that they have been restated
7.5.1 Section Summary
This section has examined 2 basic hypotheses, 3:8 and 3:9 No evidence was found to 
support these The researcher, however, thought that this may be a product of 
companies with access to the target's internal information using fewer other sources of
sample into those which had access and those which did not This results in the
hypotheses (3:8 and 3:9) being restated as:
information It was, therefore, proposed to examine the hypothesis that companies 
with access to information from the target would out perform those without access 
No evidence was found to support this The researcher, having examined whether 
greater quality or greater quantity of information increased success, proposed that; 
given access, a greater quantity of information should increase success levels No 
evidence was found to support this (Hypotheses 3:8A, 3:9A, 3:8B, and 3:9B). The 
researcher therefore concluded that no simple relationship between quantity of 
information used to prepare an acquisition proposal and success existed. These 
relationships may be a product of factors underlying the number of information 
sources used. Given this, the researcher now proposes to examine the number of 
information sources used as a dependent variable
fable 7,8 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Access to Internal
Information from Target and Acquisition Success
Access to internal financial 
information and physical plant and 
general success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2.5 2.7 1
2.7 4.1 2394
2.9 4.1 .2394
3.0 5.0 .1380
3 1 5 9 4351
3 2 6 4 .2471
3 3 7.3 6109
3 4 7.3 6109
3.5 6 8 8984
3 6 5 9 4351
3 7 5.0 4583
3 8 5.0 4583
3 9 4.1 6967
4 0 2.7 2746
4 1 1 8 1
Sample Size 33 with 1 degree of freedom
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fahle 7,8 Continued Chi-Squared Tests onAcccss to Internal 
Information from Target anil Acquisition Success
Access to internal financial 
information and physical plant and 
first specific success measure divided 
at:
Minimum
expected
requency
’robability of 
Jistribution occurring 
jy  chance
3.5 3 6 3980
3 6 4.0 2662
3.7 4 9 4548
3 8 5.3 1939
3 9 5.8 1682
4.0 4.9 2388
4.1 4 9 2388
4.2 4.4 1070
4.3 4.4 1070
4 4 3.6 0432 ** -
Sample size 27 with 1 degree of freedom
** Significant at 5 per cent level
- Access to information from the target was associated with worse 
performance
Access to internal financial informatior 
and physical plant and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.0 2.8 1
3 1 4.7 4689
3 2 4.7 .4689
3.3 6.0 1836
3 4 6 5 .3179
3 5 7.0 .4953
3 6 6 9 4757
3 7 9 3 .6466
3 8 7.4 7071
3 9 6.5 .747
4 0 5.6 6993
Sample size 4 1 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 7,9 Results of Chi-Stwared Tests between Access lo
Information from Target and Acquisition Success
Access to information from target and 
general success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency20
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2.5 11 1
2.7 16 51899
2.9 1.6 51899
3.0 2.0 63675
3.1 2.3 36442
3.2 2.6 ,20853
3.3 2 9 65618
3.4 2.9 65618
3.5 2.7 37468
3 6 2.3 65879
3.7 2 37521
3.8 2 37521
3 9 16 37521
4.0 1.1 1
4.1 8 1
Sample Size 33 with 1 degree of freedom
Access to information from target and 
first specific success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 1.8 .6336
3 6 2 62785
3.7 2.4 1
3 8 2.7 66184
3 9 2.9 1
4.0 2.4 66184
4 1 2.4 66184
4.2 2.2 63819
4 3 2.2 63819
4 4 1.8 31910
Sample size 27 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 7.9 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Access to Internal
Information from Target and Acquisition Success
Access to information from target 
and second specific success measure 
divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.0 12 1
3 1 2 65324
3.2 2 65324
3.3 2 5 1
3.4 2.7 69245
3.5 2 9 68676
3.6 3 3 1
3.7 3 9 .69652
3 8 3.1 1
3.9 2.7 1
4.0 2.3 1
Sample size 41 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 7.10 Kendall Rank Correlations between Success and Number of
Information Sources Used by Companies and Number of People 
Asked for Information which had Information from Target Company
General
success
First specific
success
measure
Second specific 
success measure
Number of sources of 
information used by 
companies with access to 
information from target or an 
information memorandum
- 1242 0501 -.0293
Sample Size 25 21 31
Number of people asked for 
information by companies 
with access with access to 
information from target or an 
information memorandum
- 1516 2465 1280
Sample size 24 21 30
Note- Kendall rank correlation coefficients are given
l ablc 7. Kendall Rank Correlations between Success and ¡Number
of Information Sources Used and Number of People Asked 
for Information by Companies that had no Information 
from Target Company
General success First specific 
success measure
Second specific 
success measure
Number of sources of 
information used by 
companies with no access 
and no information 
memorandum
-.3531 -.3080 .0843
Sample Size 6 6 8
Number of people asked 
for information by 
companies with no access 
and but an information 
memorandum
.0857 - 2125 -.5238
Sample size 6 6 8
Note- Kendall rank correlation coefficients are given
7.6 Factors Influencing the use of Information Sources
In chapter 3 it was proposed that the collection of more information by a company 
would lead to greater information use in acquisitions, as it had lower collection costs 
to the acquisition decision maker. This resulted in hypotheses 3:10 to 3:12 being 
presented:
3:10) Managers who are regularly circulated with information are more likely to 
use more information sources.
3:11) Managers at companies which collect market share data on markets which 
in they do not currently operate will use more information sources.
3:12) Companies which have corporate information libraries will use more 
information sources.
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To further test hypotheses 3:12 and 3:13, they were also restated in the form 
3:12A) Companies which have corporate information libraries will request more 
people to provide information.
3:13A) Companies that have arranged access to external corporate information 
libraries will request more people to provide information.
3:13) Companies that have arranged access to external corporate information
libraries will use more information sources.
No support for hypotheses 3:10, 3 :12, 3 I2A, 3 13 and 3 :13 A was found
The results of these tests are reported in appendix D, tables D 1 to D 3 
To test hypotheses 3:11, it was restated into the forms:
3:11 A) Companies which collect market share data on geographic markets in 
which they do not currently operate will use more information sources 
3:1113) Companies which collect market share data on product markets in which 
they do not currently operate will use more information sources.
3:11C) Companies which collect market share data on geographic markets in 
which they do not currently operate will ask more people for information.
3:1 ID) Companies that collect market share data on product markets in which 
they do not currently operate will ask more people for information.
No support for hypotheses 3:11A and 3:11C was found .
The results of these tests are presented in appendix D, table D 4
The results of the tests on hypotheses 3:11 li and 3:111) are presented in table 7 12 
These show evidence to support hypotheses 3:11B and 3:111). That is, companies that 
collected basic market share data for products that they do not currently produce, use 
more information sources when considering acquisitions This is not the tautology it 
appears as companies treated internal information as one source of information and 
included many sources of data on markets they operated in within that. Thus although 
companies that collect data on product markets in which they do not currently operate, 
have more internal information available on related products, they still collect more 
additional information from outside than those that do not
The correlation with the number of people, however, may be a product of the size of 
the company
fable 7.12 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company Collects Data on 
Product Markets it Does Not Operate in and Number of People 
Asked for Information and Number of Information Sources Used
Company collects data on product markets 
it does not currently operate in and the 
number of people asked for information 
used divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution 
occurring by chance
11 7.8 38654
16 5.3 08469* +
19 5.3 08469* +
Sample Size 36 with 1 degree of freedom
Company collects data on product markets 
it does not operate in and number ol 
information sources used divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution 
occurring by chance
3 5 02393**+
4 6 5 01350**+
6 6.5 01350**+
S 5.7 05895*+
Sample size 34 with 1 degree of freedom
* Significant at 10 per cent level ** Significant at 5 per cent level
-  Direction of correlation positive
Table 7.13 Pearson Correlations between Size and Number
of People Asked for Information and Number 
of Sources of Information Used
Sales in last set of 
accounts
Sales in 
penultimate set of 
accounts
Sales in anti­
penultimate set of 
accounts
Sample Size 42 42 42
Number of people 
asked for 
information
.6331 **** .6392**** .6212****
Sample Size 45 45 45
Number of sources 
of information used
- 0425 -0446 - 0486
**** Significant at the 1 per cent level
Note - Pearson correlation coefficients given
That is, larger companies have more staff on average. There are, therefore, more 
people available to ask for information. The availability of this information encourages 
people to use it. The data in table 7.13 supports this view The collection of data on 
product markets in which they do not currently operate, however, was not correlated 
with size as shown in table 7 14
The other hypotheses proposed in chapter 5, where information collection is the 
dependant variable, include experience as an independent variable These will be 
examined in chapter 10 with the other hypotheses on experience
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Table 7,14 Clii-Suuarcd Test Results between Company Collects Data
on Product Markets it does not Currently Operate in and Size
Company collects data on product 
markets it does not currently operate 
in, divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
1 billion 4.1 47609
1 5 billion 5.1 95621
2 billion 7.6 38543
2.5 billion 8.7 15170
3 billion 7.7 28878
Sample Size 40 with 1 degree of freedom
7.6.1 Section Summary
This section has examined a number of hypotheses concerning the factors that affect 
the number of information sources used. It has concluded that there is no support for 
any hypotheses that the presence at a company of an information library or that it has 
arranged access to an external information library, increased information use There 
was evidence to support the hypotheses that companies that collected information on 
product markets in which they do not currently operate, do collect more information 
sources This is in line with the Thordsen et al (1990) findings and the prescriptions of 
the finance textbooks
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7.7 Chanter Summary
This chapter has examined where companies search for acquisitions and how 
companies collect information to make a decision It found that all companies limit the 
industry they look at for acquisitions, and many limit the country. It was found that 
limiting the area a company searched by geography was associated with an increased 
success level.
Few companies considered many options. Thirty-four companies, considered only 
whether to buy or not. There was very limited evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the more options examined the higher the level of success. Acquisitions that 
resulted from a seller or third party approach to the acquirer were less successful than 
those that resulted from internal ideas.
Companies tended to rely on internal information or information from the target 
company This reliance may, however, be overstated as some companies implied that 
within internal sources they included databases and external material that they 
subscribed to on a regular basis Few companies mentioned city sources as important 
except as a conduit for information from the target.
There was no evidence to support the view that the more sources used the greater the 
levels of success
Companies which had corporate libraries did not use more information sources 
However, those companies that collected information on product markets in which 
they did not operate did use more sources of information and asked more people for 
information
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In conclusion, this chapter has examined the information collection processes used by 
companies and found that they rely mainly on their own information and information 
from the target. The number of sources of information does not appear to affect 
success levels Internally generated ideas, however, were more successful than external 
ones A summary of the hypotheses examined in this chapter and the results generated 
are presented after this section Chapter 8 will examine what companies do with this 
information, how they process it and what criteria are used to make acquisition 
decisions
7,8 The Main Hypotheses Considered in This Chanter
and Conclusions
Number of Options
3:1) The greater the number of options formally considered the higher will be 
the level of acquisition success ?
There was limited support for this hypothesis although most companies only consider 
yes or no as options
Search Area
3:2) The existence of an established limitation to the area of acquisition search 
will increase success levels.
3:3) Companies that place a limit on the industries in which they look to make 
acquisitions will perform better than those that do not.
It was impossible to test these hypotheses as all companies limited the area they 
searched by industry
3:4) Limiting the countries a company examines for acquisitions will increase
success.
l iiere was support for this for all 3 success measures used
Source of Idea
3:5) Acquisitions stimulated by brokers will perform worse than other types of 
acquisition.
3:6) Acquisitions stimulated by the seller will perform worse than other types of 
acquisitions.
3:7) Acquisitions stimulated within tile company will perform better than other 
types of acquisitions.
It was impossible to test these hypotheses Thus the following hypothesis was tested 
7:2) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated internally will perform better 
than those resulting from either approaches by a seller or a third party such as a 
merchant bank.
There was evidence to support this for all 3 success measures used
7:3) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take less elapsed
time to complete.
There was evidence to support this hypothesis However, it does not hold for all 
divisions of elapsed time used
7:4) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take fewer man 
weeks work to complete.
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis 
Information Sources Available and Used
3:8) The greater the number of information sources used the greater the 
probability of success.
3:9) The more people requested to provide information the higher the 
probability of success.
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To further test hypotheses 3:8 and 3:9, the sample frame was divided into those 
companies which had access to information from the target, and those which had not 
Hypotheses 3:8 and 3:9 were tested for each group No support was found for these 
hypotheses for these subgroups It was, therefore, concluded that there was no simple 
relationship between quantity of information used and success levels
Factors influencing the use o f information sources
3:10) Managers who are regularly circulated with information are more likely to 
use more information sources.
3:12) Companies which have corporate information libraries will use more 
information sources.
3:13) Companies that have arranged access to external corporate information 
libraries will use more information sources.
No support was found for these hypotheses, or for their adapted form which referred 
to access to external corporate information libraries.
3:11 A) Companies which collect market share data on geographic markets 
which they do not currently operate will use more information sources 
3:1 IB) Companies which collect market share data on product markets in which 
they do not currently operate will use more information sources.
3:11C) Companies which collect market share data on geographic markets in 
which they do not currently operate will ask more people for information.
3:1 ID) Companies which collect market share data on product markets which 
they do not currently operate will ask more people for information.
There was no support for 3:11A and 3:11C. There was, however, evidence to support 
hypothesis 3 1 IB and 3 1 ID.
There was no support for these hypotheses They were restated to take account of the
probable superior information available from access to information from the target, but
no evidence was found to support these hypotheses
Knot notes
The minimum expected frequency was below 5 for more than 20 per cent of the cells in the 
contingency tables. A Fisher exact test is not appropriate for a test which uses a 2 by 3 contingency
table
The general success measure used was the same as Datla and Grant's (1991) scale The respondents 
were asked to respond with respect to their recent acquisition programme The minimum value 
recorded was 1.9, the maximum, 5.0, mean, 3.33, and standard deviation .76. See appendix A 
question 31
’ The normally accepted minimum expected frequency for a chi-squared test to be valid is 5 (Kanji, 
1993:69). Where the for tests which use 2 by 2 contingency tables where the minimum expected 
frequency is below 5 the results of a Fisher exact tests arc reported The Fisher exact tests is only 
valid for 2 by 2 contingency tables, see Siegel and Castellan, 1989:103-110 for details 
1 The first specific success measure focused on the success of a specific acquisition and was based on 
the criteria that the interviewee felt were the three most important in that acquisition. The minimum 
recorded value was 2.5, the maximum 5 and the standard deviation .673 See appendix A question 
54
' The second specific success measure was a replication of Dalta and Grant's (1991) success measure 
as shown in figure 6.1, where respondents were asked to respond with respect to the specific ease 
discussed The mean was 3.61, minimum 1.545, maximum 5.00, median 3.7 and standard deviation
.797
6 This is the third edition of the book which was originally published in 1945. The third edition 
however has an additional introduction, which is referred to in this thesis 
The correlation between the three success measures arc given in table D 8 in appendix D.
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8 For 2 by 3 tables a Fisher exact test is not appropriate. Therefore for valid tests to be conducted a 
minimum expected frequency of 5. the normally accepted minimum for a chi-squared (he test to be 
valid (Kanji, 1993:69) , is required
9 Where minimum frequency is below 5 , a Fisher exact test result is reported
10 This is similar in its basis to hypothesis 5:33 The greater the number of different consultants used 
the shorter the elapsed time This will be tested in chapter 10.
' 1 Note chi-squared test result reported It was not possible to divide the sample into three groups by 
elapsed time and still maintain a minimum expected frequency of 5. The minimum recommended for 
a valid chi-squared tests to be conducted on a sample of this size (Siegel and Castellan 19X8:123) A 
Fisher exact test is not valid where a 3 by 2 contingency table is used.
12 Note a chi-squared test result is reported as Fisher exact test is only appropriate for tests which 
utilise 2 by 2 contingency tables
13 All except two companies on which data was collected on this area.
"  This excludes the companies which had access to internal accounts from the target 
ls One company which said it used 100 sources is excluded from the graph to make it more readable 
16 Name of company changed 
1 Name of well known retailer changed
18 Name of well known retailer changed
19 Name of company being interviewed
‘"All tests results presented arc from Fisher exact tests
C h a n te r  8 DE CISION CK1TKK1A
8.0 Introduction
The previous chapter explored how companies search for acquisitions and how 
information was collected. It concluded that companies rely mainly on ther own 
information and information from the target and that the number of sources of 
information does not appear to affect success levels Internally generated ideas, 
however, were more successful than external ones.
This chapter will examine the decision criteria used in acquisitions Chapter 4 
examined, which criteria the literature expected to be used, and how they should be 
applied It concluded that finance theory proposes that all companies should use 
discounted cash flow (DCF) measures preferably net present value (NPV). But if 
necessary internal rate of return (IRR)could be used (Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 
1990:162). Other measures are viewed as having serious shortcomings. Their use, 
therefore, should reduce success levels as they will produce incorrect decisions' 
Interest rates used in NPV calculations should be established for each project, unless 
the consequences of the project are not sufficiently significant as to make the cost of 
developing a specific rate greater than the benefits. The empirical work done in the 
United Kingdom (Pike 1983, 1988) found that most companies did use DCF 
techniques but not all and not as their only capital budgeting technique. The finance 
literature implied that all companies should use the same decision criteria (Discounted 
Cash flow Methods). Pike (1983), however, found that the size of company affected 
the propensity of companies to use discounted cash flow measures 
Given the literature review in chapter 4 briefly outlined above, 5 main areas seem 
relevant to the examination of acquisition decision criteria
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a) What criteria were used by the companies interviewed
b) How these criteria were applied.
c) How the use of DCF techniques affects success
d) How this behaviour can be explained
e) How does the use of other finance techniques influence success
This chapter will deal with the first two of these areas, what criteria were used by the 
companies interviewed, how these criteria were applied The other three areas; How 
the use of DCF techniques affects success, How this behaviour can be explained, and, 
How the use of other finance techniques influence success, will be examined in chapter 
9.
Thus the researcher will begin by examining what criteria were used to make 
acquisition decisions
8.1 Use of Financial and Accounting Measures in
Acquisition Decisions
The finance literature proposes the use of discounted cash flow measures (DCF) and 
not the effect on earnings per share (EPS), payback and accounting rate of return 
measures (ARR). This section will look at which of these techniques were used by the 
companies sampled to make acquisition decisions This will be followed by an 
examination of the combinations of the techniques used and which of the two main 
DCF techniques were used. Section 8 4 will explore what other factors were important 
in making acquisition decisions at the firms interviewed
Table 8 1 summarises the use of the financial decision criteria considered by the 
literature in the companies interviewed
Table 8,1 Financial Criteria Used hv Companies in Acquisition Decisions
Number of 
Companies
Percentage of 
Sample
Companies that used a DCF 
measure as a decision criterion 
within their acquisition process
41 804
Companies that used effect on EPS 
as a decision criterion
33 64.7
Companies that used payback as a 
decision criterion
24 47.1
Companies that used accounting 
rates of return as a decision 
criterion
22 43.1
Companies that did not use a DCF 
measure within their acquisition 
process
10 19.6
Companies that used DCF as 1 of 
their 3 main decision criteria
24 47.1
Companies that only used DCF 
measures as financial decision 
criterion
6 118
DCF Discounted Cash Flow
ARR Accounting Rate of Return
EPS Effect on Earnings per Share
8.1.1 Use of Discounted Cash Flow Criteria
Table 8 1 demonstrates that DCF measures were the most common criteria to review 
acquisitions and that for a majority2, 24 companies, DCF measures (either net present 
value (NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR)) were one of the three key decision 
criteria focused on in the acquisition. Contrary to the expectations of the finance 
literature, 10 companies said they did not use discounted cash flow measures at all 
Seven of these 10 companies gave reasons for this Three said they were unable to 
accurately predict future cash flows and therefore thought DCF techniques were not 
worthwhile, and 4 that their chief executive or board did not understand them
'I find it extremely difficult to forecast what is going to happen at the end of 
the year. If you then look at developing cash flows for 5 or 10 years 1 think 
the quality of the assessment is very difficult to get a feel for '
'We don't use any of these sophisticated discounted cash flow techniques and 
the reason for that is we don't, we cannot see into the future, we cannot judge 
what the discount rate should be, and what the value would be.'
'Internal rates of return, our management tend not to look at that, our chief 
executive doesn't understand it, doesn't want to..'
'What is not particularly important for our board is to give them complicated 
analysis.'
One company was in the process of considering whether it should use DCF analysis.
A further 9 companies who used discounted cash flow analysis did not place it as one 
of their three key criteria.3 Their reasons for not using DCF included :
A) Four companies thought the data available was not reliable enough to predict future 
cash flows in this specific case. This included 1 company purchasing a company in 
the former East Germany where no accounts existed and 2 companies purchasing oil 
assets which were unlikely to come into production for 5 to 6 years
B) At 1 company the interviewee thought that the acquisition was being driven by 
board wishes, and although a DCF analysis was conducted it was ignored by the 
board The stated reasons for purchase being :
'Primarily because we wanted it, that is a serious comment, price and the 
impact on the group was not at the time deemed to be that important, " e 
wanted the brand and we were prepared to get it come what may '
'I would base the price and valuation on the current years profit, because we
know that it is substantiated One thing is for sure is that if you make a
forecast for 95 ( th is in terv iew  took  p la c e  in su m m er 199-1) it won't be right'
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C) Four companies gave factors within their three key criteria which they considered 
to be driving the discounted cash flow analysis and dominating the conclusions of the 
DCF analysis One company stated its three key criteria in the case discussed as, 'profit 
margin, fixed cost structure and variable cost structure' and later stated, 'in this case 
the most important thing is an NPV.'
In contrast no company offered an explanation of why it used DCF techniques, 
perhaps suggesting that the use of DCF techniques for investment decisions is now 
viewed as the received wisdom. Given though that these were all large companies, 
that with 1 exception they had sales over £200 million, it is perhaps surprising that 10 
did not use DCF techniques in acquisition decisions given the level of support for them 
in the finance literature.
Only 6 companies followed the more strict interpretation of the finance literature 
(Lumby 1998:110) and only used DCF and did not also use other capital budgeting 
techniques (effect on earnings per share (EPS), accounting rates of return (ARR) or 
payback). Thus although DCF's use is wide-spread amongst large companies it is not 
always used and only in a minority of cases is it the only measure used as a stricter 
interpretation of the finance literature would recommend
In contrast to DCF's wide use no company said it used option pricing for acquisitions 
although the oil companies interviewed stated option pricing might be used to value 
exploration prospects, but not acquisitions at present
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8 , 1.2 KPS Use as A Decision Criterion
The second most common financial measure used was earnings per share which was 
used by 31 companies. This number is surprisingly high given that the financial 
textbooks tend to ignore it as an investment decision criterion or give it a limited 
examination concluding that it should not be used Further, Pike (1983, 1988) did not 
consider EPS as a capital budgeting technique
Only 2 companies rationalised why they used EPS They stated that it was because it 
was a measure the city looked at:
' We see EPS as important in selling it to the city.'
'The reason for earnings per share being of interest is that is what shareholders 
look for.'
8,1,3 Use of Payback
Payback was used by 33 companies (64.7 per cent), this is again surprising if you 
expect companies to operate in a way proposed by the strictest interpretation of the 
finance theory (Higson, 1986). The less strict view (Frank, Broyles and Carleton, 
1987), however, would have predicted payback's use as a safeguard measure in 
conjunction with DCF measures It is, however, a lower percentage of companies 
than Pike (1983, 1988) found in his research on the use of capital budgeting 
techniques in investment decisions in large UK companies (92 per cent in 1985/1986 
and 81 percent in 1980/81) No company rationalised paybacks use. One company 
acknowledged that payback was a crude measure; 'We use payback, although I 
appreciate it is a crude measure' No other company felt obliged to defend its use of 
payback as a criterion
8 ,1.4 l sc of ARK
Accounting rate of return measures like payback and EPS does not receive theoretical 
support though it was still used by 22 companies (43.1 per cent) This again is a 
lower percentage than Pike's surveys (1988, 1983) and Petry and Sprow's (1993) 
results on general investment decisions
8,1,5 Section Summary
This section has shown that DCF measures are commonly used The theoretically 
incorrect finance decision criteria, payback, accounting rate of return (ARR) and 
earnings per share (EPS) are also widely used. Few firms relied on only 1 capital 
budgeting technique to examine acquisitions. The combinations of techniques 
companies which used will be examined in section 8.2
8,2 Combinations of Capital Budgeting Techniques
Used in Acquisitions
The finance literature proposes that companies should only use discounted cash flow 
techniques to make investment decisions. Section 8.1 has shown however that 
companies are using other techniques and usually more than 1. The combinations used 
by companies are shown in table 8 2 Four features stand out in table 8 2:
A) One company did not use any of the 5 conventional capital budgeting techniques
B) Most companies used DCF measures plus other capital budgeting techniques
C) Only the company which did not use any conventional techniques did not use EPS 
or DCF
D) Payback was used mainly with more than 2 other criteria, and always at least 1
I able 8.2 Combinations of Capital Hudgcting I fclmitilies lsc<l in
Acquisition Decisions
Capital Budgeting Techniques
Used
Number of 
Companies
Percentage
(To 1 Decimal Place)
Did not use any conventional 
capital budgeting techniques
1 2 0
EPS 3 5 9
IRR 1 2.0
NPV 4 7.8
1 Method 8 15 7
EPS and IRR 3 5.9
EPS and NPV 1 2.0
EPS and ARR 3 5 9
IRR and NPV 1 2 0
IRR and ARR 1 2.0
IRR and Payback 3 5 9
NPV and ARR I 2.0
2 Methods 13 25.5
EPS, IRR and NPV 3 5 9
EPS, IRR and ARR 1 2.0
EPS, IRR and Payback 1 2.0
EPS, NPV and Payback 1 2.0
EPS, ARR and Payback 3 5.0
IRR, NPV and Payback 2 3.9
IRR, ARR, Payback 1 2.0
NPV, ARR and Payback 2 3 9
3 Methods 14 27.5
EPS, IRR, NPV, and ARR 4 7 8
EPS, IRR, NPV and Payback 5 9 8
EPS, IRR, ARR, and Payback 3 5 9
IRR, NPV, ARR, and Payback 1 2.0
4 Methods 13 25.5
EPS, IRR, NPV, ARR, and 
Payback
2 3.9
5 Methods 2 3 9
8.2.1 Companies No! Using Conventional Capital Budgeting Techniques
In contrast to most of the sample (42 companies, 82 4 per cent) who used more than 1 
technique, I retail company did not use any conventional financial evaluation 
techniques at all4. It focused on
' The number of sites, the opportunity of merging the 2 business into a single 
business and saving operating costs, the potential for sales growth under I 
brand.1
'It wouldn't be on a earnings basis it would be on a value of sites basis We are 
going to convert it to our style anyway We are not buying it as a going 
concern, we are buying trading opportunities we would try to appreciate 
what those sites would cost....'
This company's approach can be summarised as examining the cost of achieving the 
same number of sites through organic means It thus ignores the cost of capital, a 
factor which is core to discounted cash flow techniques, and assumes that increasing 
the number of retail sites it owned was a good idea. The most common approach, 
however, was the use of other measures in addition to DCF measures.
8.2.2 Use of Discounted Cash Flow Techniques With Other
Capital Budgeting Techniques
Thirty-five companies used DCF plus other measures Few companies relied only on I 
measure (8, 15.7 per cent). Only 4 companies used the approach that the strictest 
observance of financial theory would prescribe, that the only criterion used is NPV, 
which should incorporate all information (L.umby 1988 110) In comparison, Pike's 
(1988) 1985 data found an even smaller percentage of companies using only 1 
measure (8 per cent).
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8,2.3 Use of EPS and DCF
Table 8 2 also shows that, except the 1 company that did not use any of the 5 capital 
budgeting techniques in its acquisition decision making process, no other company 
failed to use either a DCF measure or EPS That is, no company relied on ARR or 
payback Thirty-three companies used at least 2 of 1RR, NPV or EPS A chi-squared 
test was done to examine if a negative relationship between DCF and EPS existed, this 
was significant at the 10 per cent level5 A test of the relationship of EPS used and 
DCF being one of the three key criteria used, produced a significance level of 50 per 
cent
8,2,4 Use of Payback with Other Capital Budgeting Techniques
The notable feature about the use of payback in table 8.2 is that only 12 5 per cent of 
companies which used payback (3 out of 24) used it with only 1 other decision 
criterion. For the 4 other capital budgeting techniques, between 22 and 30 per cent of 
the companies that used a technique, used it on its own or in combination with only 1 
other capital budgeting technique. 6 The average number of budgeting techniques used 
by companies using payback was 3 .41 compared to 2.7 in the sample as a whole.
The relationship, however, between using payback and using more than 1 other 
criterion though was not significant.7 The use of payback was not correlated with the 
use of the other individual techniques DCF, ARR or EPS.
This contrasts with Pike's (1988) research who found 6 percent of companies using 
only payback, and a further 23 percent used payback with 1 other method That is, he 
found 31 per cent of companies that used payback, used it either on its own or with 
only I other technique
Payback's position as a secondary criterion in the decisions covered by this research is 
reinforced by the fact that of the 18 companies that used payback, and stated their 3
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key criteria for a specific case, only 4 placed payback as 1 of their 3 key criteria, and 
in only 2 cases was it jointly the most important criterion This evidence would fit the 
view that it is being used as a secondary safeguard measure which the less rigid finance 
literature (Franks, Broyles and Carleton, 1985:71) would see as its place
The above data also would fit Pike's (1988, 1983) trend of payback declining in 
significance but not use, as it increasingly is used in conjunction with other measures 
His data the on use of capital budgeting techniques in 1975 shows that, 46 per cent of 
companies used it on its own or with 1 other measure, (63 per cent of those using 
payback), in 1985 this was 29 percent (31 per cent of those using payback) 8
8,2,5 Section Summary
The key features of table 8 2 are that, although payback is commonly used it is never 
used on its own and rarely with only IRR. The majority of companies (35, 68.6 per 
cent) use DCF plus other techniques and all except 1 use either DCF or EPS. The 
writer will now look at which of the 2 common DCF techniques IRR or the 
theoretically preferable NPV were used in the companies interviewed
8.3 Use of Internal Rate of Return or Net Present Value
It can be seen from Table 8 3 that IRR was the more commonly used DCF technique 
It was used by 32 companies compared to the 27 companies that used NPV More 
companies, however, used IRR and NPV together than used IRR on its own or NPV
on its own
fahle 8,3 Use o f Internal U;ile of Return and Net Present Value at
Companies That Used Discounted Cash Now Techniques
Number of 
Companies
Percentage of 
Total (To 1 
decimal place)
Percentage of those
using DCF
(To 1 decimal place)
Companies that used IRR 32 62 7 78 0
Companies that used 
NPV
27 52 9 65.8
Companies who used 
NPV and not IRR
9 17 6 22 0
Companies who used 
both NPV and IRR
18 35 3 43.9
Companies who used IRR 
and not NPV.
14 27 4 34.1
Total number of 
companies that used DCF
41 78 8 100
Companies that only used 
NPV and no other 
financial criteria.
4 7.7 9 8
Only 9 companies used only NPV, most companies either used only IRR, 14, or both 
IRR and NPV, 18 The only reason given for the greater use of IRR was:
'We would tend to look at an IRR, for the specific reason that it is a measure 
people can understand '
Some companies thought having to establish a discount rate was a disadvantage of 
NPV Only 1 company gave a reason for using only NPV analysis -
'Our aim is an NPV not an IRR because we have an indefinite holding period 
for an acquisition'
I he reasons for using IRR over NPV or NPV over IRR, however, were not generally 
explored in the interviews
These results show both methods were used together less often and that there was 
greater use of the 2 methods on their own than Pike (1988) found in 1985 '
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8.3. Section Summary
In summary. IRR, of the DCF techniques, was the more commonly used (32 
companies), but more companies used IRR and NPV together (18 companies) than 
only IRR(I4 companies) or the theoretically more correct method of using only 
NPV(9 companies). The capital budgeting techniques, however, considered by the 
finance literature were not the only criteria that companies stated they used to consider 
acquisitions The researcher will now examine the other criteria which companies said 
they used to examine acquisitions
8.4 Use of Other Decision Criteria
The finance literature would propose that all information should be incorporated in 
NPV and only NPV should be looked at when making a decision (Higson, 1991, 
Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 1990) The strategy literature would argue 'hat in 
addition an organisation's strategy should be considered since this is the only way it is 
going to develop a sustainable competitive advantage (Porter, 1980). These factors 
have been considered in chapter 7 and sections 8 1 and 8.2. This section will consider 
the other factors which companies explicitly said they used as acquisition decision 
criteria. The most commonly cited factors are shown in table 8 4
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Table 8.4 Non-Capital Budgeting Techniques filed  as Decision 
Criteria by More Than 3 Companies
Number of Companies Percentage of companies 
interviewed
Impact on Balance Sheet 14 27.5
Asset value 9 17 6
Target Profits 9 17 6
Target’s Management 8 15 7
Condition and safety of 
Plant
5 9.8
Growth Potential 4 7.8
Ability to add Value 4 7.8
Sales Slippage10 4 7.8
Risk 4 7.8
Technology 4 7.8
Customer Access 3 5 9
Product 3
Total Number of Other 
Factors Mentioned
92
Average Number of Other 
Factors Mentioned 
Explicitly as Criteria
1.80
Average Number of 
Factors Mentioned 
Explicitly as Criteria
4.28
Notable for its position at the bottom of the list is the product" made by the target 
company, it was explicitly mentioned by only 3 companies This may be an 
understatement of its importance as 6 of the sampled companies were purchasing 
operations which produced standardised commodities, such as oil. Even if these 
companies are excluded 42 out of 45 companies did not include the target company's 
product explicitly in their acquisition decision criteria This would be the position the 
finance literature would propose, that all information should be included in the NPV 
analysis and therefore should not be considered separately
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Another factor notable for its absence was any reference to the work force The 
abilities of the targets management was mentioned 9 times and the ability of the 
operating unit that the target was to be merged with only once It therefore seems that 
companies were assuming that the skills of the work force had little impact on the 
value of an organisation or that the work force could be changed at little cost The 
abilities of management to effectively use the assets at its disposal, however, were 
more important.
Table 8 4 includes 2 further factors which are purely financial in nature; impact on the 
balance sheet, and the target's profits Of the 92 items stated as decision criteria, 
excluding the 5 capital budgeting techniques proposed by the finance textbooks, 23 
were basically financial in nature rather than factors driving the financial measures
Asset value could also be viewed as an accounting measure. Some companies implied, 
however, that they included within this the process of conducting a detailed inventory 
of the condition of assets, and therefore their productive ability
Factors which relate to how the target companies produced cash flows were 
mentioned 69 times, an average of 1 80 criteria per company. This compares to the 
128 times in total that IRR, NPV, ARR, EPS and payback were mentioned, an 
average of 2.5 criteria per company It therefore seems that financial criteria, in the 
final decision making process, are far more important than the factors which allow a 
company to generate returns
The non financial factors may have been subsumed into the financial analysis It is 
however, interesting to note that only 4 people interviewed came from an engineering 
or production background
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The last 4 sections have examined the level of use of capital budgeting techniques and 
other decision criteria for acquisition decisions in the sample frame It has found that 
finance criteria dominated the process. Only 1 company did not use DCF or EPS 
DCF techniques were used widely, commonly with other finance techniques However, 
the method prescribed by the strictest interpretation of the finance literature i e. to use 
only NPV, was rarely used Payback though extensively used was rarely used as a 
criterion with less than 2 other techniques. Having examined what criteria were used, 
the writer will now examine how they were applied.
8.5 The Application of Decision Criteria
The application of the financial decision criteria has many aspects This thesis will 
focus on the use of fixed hurdle rates and the level of standardisation in the application 
of criteria.
8.5.1 Fixed Hurdle Rates
The finance literature proposes that for each decision made using discounted cash flow 
measures a specific discount rate reflecting the individual risk of that project should be 
developed.(Higson 1991:289, Schloser, 1992:319). The evidence presented in Table 
8 5, however, suggests that the majority of companies developed fixed hurdle rates for 
financial criteria rather than developing specific discount rates for each project This 
technique is supported for small projects by the finance literature (Higson, 1991 289) 
as the cost of developing a specific rate for a project may be greater than the benefit of 
developing a specific rate This is unlikely to be the case in acquisitions
The interviews, however, suggest that the situation is far less clear cut than implied by 
the answers to the closed question: Are any of these criteria subject to fixed hurdle 
rates ? That is, there are shades of grey on what is nominally a clear cut situation
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Table 8.5 Use of Fixed Hurdle Rales
Number of 
Companies
Percentage of 
Sample
Percentage of 
companies which 
answered question
Companies that used fixed 
hurdle rates in specific 
case discussed12
31 59.6 68 9
Companies that normally 
used fixed hurdle rates12
32 62.7 71.1
Several groups emerged in how they applied and used their hurdle rater. The
differences between groups are not wide in some cases, but are gaps in a continuum 
that stretches from total rigid enforcement to hurdle rates being vague targets.
Two companies stated they had hurdle rates but they were really targets to be 
achieved:
'We try to see that we can get to the 20 per cent return on our capital invested, 
including goodwill, by the end of the third year. And if we can't, how long after.' 
'They are not as fixed as they were. They are all reasonably flexible now It was 
just while we were trying to regain the confidence of the city. Then they were 
fairly rigid.'
Two companies maintained their hurdle rates but the period of measurement varied or 
application varied creating flexibility:
'Yes and no We are really looking for a minimum of fifteen per cent compound 
return on investment, over the period we are measuring.'' The reason the period 
varies is that the lower the quality of the business.... the less predictable the long 
term.'
'If something has been applied in a flexible way, you may have a fixed hurdle rate 
but if you apply it in a slightly flexible way then they are not fixed any more ' 
Eleven companies had hurdle rates, which were flexible depending on strategy and 
subjective factors:
'The hurdle rates themselves arc standard, but if it fails or passed I or 2 or all 
3, then that doesn't mean it is the end of the project, if there is an issue a tlag 
pops up.'
' The group has a hurdle rate for capital expenditure proposals and acquisitions 
but by its very nature exceptions are made '
'On 1RR we always try to have a minimum hurdle rate but there will be times 
when that is bust.'
'Yes, but there would invariably be exceptions '
Five companies had hurdle rates fixed in terms of rules:
'We have a group rate and then we put in a local inflation rate and then we 
would put in a specific risk factor '
'What you have is a real discount rate, and then the countries are split into low, 
moderate and high risk, and then there is a commercial risk which is divided by 
the type of project. All acquisitions are by definition above average commercial 
risk and so you add on 5.'
One division of a larger company thought there was an unofficial hurdle rate but there 
was no official hurdle rate:
'Officially no is perhaps what I should say to that. But I think there are 
perceived hurdle rates that we as a subsidiary feel we are working against, 
and we tend to filter out those projects that don't meet those rates.'
One company, which regularly acquires small companies in a specific area, said it had 
fixed hurdle rates for its divisions It, however, thought that it varied its discount rate 
to take account of risk in larger acquisitions It, though, had only conducted 2 large 
acquisitions over the last few years
Interviewee: 'We would set the internal rate of return for the DCF calculation, 
that would be set centrally depending on the nature of the business and the risks 
involved'
Researcher: ' So each operation would have a fixed discount rate which it could 
use in evaluating properties ?'
Interviewee: ' Yes'
But when discussing larger projects,
Interviewee: 'The discount rate will vary according to the type of project but in 
effect that is the hurdle rate '
One company had different fixed rates for its 2 divisions:
'We are looking for a lower return from our re ta il operations1*, because it is less 
risky1
Eight companies had hurdle rates which were fixed and which they claimed had no 
flexibility in them:
' No dilution to earnings per share and an increase in net assets, they are 
fundamental to the group and have been, right from the word go.'
For 8 15 companies there was either insufficient data or it was unclear how rigidly they 
were applying their hurdle rates.
It is impossible, however, to quantify exactly how rigidly companies were applying 
hurdle rates without using participant observation for all acquisitions a company has 
done The degrees of grey being discerned may be the result of different interviewees 
viewing rigidity in different ways
It is clear, however, that a maximum of only 8 companies out of the 31 for which clear 
data was available used fixed hurdle rates which were not subject to being over ridden 
by other factors.
Companies may also vary in their application of hurdle rates between operating units 
and the centre and over time. One company which stated it no longer had a fixed 
hurdle rate stated that it did at the time the specific acquisition discussed was
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That is, some companies had hurdle rates which would not result in rejection of a 
potential acquisition, others where it would, and a further group where it would 
depend
It should be noted that the 2 measures of use of fixed hurdle rates were highly 
correlated with each other (Chi-squared test result P 0004, Degrees of Freedom 1, 
Sample size =41) This may indicate that the specific cases described were not unusual 
in their level of use of fixed hurdle rates. It could be, however, that managers were 
describing what happened in a specific case when talking about generalities It is 
impossible to determine this without using observation based methods The 
consistency in the data might also be taken as reassurance that it is reasonably 
internally reliable Both measures showed high levels of use of fixed hurdle rates 
which cannot account for specific risk in an individual project
The frequency with which hurdle rates were changed appeared to be relatively low ,' 
they have been in place for quite some time.' But data on this was not consistently 
collected Therefore no conclusions can be drawn on this
Data on which factors were subjected to hurdle rates, however, was collected
8,5.2 Criteria Subject to Fixed Hurdle Kates
Table 8 6 shows the criteria subject to fixed hurdle rates It seems to reinforce the 
points noted in sections 8 I to 8 3:
A) That IRK is the dominant criterion at many companies and not the theoretically 
correct NPV, as it is the criterion for which hurdle are rates are most commonly set
conducted At I organisation where 3 interviews were conducted in different parts of
the organisation the responses on fixed hurdle rates differed
B) Payback although widely used is not a dominant criterion It is rarely subject to a 
fixed hurdle rate
C) DCF criteria are commonly used but are not the only criteria used An equal 
number of hurdle rates were set in terms of ARR, EPS and Payback as NPV and IRR 
One other point is notable, that ARR is still important enough for 9 companies to set 
fixed hurdle rates for it. That is, although ARR is the least used of the 5 capital 
budgeting techniques considered by the finance literature it is still of significance at 
some companies
Table 8.6 Criteria Subject to Fixed Hurdle Rates
Criteria Number of Companies Per cent of Sample
IRR 17 33.3
ARR 9 17 6
EPS Dilution 8 15.7
NPV 5 9 8
Payback 5 9 8
The material on which criteria are subject to fixed hurdle rates seems to reinforce the 
data on which criteria were used, in particular the diversity of criteria used, and that 
few companies used NPV in comparison to IRR. The data on hurdle rates in general 
seems to imply that although companies are using them, their use is not as high as the 
answers to the closed question would imply The level of use of fixed hurdle rates is 
further lowered by variable application of methods which the researcher will examine 
next
8.5.3 Flexibility of Application of Criteria
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The flexible application of criteria hinted at in the previous 2 sections is more clearly 
shown in table 8 7. Most companies do vary the way they apply the decision criteria 
they use One company stated 'if it is not strategically important then it will be 
rigorously applied, if it is strategically important then we will sort of review it on that 
basis' That is, 2 projects with nominally the same returns which pass the hurdle rates 
may be the product of very different approaches because 1 was viewed as being of 
strategic importance. A large number (18 or 40 per cent), however, claimed to follow 
a standardised approach.
Table 8.7 Standardisation of Method of Applying Criteria
The way criteria are 
applied and measured is:
Number of 
Companies
Percentage of 
Sample
Percentage of 
companies which 
answered question
Standardised for all 
acquisitions
18 34.6 40
Standardised but 
exceptions are made or 
usually the same
22 42.3 48.9
Varies from case to case 5 9.6 111
It is unclear what companies were including in this response. If they were focusing on 
the financial analysis, the finance literature would support a standardised approach If, 
however, the companies were focusing on the factors which underlie the cash flow 
analysis these should be dealt with individually for each case.
A further issue of variability was the time span covered, some companies only looked 
5 years ahead,
'most of the models were only 5 years but there was a horizon value.'
Some looked at only 3 years:
Interviewer:' Before you bought it, how far out did you look ? '
And one: 'We looked at the period, of about 18 months, when both businesses 
were fully integrated and operating at their most effective 
One company however looked at the whole 25 year life span of an asset although
' after 6 years and thereafter it was forecasting and best guess, whatever you 
want to call it'
and for some companies the modelling period has changed: 'I think, it has changed 
since but then we tried to model through to 20 years .. .We model to 10 years 
and stick on some kind of perpetuity .'
Most companies, however, appeared to be relatively consistent over how long they 
looked, but a similar caveat to the use of fixed hurdle rates must apply. This is what 
companies said they did Some were vague: 'the fact of the matter was we did 10 
years at most.' The mean period over which companies that used DCF developed 
forecasts was 9.667 years, the median was 8.5 but the range was from 3 years to 
25. This variation in time scale is particularly significant if no residual value is 
used, for it could have a marked effect on a net present value, especially in a low 
risk sector where the discount factor used should be small. This variation raises the 
question as to what these cash flows were based on.
8,5,4 Basis of Cash Flows
The factors underlying the cash (lows on which analysis was conducted varied Of the 
41 companies which discussed where the information came from to generate the cash 
flows in models: Nineteen companies mentioned looking at the wider economy as well 
as the industry. The level of importance the wider economy was given varied, as 
illustrated below Seventeen companies did not explicitly mention factors outside their 
industry as being considered Five said their analysis centred on industry factors Of 
the above, 2 stated they examined individual customer demand
Interviewee: 'It would be 3 years '
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These distinctions though are a case of chopping a continuum The gaps are small and 
it is unclear whether those companies that did not mention wider factors as influencing 
the cash flows, had not already conducted detailed analysis of the factors affecting the 
industry in which they operated, to generate budgets and strategic plans for current 
operations It is also unclear whether the companies that examine demand on a 
customer by customer basis were incorporating a wider economic view into this 
One company said:' Definitely industry dynamics, I think you can't ignore the general 
environment as far as recession is concerned because it does have a bearing, 
but it was more industry specific and at times people were playing around with 
(Product b lend) and so on so.'
Another 'We focused largely on industry trends and checked those against economic 
trends.'
A third:' First of all there has been a volume decline for at least 3 ,4 years and the 
basis of our proposition was that we could revise the volume decline by 
advertising and marketing programmes, marketing innovations. The sellers had 
neglected it, they had decided that about 2 or 3 years ago that they weren't 
interested.
A fourth: Interviewer: 'How did you develop any projections that were used for your 
IRR'
Interviewee: 'We used the local profit centre management and then the knowledge of 
the industry . We rely on them, they have got to own and run it at the end of 
the day They have the industry experience '
Interviewer 'Would that have been generated from their annual budget. That is would 
you use that as a starting point ?'
Interviewee ' We know what the operating parameters are of this type of business.' 
Interviewer 'Were these projections developed on an industry basis or did you 
consider any wider economic factors in them ?'
Interviewee 'Yes, you are concerned with what the American economy is doing.'
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Interviewee 'We are not going to invest in an economy where the bottom has just 
fallen out of it.1
A fifth company stated Various things, obviously, how the economy is going, can the 
competitive position of this company be sustained, the investment needs to 
develop it.'
For another, political concerns were important:
Interviewee: 'If the market wasn't going to develop then it was going nowhere but then 
you have only got to get the market to grow 50% via scrubbing16 and its a big 
market This market has to develop.... It is substitution and market growth'
Interviewer:' Okay Did you consider wider, firstly, economic variables and secondly 
environmental variables in this?'
Interviewee:' In our evaluations we were conscious that the environmental issues were 
going to get stronger and, therefore, would pressure on customer to switch to 
this other technology.1
Interviewer:' So political issues ?'
Interviewee:' Political'
Interviewer: 'Political issues in terms of environmental legislation and what about the 
environmental groups who have major influence on politicians in passing 
legislation?
Interviewee:' That would be important in helping us turn customers round .'
Interviewer:' So that was looked at, the likelihood of environmental legislation on the 
specific markets.'
Interviewee:' Yes, We looked at how that was going '
For some companies, the wider economic situation was not seen as relevant: 'No, the 
main factors driving those were, because it was a flat market ,the main factors 
were agricultural rates of inflation, and our ability to improve the prospects of 
the company ’
Interviewer: 'Is that an important factor ?'
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I or 2 companies, i( was how individual customers would react: 'You look at it on a 
customer, by customer basis There was basically existing customers and new 
customers and obviously you look at existing customers, that is relatively easy, 
they have an association, it is a case of saying whether they arc going to buy 
the same amount as last year New customers are much more difficult because 
you have got to guess whether and when they are going to come on board and 
how many units they are going to take'
The analysis of the wider economy was in some companies not particularly 
quantitative in nature 'The people in the marketing part of the central 
European group, went into a darkened room, looked into the German economy 
looked into the customers on the system, and just discussed it They 
considered the historical trends of each customer by volume and took a view 
by customer, on what the growth for each customer would be There are 
very few there are only about 10 major customers.'
That is, some companies said they were only looking at the industry, some didn't say 
they were looking outside their industry, and some said that they incorporated factors 
other than industry dynamics in their assumptions and forecasts.
One company stated: Interviewer: 'You didn't include wider the economic 
situation in there ?'
Interviewee:' Yes by inference, because of our knowledge of our business, yes, 
but without necessarily going out and pulling specific information.'
That is it did not specifically look but thought it had already incorporated outside 
ellects in its industry assumptions
Another company had a more clearly developed picture of the country it was investing 
in
Interviewer ' Did you develop a macro-economical view and incorporate that ¡it all '
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Interviewer1 So was that incorporated into the model.'
Interviewee: ' Yes.'
No statistics were carried out on the divisions used above as this would imply clear 
cut categories which in many cases were blurred at the edges The picture is unclear 
Some companies built detailed views of the economies they were investing in Others 
only said they examined industry dynamics.
Interviewee' No we already had a macro-economic view of the country and the market
concerned '
8,5.5 Section Summary
This section has examined the application of financial decision criteria and found that 
although many companies profess to having fixed hurdle rates for a variety of reasons, 
including deliberate flexibility and the method of application, these rates are not that 
rigid. Few companies described detailed methods for developing discount rates which 
would take account of risk in a rigorous and consistent fashion. Five described rule 
based approaches for this. Companies were found to generate cash flow models for a 
variety of periods for 3 to 25 years. Companies also based these cash flows on a 
combination of industry and wider economic assumptions The incorporation of the 
latter ranging from none to a fairly significant factor in the model
8.6 Chanter Summary
This chapter has examined the decision criteria used in the acquisition process It has 
concluded that although most companies used DCF techniques, most also used
payback, ARR and EPS as well as other non financial criteria. Few companies 
considered the product made to be an important criteria in its own right Fixed hurdle 
rates were commonly used by companies Further examination of this showed that 
these in some cases were fairly flexible
The next chapter will consider whether the use of any of the financial techniques this 
chapter has found that companies use, had an effect on acquisition success. It will 
focus on whether DCF techniques which are theoretically superior to other techniques 
produce improved success levels in practice
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hoot notes
1 Nol value maximising.
2 Only 43 companies staled whether DCF was in their three key criteria.
’ X companies who used DCF did nol state their 3 key criteria
4 That is it did not use Payback, ARR, IRR. NPV or EPS.
Exact significance 7.710 per cent This is the result of a Fisher exact test as the minimum expected 
frequency was 3.5.
11 30.3 percent o f companies that used EPS, used it on its own or in conjunction with only one other 
capital budgeting technique.
22 7 per cent of companies that used ARR measures used it in conjunction with only one other 
capital budgeting technique.
28 1 per cent o f companies that used IRR measures used it in conjunction with only one other capital 
budgeting technique.
25.9 per cent that used NPV used it in conjunction with only one other capital budgeting technique.
P - 0 880205. This chi-squared test compared companies who used payback plus more than one 
other criteria to those that used more than one criteria excluding payback That is did companies 
using payback use more capital budgeting techniques excluding payback than the group that did not
use payback
“ It should be noted that no distinction is made here between use o f discounted payback or simple 
payback as data was not specifically collected on this and is therefore incomplete.
' Pike (1988) found that in 1988, 9 per cent used only NPV, 57 per cent used both IRR and NPV and 
17 per cent used only IRR in 1985 
" I.oss of sales resulting from purchase 
!l Including services
12 Taken from description of how decision criteria were applied in specific case
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1' Response lo a direct closed question
11 Specific type of retail operation was named but this has been removed to disguise the company.
1 This gives thirty nine companies, who either said they had a specific hurdle rale when talking about 
normal behaviour or said the)’ had applied a fixed hurdle rate when discussing a specific case. 24 who 
used a fixed hurdle rate normally and in the specific ease discussed, eight who used it in either the 
specific ease or normally, and seven for which a coding for only one of the two variables was possible. 
16 Process for cleaning gas emmisions into atmosphere.
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CHAPTER 9 DECISION CRITERIA AND SUCCESS
9.0 Introduction
Chapter 8 examined which decision criteria companies used and how these were 
applied. It found that most companies were using DCF techniques but that they were 
also using ARR, Payback, and EPS, as well as non financial criteria
Chapter 4 reviewed the finance literature. It concluded that finance theory proposes 
that all companies should use discounted cash flow (DCF) measures preferably net 
present value (NPV). But if necessary internal rate of return (IRR)could be used 
(Samuels, Wilkes and Brayshaw, 1990:162). Other measures are viewed as having 
serious shortcomings. The use of DCF techniques, therefore, should increase success 
levels, while the use of other criteria will reduce success levels as they will produce 
incorrect decisions'. The use of fixed hurdle rates in NPV calculations should reduce 
success levels, unless the project has no significant consequences to make the cost of 
developing a specific rate greater than the benefits.
This chapter will examine 3 main areas:
a) Whether the use of DCF techniques affects success.
b) How can these results be explained.
c) How did the use of criteria apart from discounted cash flow(DCF) techniques 
affect success, and what other factors were associated with the use of these criteria 
This will include the examination of the following hypotheses:
4:4) Use of discounted cash flow measures as decision criteria in acquisitions will 
increase success.
4:5) Use of NPV as a decision criterion will increase success rates.
4:6) The use of only NPV as a decision criterion will give an increased success 
level.
4:7) The use of fixed hurdle rates will lower success levels.
4:8) Larger companies in terms of sales will show an increased propensity to use 
discounted cash flow measures.
4:1) Use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success.
4:2) Use of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce success. 
4:3) Use of earnings per share as a decision criterion will reduce success.
9.1 Use of Discounted Cash Flow Techniques and Success
Chapter 8 established that the majority of companies interviewed used discounted 
cash flow (DCF) techniques as prescribed by the finance literature. The researcher will 
now look at whether DCF's theoretical superiority was translated into superior 
success levels. Table 9.1 shows that, the use of DCF techniques was not associated 
with significantly better performance.
One result in table 9.1 shows a negative relationship between DCF, being one of the
three key criteria used, and the general success measure. This was significant at the 1
per cent level The other tests, however, produced no significant relationships The
researcher, concluded that this 1 significant result, presented in table 9.1, was
insufficient to support the hypothesis that: the use of discounted cash flow measures
%
reduces success levels in acquisitions
The variable, discounted cash flow was one of a company's three key criteria in the 
specific case discussed, was used to attempt to exclude companies which used DCF 
techniques but did not pay any attention to the results. Thus the researcher concluded
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4:4) The use of discounted cash flow measures as decision criteria in acquisitions 
will increase success.
that DCF analysis does not seem to result in superior performance, contrary to the
expectations of the finance literature That is, the evidence implies a rejection of the
hypothesis:
Table 9.1 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between The Use of Discounted 
Cash Flow Measures and Success
Minimum
expected
frequency2
Sample
Size
Probability o 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
DCF Used and General Success Measure 4.0 38 .69280
DCF 1 of 3 Key Acquisition Criteria an 
General Success Measure4
7.0 37 .0042***-
DCF Used and First Specific Succes 
Measure4
1.4 30 .61106
DCF 1 of 3 Key Acquisition Criteria an 
First Specific Success Measure
4.0 30 .69561
DCF Used and Second Specific Succes 
Measure5
3.2 44 .45592
DCF 1 of 3 Key Acquisition Criteria an 
Second Specific Success Measure
5.4 38 .33082
All tests had 1 degree of freedom
- Direction of Relationship Negative
*** Significant at 1 per cent level
There are several possible interpretations of the rejection of hypothesis 4:4) based on 
the results in table 9.1:
1) The result is inaccurate,
2) DCF methods were not applied correctly,
3) Companies using NPV did produce superior results but companies using 1RR did 
not because of its flaws and this reduced the overall success level of companies using 
DCF methods.
4) companies are using DCF techniques but the results are ignored in the decision 
making process
5) DCF is being used as a substitute for analysis and thus superior performance as a 
result of DCF being used is lost because of other changes in the acquisition decision 
process associated with it. That is :
Hypothesis 9:4, Companies which used discounted cash flow techniques are 
different from those that do not in such a way as to negate the effect of improved 
performance in acquisitions resulting from the use of DCF techniques.
The researcher will now examine each of these options in turn
9.1,1 Method Problems - Success Measure Bias
A possible methodological problem is that the success measure is systematically biased 
and in reality the companies using DCF were more successful but this is not captured 
in the success measure. That is, the result is not an accurate reflection of reality. A 
problem with the subjective measure used is that managers may have different 
expectations If managers at companies which used DCF had consistently higher 
expectations of how their acquisitions would perform than managers at companies that 
did not use DCF analysis, this would produce results showing that companies using 
DCF analysis acquisition's performed less well than those of companies not using 
DCF, even if their performance was identical on a hypothetical neutral measure.
A possible cause of managers at companies using DCF having higher expectations is 
superior past performance. To examine if past success might have influenced the 
results, profitability (Pre-tax profits/Sales) for the last available set of accounts is 
presented to give a comparison of general performance between those companies that
used DCF and those that did not Although this is a crude measure since it takes no 
account of the industry a company is operating in, and only covers 1 year, the 
researcher has no reason to believe that it is systematically biased The results (Table 
9 2) imply that the companies which used DCF did not have superior general 
performance Therefore, the companies using discounted cash flow analysis should not 
have higher targets because of prior better general performance Thus prior 
performance should not be an explanation of systematic lower assessment of success 
for same level of performance by companies which used DCF.
Table 9,2 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Use of Discounted
Cash Flow Measures and Profitability
DCF used and profitability6 for last 
set of accounts divided at divided at :
Sample
Size
Minimum
Expected
Frequency7
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
6 per cent 50 1.8 1
8 per cent 50 3 6 1
10 per cent 50 4.0 71306
DCF 1 of 3 Key Acquisition Criteria 
and profitability for last set of 
accounts divided at
6 per cent 42 3.8 1
8 per cent 42 8.1 .4740
10 per cent 42 64 .7100
All tests had 1 degree of freedom
No convenient method is available to examine if companies which use DCF had 
higher expectations because they used DCF To overcome this problem another type 
of success measure could be used But, as discussed in chapter 6, all other success 
measures have problems, which would have curtailed data collection
9.1.2 Method Problems - Success Measure Sensitivity
A second possible explanation for the success measure not accurately capturing 
improved performance for companies using DCF within their acquisition process is 
because the sample size restricts the chi-squared tests to 2 cells by 2 cells, and 
therefore the measure loses sensitivity. To check the validity of the chi-squared tests, 
and check the results for sensitivity to the dividing points used, the test was conducted 
with the dividing point of the success measures varied. The results of the tests 
between DCF used and the general success measure, and DCF as one of a company's 
three key criteria and the general success measure, are presented in tables 9.3 and 9 4. 
The results of the tests with the other success measures are presented in appendix D, 
tables D 10 to D. 13.
No test between DCF used and the first specific success measure were significant. 
Results presented in appendix D, table D. 10
No test between DCF used and the second specific success measure were significant. 
Results presented in appendix D, table D.12.
No test between DCF as one of a company's three key criteria for an acquisition 
decision and the first specific success measure were significant. Results presented in 
appendix D, table Dl l .
No test between DCF as one of a company's three key criteria for an acquisition 
decision and the second specific success measure were significant. Results presented 
in appendix D, table D.13__________________________________________________
Table 9.3 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between DCF Used and Success
DCF used and general 
acquisition success measure, 
divided at:
Minimum expected 
frequency8
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
2.5 1.5 1
2.7 2.1 1
2.9 2.1 1
3 2.5 69828
3.1 2.9 1
3.2 3.3 1
3.3 4 .69280
3.5 4 69280
3.6 3.5 1
3.7 2.5 .23195
3.8 2.3 .19496
3.9 1.9 07133* -
4.0 1.3 .09401* -
4.1 9 .02565**-
All chi-squared tests had 1 degree of freedom and a sample size of 38
Table 9.4 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between DCF as One of a 
Company's Three Key Criteria and Success
DCF 1 of a company's 3 key 
acquisition decision criteria and 
general acquisition success measure, 
divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution 
occurring by chance
3 0 4.2 33693
3.1 5.2 .10777
3.2 6.1 .02565 ** -
3.3 7.0 .00421 *** -
3.4 7.0 .00421 *** -
3 5 7.0 03508 ** -
3.6 6.1 .03606 ** -
3 7 5.6 01353 ** -
3.8 5.2 .03392 ** -
3.9 4.2 16048
All chi-squared tests had 1 degree of freedom and a sample size of 32
_____ Correlation Direction negative______________________________
*** Significant at 1 per cent level________________________________
* * Significant at 5 per cent level________________________________
The tests between DCF as one of a company's three key criteria, and the general
success measure, replicated the result achieved when the scale was divided at 3 4 to
produce a dichotomous variable, although the significance levels are not as high Eight
tests for different dividing lines of the success variable produced significant results
This seems to suggest the result is fairly robust and implies that DCF is not only not
producing superior results, but that it is associated with reduced general levels of
success.
No other solution to improve the ability of the success measure to capture small 
changes resulting from the use o f discounted cash flow analysis is available apart from 
conducting more interviews. This is not an option within this research. It, however, 
represents a future avenue for research in this area.
It could be argued that table 9.4 supports the perspective that companies which use 
discounted cash flow have higher targets. That is, if all companies' acquisitions on 
average performed the same, the negative correlation on the general success measure 
could be taken to indicate that those companies which use DCF have higher targets 
This argument is, however, tenuous as it assumes over the long term all acquisitions 
perform the same
A further problem with the method used is that the researcher is reliant on the 
interviewee accurately recalling events.
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9 , 1 . 3 Method Problems - Inaccurate Pala
A possible problem associated with collecting data on DCF use is that companies may 
view using DCF as a desirable sign of being a professional company and therefore 
claim they were using it when they were not. To counteract this problem the 
researcher examined whether a company placed DCF in their three key decision 
criteria. This it must be hoped would be less likely to include spurious data as it was 
implied in the interview that the data was to be used as a success measure In addition, 
several questions were asked on this topic in different parts of the interview The 
problem of interviewees claiming one thing when actually doing another is almost 
impossible to counteract with any other means apart from asking multiple questions 
when collecting data on acquisitions Observation as a data collection method is 
unlikely to gain access and access to written sources is unlikely until the acquisition is 
no longer perceived as being sensitive to the company or senior personnel By this 
time, practice will probably have changed and no triangulation with interview sources 
will be possible because people have limited memory spans.
Therefore, although there are several problems with the methods used there does not 
appear to be sufficient evidence to support the hypothesis: 4:4) Use of discounted 
cash flow measures as decision criteria in acquisitions will increase success This 
leaves the option of rejecting the hypotheses as the evidence in table 9,2 implies 
Which in turn leaves the problem of explaining how the theoretically superior method 
fails to produce superior results Explanations proposed for this include:
A) The use of 1RR, which has a number of problems, is negating any improvement in 
success occurring at companies using NPV
B) DCF analysis is being carried out but ignored by decision makers
C) DCF analysis was not being applied correctly
D) The improvement in acquisition success resulting from using DCF was marginal 
and being swamped by other changes associated with using DCF analysis. The 
researcher will now examine each of these possibilities in turn
9.1.4 Use of IRR is Reducing Discounted Cash Flow Performance
Chapter 4 proposed 2 hypotheses which seem relevant to this view of the cause of 
DCF producing worse general performance, and no superior performance on the 
specific measures used in this research:
4:5 - Use of NPV as a decision criterion will increase success rates
4:6 - The use of only NPV as a decision criterion will give an increased level of
success.
If NPV did give superior performance, and IRR did not because of its flaws, this 
would provide an explanation for the lack of superior performance by companies using 
DCF techniques. That is, the theoretically correct NPV is giving superior performance, 
but IRR is not and when combined no effect is detectable.
To examine the effect on success of companies using IRR and NPV they were 
divided into, A) those which used NPV and not IRR, and, B) those which used IRR 
and not NPV, these groups being mutually exclusive. They were also divided into; A) 
those which used NPV and , B) those which used IRR, which were not mutually 
exclusive
The researcher could not test hypothesis 4:6 directly as only 4 companies only used 
NPV as a financial decision criteria. These all used other non financial criteria
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As a substitute the researcher tested the hypothesis that
9:1) The use of NPV and not 1RR as a decision criterion will increase success 
levels.
The results of this are presented in table D 16 in appendix D No results are 
significant. Hypothesis 9:1 was therefore rejected The researcher thought this may be 
due to the very small minimum expected frequencies To check this result the 
researcher examined the hypothesis that
9:2) The use of IRR and not NPV as a decision criterion will reduce success 
levels.
That is if it could not be shown that the use of NPV gave increased success, could it 
be shown that the use of IRR gave reduced levels of success. The results of testing this 
hypothesis with the second specific success measure are presented in table 9.5. The 
results for 4 divisions of the second specific success measure used were significant 
The results of the tests with the general success measure and first specific success 
measure, which are not significant, are presented in table D 17 in appendix D
No test between use of IRR and not NPV and the first specific success measure 
were significant.
No test between use of IRR and not NPV and the general success measure were 
significant.__________________________
Table 9.5 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between IRK Used and nol NPV in
Acoiiisition Process and the Second Specific Success Measure
IRR used and not NPV and 
second specific success measure 
divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 2.0 08508 * -
3.1 2 9 13056
3.2 2 9 11149
3.3 3.7 02555** -
3.4 3.4 .03188** -
3.5 4 2 07213* -
3.6 4 6 16011
3.7 5.4 26566
3 8 4.4 48244
3.9 3.7 72624
4.0 2 9 1
Sample size 45 with 1 degree of freedom
- Negative relationship
** Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
The researcher concluded that this was insufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis:
9:2) The use of IRR and not NPV as a decision criterion will give a reduced level 
of success.
It does, however, indicate that IRR use may be a factor in negating DCF theoretical 
superiority.
The researcher, therefore, focused on hypothesis 4:5:
The use of NPV as a decision criterion will give an increased level of success.
Table 9 6 presents evidence on this hypothesis. It shows that NPV is significantly 
negatively associated with 3 divisions of the general success measure The researcher 
therefore rejected hypothesis 4:5.
Examination of the related hypothesis that
9:3) Use of IRR as a decision criterion will give reduced success levels. 
Did not produce any significant correlations
The results of testing this are presented in table D 14 in appendix I)
The evidence thus implies that the hypothesis 4:5 cannot be accepted The evidence 
on the effect of the use of IRR and NPV on success is unclear Chi-squared tests on 
the relationship between the variables, A) Use of IRR and not NPV and, B) Use of 
NPV, and success produced significant negative relationships. However, tests 
between, A) Use of NPV and not IRR and, B) Use of IRR, and success produced no 
significant results It is, therefore, an area which would benefit from the larger sample 
frame possible with a questionnaire approach. Unfortunately this, would be more 
vulnerable to people stating that they used DCF because, that is viewed as desirable
Table 9,6 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between NPV Used and Success
NPV Used and first specific 
success measure divided at :
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3.5 3.7 1
3 6 4.2 69439
3.7 5.2 91935
3 8 5.6 .65400
3 9 6 5 73210
4.0 5.6 29564
4.1 5 6 29564
4.2 5.1 1 563 1
4 3 5.1 23598
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 9.6 Continued Chi-Squared Tests on NPV Used and Success
NPV used and general success 
measure divided at :
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
2.5 3 3 1
2.7 4.7 1
2 9 4.7 84605
3 0 5.6 8251
3.1 6.6 67056
3.2 7.6 29880
3.3 9 19375
3.4 9 19375
3.5 8 0 20322
3 6 6 6 35670
3.7 5.7 .35744
3.8 5.2 19986
3.9 4.3 05770 *-
4 0 2.9 04633 ** -
4.1 2.8 08283 * -
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
NPV used and second specific 
success measure divided a t :
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3.0 3 6 .43468
3.1 5.3 .25819
3.2 5.3 .25819
3.3 6.7 13756
3.4 7.1 .23649
3.5 7.5 .37144
3 6 8.4 .12061
3.7 9 8 .18231
3.8 8 .22067
3 9 6.7 .67137
4.0 5.3 82110
Sample size 45 with 1 degree of freedom
- Direction of relationship negative
** Significant at 5 per cent level | * Significant at 10 per cent level
9 . 1 . 5 The Decision Makers arc l^iioriim the Results of IK'F Analysis
The use of other financial decision criteria in addition to DCF implies that DCF 
analysis is not being exclusively focused on The small numbers (6)'’ of companies that 
used only DCF made tests impossible as to whether they had superior performance to 
the other companies. It could be argued that although DCF analysis is being used its 
results are being compromised when its conclusions disagree with other tests (EPS, 
ARR and Payback) which are more intuitive (Higson 1984:146). It is precisely these 
situations where these other measures are not producing the correct (value 
maximising) answer That is, although the analysis was carried out, its results are 
viewed as only 1 of many factors Moreover the results are being over-ridden in 
certain situations, which may result in poor performing acquisitions being made The 
qualitative evidence seems to support this argument.
One company provided a case where the manager being interviewed thought the board 
had already made its decision and the analysis was ignored :
’The valuation process went through the normal routine things. .. it would be 
wrong to say they were ignored because the people who made the decision 
would say they weren't ignored, they were very much part of the thinking, but in 
terms of controlling the decision they didn't have a significant bearing'
'The fundamental criteria was that we wanted the brand.'
One interviewee at a company which used DCF thought that:
'In terms of presenting it to senior management, senior management are 
confident and familiar with return on investment and confident with that term, 
and they are not that familiar with internal rate of return.'
Another company that :
'Normally I would say you must be able to capture everything in the numbers 
otherwise, if you do things for quote strategic reasons then you will make a hash
of it. But I think that in some cases you can make the models make the right 
answer and it can be very difficult to justify the way in which those numbers 
were derived.'
'It is no good making NPV positive investments if they don't contribute to 
earnings'
'Ultimately if the chairman jumps up and down and says we are doing it, we are
doing it.'
' I think more important to us would be contribution to earnings '
I hat is, although DCF calculations were carried out, senior managers, in some cases 
are focusing on other factors when making decisions A third possible explanation for 
the lack of greater success by companies using discounted cash flow techniques is that 
they did not apply them correctly
9.1.6 Application of Discounted Cash Flow Methods.
Fixed Hurdle Rates
I he presence of fixed discount rates for criteria discussed in section 8.5.1 implies that 
some companies are not applying discounted cash flow measures correctly in some 
cases (Schlosser 1992:319). That is, the rates used do not reflect the risk for the 
individual project. The only exceptions to this should be. A) where an investment is so 
small that the cost of developing a specific rate is greater than the benefit of improved 
decision making, or B) the company only makes acquisitions in a very narrow area 
such that the risk levels are always the same Some companies were developing 
specific rates using rules, others tailoring them to specific cases However, some were 
using fixed hurdle rates and including flexibility for reasons which do not specifically 
relate to the risk involved, as the finance literature would propose. Only 5 companies
Table 9 7 shows that the use of fixed hurdle rates was associated with the presence of 
discounted cash flow techniques as one of a company's three key decision criteria 
Therefore companies which were using discounted cash flow techniques were also 
more likely to use a method which it was hypothesised, in chapter 4, would reduce
success
described a process whereby a discount rate was individually tailored to a specific
project using established procedures, to take account of country and sector risk for
each part of an acquisition
Table 9.7 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between DCF Used by A Company 
and Fixed Hurdle Rates
DCF used and : Sample
Size
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
Direction
of
Correlation
Use of fixed hurdle 
rates in specific case
44 .20890 2.4
Use of fixed hurdle 
rate normally
38 .41127 2.6
DCF one of a 
company's three key 
criteria and
Use of fixed hurdle 
rates in specific case
38 .03674** 4.9 Positive
Use of fixed hurdle 
rate normally
38 .03674** 4 9 Positive
All tests had 1 degree of Freedom
Hypothesis 4:7 : The use of fixed hurdle rates will lower success levels. 
The results of testing this hypothesis are presented in tables 9 8 to 9 10
Table 9.8 Results of Chi-Smiared Tests between The Use of Fixed
Hurdle Rates In General Case and First Specific Success Measure
Use of Fixed Hurdle Rates in 
general case and first specific 
success measure 10 divided at
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
3.5 1 1.7
3 6 1 19
3.7 1 2.4
3 8 66798 2 7
3 9 1 2 3
4.0 19039 2.7
4 1 19039 2.7
4.2 19039 2.7
4.3 19039 2.7
4 4 06218* + 2.2
Sample size 26 with 1 degree of freedom 
+ Positive relationship
Table 9.9 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between The Use of Fixed Hurdle Rates 
in General in Acquisitions and Second Specific Success Measure
Use of Fixed Hurdle Rates in 
general in acquisitions and 
Second specific success 
measure divided at:
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
3 1 2.4
3 1 72462 3 6
3 2 72462 3.6
3 3 47726 4.5
3 4 24932 4 6
3.5 14272 5.1
3 6 06211* - 5.7
3 7 07136* - 5.4
3 8 72009 4.2
3 9 1 3.6
4 0 69689 3 6
Sample size 40 with 1 degree of freedom
* Significant at 10 per cent level
- Negative relationship
Table 9,10 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between The Use of Fixed
Hurdle Rates in General and General Success measure
Use of fixed hurdle rates in 
general in acquisitions and 
general success measure 
divided at
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
2.5 1 2
2.7 68578 2.8
2.9 .68578 2.8
3.0 44698 3.1
3.1 43401 3.4
3.2 70412 4
3.3 72333 4 6
3.4 1 4.6
3.5 1 4.6
3.6 1 4
3.7 70621 3.4
3.8 1 3.1
3 9 1 2.6
Sample size 35 with 1 degree of freedom
No chi-squared tests between the use of fixed hurdle rates in a specific case and 
first specific success measure were significant.
No chi-squared tests between the use of fixed hurdle rates in a specific case and 
second specific success measure were significant.
Three chi-squared tests between the use of fixed hurdle rates in a specific case 
and general success measure were significant. The use of a fixed hurdle rate in a 
specific case was negatively related to the general success measure.
The evidence presented in the tables 9.8 to 9.10 seems to imply rejection of the 
hypotheses 4:7 for there general use. The chi-squared tests do show 2 negative
relationship in which are significant at the 10 per cent level, for 2 divisions of the 
second specific success measure and use of fixed hurdle rates in general There is, 
however, also one significant positive relationship between the use of fixed hurdle 
rates in general and the first specific success measure
There are 3 significant relationships between the use of fixed hurdle rates in the 
specific case and the general success measure The researcher however concluded that 
this was insufficient evidence to accept hypothesis 4:7 This relationship may be 
contributing to the loss of the theoretical advantage of DCF analysis when it is 
translated into practice, but it does not appear to be a major factor.
It was not possible to include the different groupings based on how rigidly fixed 
hurdle rates were applied that were generated in section 8.4.1, because of the sample 
size". This may explain the limited evidence supporting the hypothesis. That is, 
although companies are claiming the existence of fixed hurdle rates it is only the group 
that are rigidly enforcing them that are suffering a disadvantage
A second explanation is that some companies can adequately account for risk when 
using a fixed hurdle rate because all projects they undertake have very similar levels of 
risk.
A third explanation is that the marginal errors in the hurdle rates are small because 
most organisations operate in low inflation countries in established industries The 
variation in discount rates to accurately reflect this is therefore relatively small 
compared with other potential changes.
9 . 1 . 7 Application of Discounted Cash Flow Measures
and Variable Application
A further factor which may reduce the effectiveness of DCF is the variability in 
application discussed in section 8 5.3. That is, to allow projects which would 
otherwise not pass hurdle rates to go ahead, because of other factors, methods are 
applied less rigorously: ' if it is not strategically important then it will be rigorously 
applied, if it is strategically important then we will then review it on that basis '
Benefits of using discounted cash flow analysis may therefore be lost because incorrect 
discount rates are being used and the methods applied in an inconsistent fashion There 
was, however, no correlation between the use of standardised procedures and DCF 
analysis.12 The researcher examined the period for which companies developed cash 
flow forecasts. There was a strong correlation between DCF as one of a company's 
three key criteria and cash flows projections being carried out for longer periods 12 
The development of cash flow projections for longer periods, however, was not 
significantly correlated with success 14
A further possible reason for the lack of greater success at companies using discounted 
cash flow analysis is that the benefits may be swamped by other differences that are 
associated with using DCF techniques. That is, there are other differences between 
the companies which used DCF and those that did not which are so great that these 
differences are equal to the gains in acquisition performance of using DCF techniques 
This hypothesis that companies that used DCF are fundamentally different will be 
explored in section 9 1.8
9 . 1.8 Use of DCF and Size of Company
Section 9 1 provided the hypothesis that: Companies which used discounted cash 
flow techniques are different from those that do not in such a way as to negate 
the effect of improved performance in acquisitions resulting from the use of DCF 
techniques. Chapter 4 provided a more specific hypothesis which seems relevant to 
this, hypothesis 4:8 : The larger the company the greater the use of discounted 
cash flow measures.
Table 9 11 presents evidence on this hypothesis
1 chi-squared test between DCF used and sales was significant.
2 chi-squared tests between DCF used and profits were significant.
These were positive in nature.
Results of these tests are presented in Table D.18 in appendix D._______________
The evidence presented in table 9.11 supports hypothesis 4:8, specifically that the 
larger the company the greater the probability that it included discounted cash flow 
techniques in its 3 key criteria. The evidence on the relationship that the greater the 
size of a company in terms of pre-tax profits and sales the greater the probability that it 
used DCF techniques was less clear cut15. However, these test results, in table 9.11, 
support the view that companies that used discounted cash flow analysis are 
significantly larger than those that do not.
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Table 9.11 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between DCF Included in a 
Company's 3 Key Criteria and Measures of Company Size
DCF included in a 
company's 3 key criteria 
and
Sample
Size
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
Distribution Occurring 
by Chance
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 1 billion 
pounds
43 6.7 .00485*** +
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 1.5 
billion pounds
43 7.3 00275*** +
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 2 billion 
pounds
43 9.3 00857*** -r
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 2.5 
billion pounds
43 8.1 04897** +
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 3 billion 
pounds
43 7.5 .11468
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
100 million pounds
42 7.7 .03843** +
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
200 million pounds
42 6.9 01326** +
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
300 million pounds
42 3.9 .25781
All tests had 1 degree of freedom
+ Direction of relationship positive
***Significant at 1 percent level
** Significant at 5 per cent level
* Significant at 10 per cent level
This result is perhaps surprising given that all the companies bar 1, in the sample 
frame, had sales greater than 200 million pounds It docs, however, provide a 
difference associated with companies that used DCF that might have the effect of
negating any improvement in acquisition success because they used DCF. Three of the 
Kendal! rank correlations in table 9 12 examining whether the acquisitions by larger 
companies produced lower success levels are significant This implies size is a possible 
explanation for the poor performance of companies using DCF techniques
To examine if a relationship was being effected by greater DCF use in larger 
companies the researcher divided the sample into companies who used DCF and those 
that did not and examined the relationship between size and success in the former 
group There were 4 significant relationships between, sales for the last three sets of 
published accounts, and the success measures used, as shown in table 9 12 The 
correlations were negative in direction Therefore, although the larger companies have 
a greater probability of having used discounted cash How techniques as 1 of their 3 key 
criteria, the size of a company is significantly negatively related to the level of success 
it recorded on the 3 scales used in this research This relationship between size and 
success holds if use of DCF is standardised for. That is it does not appear to be a 
product of DCF use This therefore could be a factor in explaining why companies 
which used discounted cash How techniques did not perform better than, companies 
that did not use them
This leaves the wider hypothesis (hypothesis 9:4): Companies which used 
discounted cash flow techniques arc different from those that do not in such a 
way as to negate the effect of improved performance in acquisitions resulting 
from the use of DCF techniques.
I able 9.12 Kendall Rank Correlations between Sales mid Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure 1
Specific Success 
Measure 2
Sample Size 37 30 45
Sales for last set of 
accounts
-.1733 00093 - 1809*
Sales in previous 
years set of accounts
-.1763 0 - 1667
Sales in anti­
penultimate set of 
accounts
- 2336 ** -.0513 - 2053**
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure 1
Specific Success 
Measure 2
Sample Size 30 26 36
Sales for companies 
who used DCF for 
last set of accounts
-.2035 -.0781 -2620**
Sales for companies 
who used DCF in 
previous years set of 
accounts
-.2081 -.0650 -.2588**
Sales for companies 
who used DCF in 
anti-penultimate set 
of accounts
- 2497 * -.1219 - 2907**
** Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients presented
9.1.9 DCF Use and Other Process Factors
To examine if there were any relationships between whether DCF techniques were 
used, and whether it was 1 of a companies 3 key criteria, and other process factors, 
chi-squared tests were conducted on all other variables collected which could be 
turned into categorical variables. Tables 9 13 and 9 14 report the significant 
relationships resulting from these chi-squared tests
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Table 9.13 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash Flow
Analysis in a Company's 3 Key Criteria and Ollier Factors
Discounted cash flow analysis 1 of 
a company's 3 key criteria and
Sample Size Minimum
Expected
Frequency
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by 
Chance
Direction of 
Correlation
Relative size split at: 5 per 
cent 
2 per 
cent
43 6.3
8.4
.02980*»
13856
Negative
Company has own corporate 
information library
40 6.0 04083** Positive
Highest number of 
acquisitions conducted in 
any 1 year over last 5 
years split a t16:
4.5
6
40 7.2
6.3
.01369**
.01368**
Negative
Median number of acquisitions 
conducted in last 5 years split at
3.3
40 8.1 .04766** Negative
Total number of 
acquisitions in last 5 
years split at
13.5
12
10
9
39 6.9
6.9
6.9
6.9
.00711***
.05362*
.05362*
.05362*
Negative
Total number of acquisitions 
divided by sales split at .011
38 6.7 .00041*** Negative
Man weeks work 
spent on acquisition 
split at
40
28 and 75 
30 and 90
40 7.6
5.5
5.1
.03126**
.04012**
.05446**
Positive
Source of acquisition, internal or 
external
39 7.4 .02636** ♦
Use of ARR 43 8 8 .05151* Negative
Use of Payback 43 8.4 .80687
Use of EPS 43 7.1 .59674
Geographic limits to search 38 7,6 m i 4»
Access to targets internal 
information
39 7.8 1629 A
♦ External idea correlated with DCF being one of a company's 3 key criteria 
+  Companies with no explicit limits to the geographic area they searched for
acquisitions were more likely to include DCF in their 3 key criteria 
A No access associated with DCF as one a company's 3 key criteria 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level 
** Significant at 5 per cent level
* Significant at 10 per cent level
l abié 9.14 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash
Flow AnalvsisUsed by A Company and Other Factors
Discounted cash flow used and Sample Probability of Minimum Direction of
Size Distribution expected Correlation
Occurring
Chance
by frequency
Relative size split at: 5 per cent 50 .27677 3 4
2 per cent .47977 4 4
Company has 
information library
corporate 48 04404** 3 Positive
Highest number of 6 47 13571 3.6
acquisitions conducted 
in a year over last 5
years split at : 4.5 .30643 4.5
Median number of acquisitions 47 97535 4 0
conducted in last 5 scars divided
at 3.3
Total number of 13.5 46 .46229 3.7
acquisitions in last 5 12 1 3.7
years split at 10 1 3.7
9 1 3.7
Total Number of acquisitions in 
last 5 years divided by sales split
44 .06441* 4.1 Negative
at O il
Man weeks work spent on 49 .46053 3.8
acquisitions split at: 40
Source of acquisition. Internal or 46 1 4
external
Use of ARR 51 .29521 4 3
Use of Payback 51 .30043 4.7
Use of EPS 51 .07710* 3.5 Negative
Report Length 50 .01357** 4.6 Negative
Geographic limits to search 45 .21420 3.1
Access to targets internal 46 .29221 4.3
information
Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
The small number of variables statistically significant with the variable DCF used, is 
probably a product of the low minimum expected frequencies Within the factors that 
had significant correlations with the variable, discounted cash flow as one of a 
company's three key criteria, 2 groups of factors appear to exist
A) Those variables which appear to be related to size; the company has a corporate 
library, and the relative size of an acquisition
B) Those which reflect the number of transactions a company has conducted in the 
last 5 years.
This leaves 3 factors correlated with DCF as one of a company's three key criteria 
which do not fit into these 2 groups: amount o f work put into a review, source of the 
acquisition, and the use of accounting rates of return
9.1.10 Discounted Cash Flow Use and Other Process Factors
Linked to size
The correlation between relative size and DCF as one of a company's three key criteria 
may be a product of the size correlation That is, although larger companies are 
making large acquisitions these are relatively not as large This therefore results in the 
smaller companies representing a greater proportion of those companies making 
acquisitions over 5 per cent of their own sales. The data shown in table 9.15 supports 
this, but not totally. The tables which show no relationship with size, however, tend to 
be separating the very large from the large In the tests where 3 billion pounds of sales 
was used to divide the sample into large and small companies, acquisitions of up to 
150 million pounds could be categorised as a small acquisition by a small company.
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Table 9,15 Kesults of Clii-Sqnarcd Tests hetween The Relative Si/.e
of The Target ami Bidder Sales and Profils
Relative Size of target divided at 
per cent and sales of buyin 
company in billions of pound 
divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
1 6 0 .00209*** -
1.5 6.4 .00483*** -
2 8 3 .03098** -
2.5 7.3 15528
3 6 6 31537
Relative Size divided at 2 per cen 
and sales of buying company i 
billions of pounds divided at:
1 8 .06909 * -
1.5 9 .20715
2 11.275 20488
2.5 10.5 .42352
3 9 25838
Relative Size divided at 5 per cen 
and profits of buying company i 
millions of pounds divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
100 6.7 .16562
200 6 7 98134
300 4.1 17917
Relative Size divided at 2 per cen 
and profits of buying company i 
millions of pounds divided at:
100 8 84656
200 9 .18294
300 11 275 51365
All tests had a sample size of 50 and 1 degree of freedom
The larger the company the relatively smaller the acquisition 
*** Significant at 1 per cent level
** Significant at 5 per cent level
*_____ Significant at 10 per cent level________________________
Chapter 2 proposed the hypothesis that
2:1) Relatively small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisitions.
I il hic 9.15 Results of Chi-Siiiiared Tests between The Relative Size
of The Target and Bidder Sales and Profits
Relative Size of target divided at 
per cent and sales of buyin 
company in billions of pound 
divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
1 6 0 00209*** -
1.5 6 4 00483*** -
2 8 3 03098** -
2.5 7.3 15528
3 6.6 31537
Relative Size divided at 2 per cen 
and sales of buying company i 
billions of pounds divided at:
1 8 06909 * -
1.5 9 20715
2 11.275 20488
2.5 10.5 .42352
3 9 25838
Relative Size divided at 5 per cen 
and profits of buying company i 
millions of pounds divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
100 6.7 16562
200 6 7 98134
300 4.1 17917
Relative Size divided at 2 per cen 
and profits of buying company i 
millions of pounds divided at
100 8 84656
200 9 18294
300 11.275 51365
All tests had a sample size of 50 and 1 degree of freedom
The larger the company the relatively smaller the acquisition 
*** Significant at I per cent level
** Significant at 5 per cent level
*_____ Significant at 10 per cent level________________________
Chapter 2 proposed the hypothesis that
2:1) Relatively small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisitions.
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The second hypothesis proposed in chapter 2, a replication of Hunts (1990 71) 
hypothesis:
2:2) There is a size mismatch if the seller's turnover is less than 2 per cent of that 
of the buyer and the failure rate will be above the norm.
This produced 3 positive correlations for the first specific success measure, as shown 
in table 9 17, which allowed the respondent to define the variables on which the 
acquisitions were rated That is, acquisitions which were below 2 per cent of sales of 
the buyer performed worse than the norm. Thus, there is only limited significant 
evidence to support Hunt's (1990) or Kitching's (1973) results There is, however, no 
evidence to support the opposite hypothesis. The researcher therefore concluded that 
there was no evidence to support or reject the existence of a relationship This 
therefore would not appear to be a factor in negating the theoretical superiority of 
discounted cash flow analysis when it was used in acquisition decisions.
The other factor which is correlated with the size of an organisation is the possession 
of a corporate information library.17 Five tests showed a significant association with 
general success measure. 18 The relationships, were negative in nature.
These 2 factors associated with size do appear to be having an effect on the level of 
success of an acquisition The relationship for relative size is, however, not conclusive 
given the number of tests conducted. A company having a corporate library is strongly 
associated with poorer performance on the general success measure. It thus may be 
negating some of the theoretical benefit from using discounted cash flow measures
As shown in table 9 16, two relationship between relative size, split at 5 per cent, and
the first specific success measure were significant
Table 9,16 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Relative Size of the
Target Divided at Five Per Cent and Success
Relative size of acquisition divided Minimum Probability of
at 5 per cent and general success expected distribution occurring
measure divided at: frequency by chance
2.5 2.3 1
2.7 3.2 1
2.9 3.2 1
3.0 3 9 71094
3.1 4.5 26462
3 2 5.2 12069
3 3 5.8 55607
3.4 5.8 55607
3.5 5.5 .73171
3.6 4.5 1
3.7 3.9 1
3 8 3.6 1
3.9 2.9 1
Sample size 37 with 1 degree of freedom
Relative size of acquisition divided Minimum Probability of
at 5 per cent and first specific expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at: frequency by chance
3.5 2.7 21029
3.6 3 .20351
3.7 3.7 .04851 ** +
3 8 4.0 02088 ** +
3.9 4.7 .26024
4 0 4.0 13915
4 1 4.0 13915
4 2 3.7 42528
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 9,16 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Relative Size
of the Target Divided at Five Per O ut and Success
Relative size of acquisition divided 
at 5 per cent and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.2 4.5 .48925
3.3 5.5 .72324
3.4 5.9 55816
3.5 63 41698
3.6 7.0 .52617
3.7 8 1 93643
3.8 7.0 .52617
3.9 5.9 .95553
4.0 4.8 .73901
Sample size 46 with 1 degree of freedom
Table 9.17 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Relative Size
Divided at Two Per Cent and Success
Relative size of acquisition divided 
at 2 per cent and general success 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2 9 4.3 71647
3.0 5.2 89331
3.1 6.1 .51747
3.2 6.9 95669
3 3 7.8 60280
3.4 7.8 .60280
3.5 7.4 .27229
3 6 7.1 51747
3.7 5.2 19927
3 8 4.8 .15138
Sample size 37 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table 9,17 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Relative
Size Divided at Two Per Cent anti Success
Relative size of acquisition divided 
at 2 per cent and first specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 3.7 .10103
3 6 4.2 04568 ** +
3.7 5.1 .02948 ** +
3.8 5 6 .07300 *+
3.9 6.5 .28198
4.0 5 6 23300
4.1 5 6 .23200
4.2 5.1 .38941
4.3 5.1 .38941
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
Relative size of acquisition divided 
at 2 per cent and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.1 4.957 19035
3.2 4.957 19035
3.3 6.2 .24908
3.4 6.6 .38171
3.5 7.0 22880
3.6 7.9 .19058
3.7 9.1 .25147
3.8 7.9 .26111
3.9 6.6 .70194
4.0 5.4 .67502
Sample size 46 with 1 degree of freedom
Key
Relationship positive
Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant
9.1.11 Discounted Cash Flow Use and The Number of Acquisitions
Conducted Over The Last 5 Years
The second group of factors significantly associated with discounted cash llow 
measures being one of a company's key criteria were those relating to the number and 
rate of acquisitions. These negative relationships could represent a possible bias in the 
sample That is, that the companies who have conducted many acquisitions have more 
to chose from when deciding which one to discuss, and if they wish to put themselves 
in a good light they will chose the most successful one If the success of an acquisition 
was based on chance then those companies which have conducted many acquisitions 
would appear more successful as there is a greater probability of 1 being successful by 
chance, thus biasing the results.
Given that companies which placed discounted cash flow measures in their 3 key 
criteria did fewer acquisitions, perhaps because they committed more management 
resources to each acquisition this would affect the relative success levels of the 2 sets 
of companies That is, between those that did and those that did not place discounted 
cash flow analysis in their 3 key criteria.
These variables (Highest, median and lowest number of acquisitions conducted in any 
1 year in the last 5 and total number of acquisitions conducted over the last 5 years) 
were intended as measures of corporate experience of acquisitions to allow hypothesis 
5:21 The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the more 
likely success is, generated in chapter 5 to be tested No evidence was, however, 
found to support this hypothesis l9. It though will be explored in greater detail in 
chapter 10 in conjunction with individual experience.
Correlation tests between the success measures used in this research and the number 
of acquisitions over the last 5 years on the sub-groups, companies which included DCF
This, though, seems to remove the possibility of company experience or bias resulting 
from interviewees at companies having a larger number of acquisitions to choose from, 
one of which may have been serendipitously successful. This leaves a group of 
unrelated factors, as a potential explanation for the lack of superior performance by 
company's using discounted cash flow techniques
9,1.12 Discounted Cash Flow llse and Other Process Factors
Of the 3 other factors which produced significant chi-squared results with discounted 
cash flow as one of a company's three key criteria that do not appear to be linked 
source of the acquisition, amount of work put into a review, and the use of accounting 
rate of returns. The first was found in chapter 7 to cause poor performance Table 
7 4 showed that acquisitions stimulated by the seller or an external agent performed 
worse than those resulting from the buyer approaching the seller, with the majority of 
the relationships being significant This was correlated with increased use of 
discounted cash flow analysis and therefore could be a factor in negating the superior 
theoretical performance
Table 9.18 shows that this relationship holds for the sub-group, companies using DCF 
Results of tests between the variable DCF as one of a company's three key criteria and 
success while standardising for the source of the idea are presented in Tables D. 19 and 
D 20 in appendix D The results of only 3 tests between DCF one a company's three 
key criteria and sucess, for acquisitions which were stimulated by an internal idea, are 
significant, these are negative. The association with external ideas therefore remains a
in their 3 key criteria and companies which used DCF were not significant The sample
sizes , however, were between 15 and 19, and 25 and 35 respectively This is an area
therefore which would benefit from future examination using a larger sample size
potential explanation for the lack of superior performance of acquisitions where DC1
was used
Table 9.18 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Source of Idea and 
Acquisition Success for Companies llsim; DCF
Source of idea and general 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2.5 2.7 .06382 * +
2.7 3.6 .00970 *** +
2.9 3.6 .00970 *** +
3.0 4.0 .00327 *** +
3.1 4.931 .00274 *** +
3.2 5 8 .01722 **+
3.3 6.3 .01437 **+
3.4 6.3 .01437 **+
3.5 5.8 .03375 **+
3 6 4.5 11421
3.7 3.6 .04434 ** +
3.8 3.1 .09272 * +
3.9 2.2 .34219
4 1.3 .03375 **+
Sample size 29 with 1 degree of freedom.
Fable 9.18 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Source of
Idea and Acquisition Success for Companies Using DCF
Source of idea and first specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 2.3 1
3 6 2.7 1
3.7 3.5 .69245
3.8 3.8 42496
3.9 4.6 10537
4.0 3.8 21773
4.1 3.8 21773
Sample size 26 with 1 degree of freedom
Source of idea and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.1 5 45675
3.2 5 45675
3.3 6.5 29789
3.4 7.0 17146
3.5 7.5 09097 * +
3 6 7.5 09097 * +
3.7 8.5 09507 * +
3.8 7.5 .09097 * +
3.9 6.6 .03390 ** +
4.0 5.0 02557 ** +
Sample size 26 with 1 degree of freedom
-  Internal ideas associated with superior performance
** Significant at 5 percent level
* Significant at 10 percent level
There appears little logic to the link, as the outside stimulation of an acquisition was 
not related to size20 It is, however, possible that the agents driving the adoption of 
discounted cash flow analysis in acquisitions are outside agents. It is also possible that 
both are part of the professionalisation of management of an organisation, associated
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with the employment of MBA's. Establishing this would appear difficult even if there 
is any causation in this link
The volume of work put into the acquisition by the company will be examined in 
chapter 10 with the section on management resources available. It should be noted that 
the correlation, between the use of discounted cash flow in a company's 3 key criteria 
and the management time used on an acquisition is a positive one That is, companies 
which used DCF inputted more management time than those that did not. Therefore, 
there appears to be evidence to say that, DCF analysis is not being used as a substitute 
for analysis work.
This leaves the use of accounting rate of return. The effect on success of this and the 
other 3 measures rejected by the finance literature will be examined in section 9.2.
To provide a balanced picture of the number of factors correlated with discounted 
cash flow use, those which were tested and not correlated with discounted cash flow 
are presented in table D.21 in appendix D. These show that a large number of factors 
which described the process or the individuals responsible in a quantitative fashion 
were not correlated with DCF as one of a company's three key criteria in an 
acquisition decision.
Thus the variables examined in the sections 9.1 9 to 9.1.12, as significantly correlated 
with DCF as one of a company's three key criteria in an acquisition decision, must be 
seen as representing only a limited number of facets of the process in, comparison with 
the elements represented by those variables which are not correlated with DCF as 
one of a company's three key criteria
262
9.1.13 Conclusions on Lack of Superior Performance hv
Coinnnnies Using Discounted Cash Flow Techniques
The easiest explanation for the lack of superior performance at companies which used 
discounted cash flow analysis is methodological problems. There are inevitably 
methodological problems when examining a decision as sensitive as an acquisition No 
success measure can capture all elements of an organisation's objectives, benefits to 
shareholders or benefits to other stakeholders Reliance on a subjective measure, 
however, raises the question of differences in expectations between those who used 
and did not use discounted cash flow measures. This could only be resolved by using 
either finance or accounting measures These, however, have problems as discussed in 
chapter 6
There is clearly evidence to support the view that companies are not applying DCF 
correctly, given that fixed hurdle rates were used by large organisations which may 
have businesses with vastly different risks There were also large variations in time 
scales covered. There is also extensive evidence that companies are ignoring DCF in 
some cases and in most cases supplementing it with other techniques which may 
produce contradictory results. The latter option is the most difficult to examine since 
to generate definite conclusions requires knowledge of board members mind sets at the 
time of decision making Interviewing board members ex-post the event may not be 
illuminating as they may claim to have relied on DCF analysis when they have ignored 
it This though, is a persuasive argument The companies using DCF are clearly larger 
and company size is correlated with poorer performance but precisely how this 
influences success levels is unclear
263
9.1.14 Section Summary
This section has examined the use of discounted cash flow measures and success . It 
has concluded that the evidence does not support the view that DCF techniques 
produced superior performance for acquisitions 
Explanations proposed for this were :
A) Methodological problems, - a biased success measure. No reason was found to bias 
the success measure although it was accepted that the use of a subjective success 
measure was reliant on companies having consistent expectations. No other success 
measure would have allowed the data used to be collected.
B) Methodological problems, - the success measure used was not sensitive enough 
when used in chi-squared tests. As a result of the sample size, 52, only 2 by 2 chi- 
squared tests were possible. This reduced the sensitivity of the success measures to 
small changes To counteract this, chi-squared tests were repeated with a spread of 
division points, this showed that the correlations which were significant, were 
negative To improve the sensitivity of the success measure the sample size could be 
increased This, however, was not an option for this research
C) Methodological problems - inaccurate data, no further way round this problem was 
viewed as viable Observation and collection of written sources was seen as unlikely to 
be possible It was therefore concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support 
hypothesis 4:4: Use of discounted cash flow measures as decision criteria in 
acquisitions will increase success.
1 he researcher finds no argument completely persuasive There is, however,
insufficient evidence to refute any of the explanations put forward They all therefore
should be avenues for further research.
D) NPV is superior to other methods but IRR's flaws reduce its superiority which 
results in DCF measures as a whole not producing superior success levels Conflicting 
evidence was presented , thus no positive conclusions could be drawn
E) Decision makers are ignoring DCF analysis when making decisions The use of 
other measures and a number of qualitative sources were presented as evidence on this 
but it could only be concluded that this was a possible source of loss of superior 
performance.
F) Increased use of fixed hurdle rates in companies using DCF is negating superior 
performance The use of fixed hurdle rates was shown to be positively correlated with 
use of DCF However, there were only 2 valid negative results which were significant 
at the 10 per cent level, between the use of fixed hurdle rates in general and the second 
specific success measure. There were 3 significant positive correlations between the 
general success measure and the use of a fixed hurdle rate in the specific case 
examined This was viewed as insufficient to accept hypothesis 4:7 that : The use of 
fixed hurdle rates will lower success levels.
G) Application of discounted cash flow methods is a variable leading to invalid 
conclusions.
H) Companies using DCF techniques are larger than other companies in the sample 
and this affected success levels.
Hypothesis 4:8 : The larger the company the greater the use of discounted cash 
flow measures was accepted. Size, was significantly negatively correlated to success
1) Companies using DCF techniques are so fundamentally different from the other 
companies in the sample that this affected success levels. A number of other factors 
examining the acquisition process were found to be significantly correlated with DCF 
as one of a company's three key criteria Two of these factors were associated with 
Size, a company having a corporate information library and relative size of the 
acquisition The relationship between these factors and success was significant for only 
a few divisions of the general success measure and first specific success measure 
respectively. This was considered insufficient to support the hypothesis that, relatively 
small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisitions or that the presence of a 
corporate information library will reduce success levels. The factors concerning rate 
of acquisition will be examined in the next chapter. The only factor which was 
significantly related to both DCF as one of a company's three key criteria and success 
was the source of acquisitions External acquisitions were found to produce lower 
success levels. This, it was concluded, could be a significant factor in negating the 
success of acquisitions where companies used discounted cash flow analysis
This research, having concluded that the use of the theoretically superior discounted 
cash flow analysis did not improve performance, will now examine whether the criteria 
which the finance literature consider unsuitable for capital investment decisions 
affected success
266
9 .2 Ollier Financial < 'rilt-ria and Success
The finance literature reviewed in chapter 4 proposed that accounting rate of return, 
payback and earnings per share dilution should not be used for capital budgeting 
decisions The following hypotheses, concerning use of other financial criteria apart 
from DCF techniques, were generated:
4:1) The use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:2) The use of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce
success
4:3) The use of earnings per share as a decision criterion will reduce success
This section will examine these, beginning with payback
9.2.1 Payback and Success
The evidence of payback and success is provided in table 9 19 It shows that there is 
only 1 significant relationship between payback and success and this is positive There 
therefore appears to be no evidence to support hypothesis 4:1 Detecting a 
relationship between payback and success was likely to be difficult even if one existed, 
as it was rarely used except in combination with I other criteria and more usually with 
2 or more other criteria Payback was also very rarely a key criteria, suggesting its 
influence on decisions is limited
To test whether payback was not an influential factor the researcher examined the data 
for significant relationships between acquisition process factors and the use of 
payback Payback was significantly associated with only 4 variables: the years the 
interviewee had spent at a company, the number of years an interviewee had spent in 
the industiy, the number of groups of people asked for information and the man 
weeks work spent on an acquisition Two of these variables, the years spent at a
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company by an interviewee and the years spent in an industry by an interviewee were 
closely related. This, however, may be a proxy for interviewee age To have spent a 
long period at a company or in an industry requires the interviewee to be older These 
people may have finished any professional training prior to the widespread acceptance 
that DCF analysis should be used 21 or its rapid use was possible through 
computerisation and the use of spreadsheets These people may therefore look at 
payback out of habit or for reassurance that the discounted cash flow calculations are 
not wildly inaccurate. This is, however, speculative and is an hypothesis for future 
investigation
None of the relationships presented in tables 9.20. are significant for more than 1 
division of the scalar variables and only 1 factor is significant at the 5 per cent level 
This lack of correlation seems to reinforce payback's position as a secondary criteria 
which does not significantly affect the acquisition process.
Accounting rate of return which the researcher will now examine, similarly does not 
appear to be a significant factor in influencing success or the acquisition process
Table 9.19 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between l)se of Payback as An
Acquisition Decision Criteria and Success
Use of payback as acquisition 
decision making criteria and 
second specific success measure 
divided at:
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
3.1 44470 5.9
3.2 44470 5.9
3.3 29172 7.3
3.4 46310 7.8
3.5 67176 8.3
3 6 86133 9.2
3.7 65217 10.8
3.8 27320 8.8
3.9 83299 7.3
4.0 44470 5.8
All tests had sample sizes of 45 and 1 degree of freedom
Use of payback as an acquisition 
decision making criteria and first 
specific success measure divided 
at:
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
3.7 .10521 5.1
3 8 05211* + 5.6
3.9 .26068 6.5
4.0 29564 5.6
4.1 29564 5.6
4.2 .51043 5.1
4.3 .51043 5.1
All tests had sample sizes of 30 and 1 degree of freedom
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I able 9. I*) C ontinued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Use of
Payback as An Acmiisition Decision Criteria and Success
Use of payback as an acquisition 
decision making criteria and 
general success measure divided at:
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
2 9 1 5
3 72057 5.5
3.1 .50121 7
3.2 18876 8
3.3 .74560 9.5
3.4 .74560 9 5
3 5 .74423 8 5
3.6 1 7
3.7 48519 6
3 8 .72057 5.5
All tests had sample sizes of 45 and 1 degree of freedom
+ Direction of relationship positive
Table 9.20 Chi-Squared Test Results between Payback 
and Other Process Factors
Use of payback as an Minimum Probability of distribution
acquisition decision expected occurring by chance
criteria and : frequency
Number of groups of 4 8 4 02758** +
people asked for 6 7 .20489
information divided at: 8 6.6 36659
Years spent at company 6 9.3 09021* +
divided at: 8 7.0 19431
Years spent in industry by 6 7.9 06909* +
interviewee divided at 8 9 8 17208
10 7.4 32434
Man weeks work spent on 31 and 90 6 6 07689* -
acquisition divided at 40 8 9 19683
50 10.3 17544
** Significant at 5 percent level * Significant at 10 percent level
~ Direction of relationship negative + Direction of relationship positive
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9,2,2 Accountin2 Rate of Return's Use as a Decision Criterion
and Acquisition Success,
Chapter 4 proposed the hypothesis that: 4:2 Use of accounting rate of return as a 
decision criterion will reduce success was proposed The evidence in table 9 21 
seems not to support this. Only 1 valid chi-squared test between the first specific 
success measure and the use of accounting rate of return is significant
Exploration of accounting rate of return's influence on other process factors found 4 
areas correlated with the use of accounting rate of return :
The number of acquisitions conducted over the last 5 years 
The source of the acquisition, internal or external.
The number of sources of information used.
Relative size.
It could be proposed that highly active experienced acquirers, which therefore have a 
high level of corporate experience of acquisitions, have adapted to this by focusing on 
an accounting rate of return rule of thumb which requires less management resources 
to carry out They instead use management resources to generate ideas for acquisitions 
which, as was shown in chapter 7, are likely to be more successful than one's 
stimulated by either third parties or the seller. The emphasis is thus on the quality of 
the original idea rather than the analysis. Some of these companies may be suspicious 
of clever methods and outside advisers :
One company stated
'We are a very prudent group, we don't put our fingers in the air and apply 
fancy multiples to things '
'And I would base the price and valuation on the current years profit, because 
we know that is substantiated.'
And on outside consultants :
271
'With all those businesses I have purchased I can't remember one which was 
found by an external agent They have all been found by ourselves '
'We have done a lot of acquisitions and none have been found by these type of 
people'
This is, however, speculative but should be explored further in future research Their 
are, however, a large number of variables for which no correlation exists with the use 
of accounting rate of return The main conclusion therefore has to be that the use of 
accounting rate of return was not a significant factor in determining either the process 
or success levels at companies which used it In contrast, earnings per share use is 
highly correlated with one of the success measures. The researcher will now examine 
this.
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Table 9.21 Chi-Squaretl Test Results between The Use of Accounting
Kales of Uelurn and Success Measures
Use of accounting rate of return as 
an acquisition decision making 
criteria and second specific 
success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
3.1 5 3 65100
3.2 5 3 65100
3.3 6 7 83200
3.4 7.1 94440
3.5 7 6 73103
3.6 8 4 78720
3.7 9 8 64066
3.8 8 0 54029
3.9 6.7 39614
4.0 5.3 25019
All tests had sample sizes of 45 and 1 degree of freedom
Use of accounting rate of return a 
an acquisition decision making 
criteria and first specific success 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
3.5 3.2 1
3.6 3 6 62559
3.7 4.4 44248
3.8 4.8 25985
3.9 5 6 05211*+
4.0 4 8 13618
4.1 4.8 13618
All tests had sample sizes of 30 and 1 degree of freedom
Use of accounting rate of return as 
an acquisition decision making 
criteria and general success 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
3 0 5.1 97032
3 1 5 9 54223
3.2 6 7 86098
3.3 8 0 511 10
3.4 8 0 51110
3.5 7 2 91690
3 6 5 9 54223
3.7 5.0 45685
All tests had sample sizes of 38 and 1 degree of freedom
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* Significant at 10 per cent level
* Direction of relationship positive
Table 9.22 C'hi-Smiarcd l est Results between The Accounting Kate of
Return and Other Process Factors
Use of accounting rate of Minimum expected Probability of
return and : frequency distribution
occurring
chance
by
Relative size divided at: 2 9.7 .03467**+
5 7.5 12962
Number of sources of 4 6 8 07886*+
information used divided 6 5 7 02969**+
at 8 5.7 02993**+
Source of idea, internal or 
external
10 01734**V
Total number of 10 7.7 28021
acquisitions in last 5 years 12 7.7 28021
divided at : 13.5 7.1 01480**+
Highest number of 4.5 
acquisitions conducted in
9 8 01420**+
any year in last 5 years 6 
divided at :
8 01392**+
Median Number 3.3 
conducted over the last 5 
years divided at:
8 9 00356***+
Range of number of 4.5 
acquisitions conducted in 
each year over last 5
8 4 00594***+
years divided at:
Direction of relationship positive
Direction of relationship negative
v Internal sources of idea associated with use of accounting rate
of return
*** Significant at 1 percent level ** Significant at 5 percent level
* Significant at 10 percent level
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9.2,3 Use of Earnings Per Share as ;»n Acquisition Criteria. 
Success and the Acquisition Process
The final capital budgeting technique rejected by the finance literature is earnings per 
share dilution Chapter 4 presented hypothesis 4:3, that Use of earnings per share 
as a decision criterion will reduce success. The evidence in table 9.23 seems to 
support this hypothesis for the second specific success measure There is, however, 
only limited evidence that this relationship holds for the general success measure and 
no evidence for the first specific success measure
It is difficult to explain this anomaly. There is no reason22 to expect the one success 
measure focused on a specific case to be systematically different from the other one 
The difference between the second specific success measure and the general success 
measure is that the respondents were asked to focus on the specific case in the former 
and the general performance of the company's acquisitions in the latter The items on 
the instruments were however identical. This therefore suggests that many companies 
were not answering with respect to a specific acquisition when talking about general 
performance.
The difference between the second specific success measure and the first is that the 
first is based on what the respondents viewed as their company's three key criteria, the 
second measure on: return on investment, effect on earnings per share, effect on group 
share price, cash flow, and sales growth
These differences in the test results make it difficult to draw a clear conclusion on 
hypothesis 4:3 Equally significant is that the use of earnings per share was not 
significantly related to any process factor
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9.2.4 Section Summary
This section has examined 3 main hypotheses :
4:1) Use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:2) Use of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce success
4:3) Use of earnings per share as a decision criterion will reduce success
It concluded that there is no evidence to support the first 2. However, there is clear 
evidence to support the third hypothesis for 1 success measure. There is no evidence, 
however, for the success measure using the respondents own reference frame 
The influence of these 3 variables, Payback, ARR and EPS on other process factors is 
very limited. The association of payback with the length of time a respondent has spent 
in an industry and at a company may be a product of age, older managers not having 
dropped the use of payback These limited number of correlations seems to reinforce 
payback's position as the least important criteria, even if it is used by more companies 
than accounting rate of return.
The use of earnings per share like payback, and accounting rate of return does not
seem a key factor in determining the process a company uses to make acquisitions It,
however, does have a negative relationship with success.
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Table 9.23 Chi-Squared Test Results between The Use of Earnings Per Share 
as Aii Acquisition Decision Making Criteria and Success Measures
Use of earnings per share as 
an acquisition decision making 
criteria and second specific 
success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.3 5 3 02766** -
3.4 5 6 08023* -
3.5 6 0 05052* -
3.6 6.8 .01789** -
3.7 7.8 .01726** -
3.8 6.4 .02211** -
3.9 5.3 01542** -
4.0 4.3 .05424* -
All tests had sample sizes of 45 and 1 degree of freedom.
Use of earnings per share as an 
acquisition decision making 
criteria and first specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.8 5.2 88044
3.9 6.1 96073
4.0 5.2 88044
4 1 5.2 88044
All tests had sample sizes of 30 and 1 degree of freedom
Use of earnings per share as an 
acquisition decision making 
criteria and general success 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 2 4.6 23719
3.3 5 5 .28323
3 4 5.5 28323
3 5 4 9 9097
3 6 3 5 .14191
3.7 2 6 06790* -
3 8 3.2 04706** -
All tests had sample sizes of 38 and 1 degree of freedom
Direction of relationship negative
** Significant at 5 per cent level
* Significant at 10 per cent level
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9 .3 Chanter Summary
The main hypotheses looked at in this chapter, and conclusions on each are presented 
below The lack of superior performance by companies using DCF measures was 
examined in detail, and several possible interpretations of it were offered: the result 
was inaccurate; DCF methods were not applied correctly, companies using NPV did 
produce superior results but companies using IRR did not, because of its Haws and this 
reduced the overall success level of companies using DCF methods, DCF is being used 
but the results are ignored in the decision making process, or DCF is being used as a 
substitute for analysis, and thus superior performance as a result of DCF being used is 
being lost because of other changes in the acquisition decision process associated with 
it The researcher favoured the views that some companies were ignoring DCF in 
some cases; that discount rates did not accurately reflect risk as fixed hurdle rates 
were being used, and that acquisitions conducted by companies which used discounted 
cash flow criteria were more likely to have been stimulated by an external party This 
was associated with lower success levels No option, however, could be rejected.
It was concluded that larger companies were more likely to use discounted cash flow 
analysis even though all the companies with one exception had sales over 200 million
pounds.
The examinations of hypotheses on payback, ARR and success concluded that the use 
of these criteria did not influence success levels Use of EPS was, however, found to 
be associated with lower levels of 1 success measure. No other factor was correlated
with EPS
In conclusion, this chapter has found that the use of Payback and ARR arc not 
correlated with any changes in success levels However, use of DCF and use of EPS
was correlated with lower success levels on 1 measure Chapter 10 will examine how 
experience and management resources affect success and the process by which 
companies consider making an acquisition
9.4 The Main Hypotheses Examined in this
(-banter and Conclusions
4:4) The use of discounted cash flow measures as decision criteria in acquisitions 
will increase success.
No evidence was found to support this. It was therefore rejected
4:5) Use of NPV as a decision criteria will increase success rates
This cannot be accepted It is, however, an area which would benefit from the larger
sample frame possible with a questionnaire approach.
4:6)The use of only NPV as a decision criteria will give an increased level of
success,
This could not be tested because only 4 companies used only NPV These, however, 
also used non financial criteria
4:7) The use of fixed hurdle rates lowers success levels
The evidence presented seems to imply rejection of this hypothesis
4:8)The larger  the company the greater th e  use of discounted cash flow
measures.
There was extensive evidence to support this hypothesis
2:1) Relatively small acquisitions will perform worse than larger acquisition.
Only limited evidence of a relationship between relative size and the success 
measures was found The researcher, however, concluded this was insufficient to 
accept hypotheses 2:1 and 2:2
4:1) Use of payback as a decision criterion will reduce success
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis.
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4:2) Use of accounting rate of return as a decision criterion will reduce success 
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis
4:3) Use of earnings per share as a decision criterion will reduce success
I here is evidence to support this hypothesis for the second specific success measure 
which imposed a reference frame. However, there was no evidence for the first 
specific success measure, and only limited evidence for the general success measure
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Footnotes
1 Not value maximising.
• The normally accepted minimum expected frequency for a chi-squared lest to be valid is 5 (Kang. 
1993:69). For tests which use 2 by 2 contingency tables, where the minimum expected frequency is 
below 5, the result of a Fisher exact test is giv en
1 For this Chi-squared test the general success measure was divided at 3.4. as no company produced a 
result of 3 4, and this was the median value This thus resulted in 19 companies being recorded as 
successful, and 19 companies as unsuccessful
' The first specific success measure measured success of a specific acquisition. It was based on llie 
criteria that the interviewee thought were the three most important in that acquisition Ihc 
respondent was asked to rate performance on those criteria out of 5 and weight the criteria on how 
important they were in the decision making process for that specific acquistion. For this chi-squared 
lest it was divided at 4.2. This value was chosen because no company recorded a value of 4.2 on llus 
scale and it was close to the mean of 3.9. This resulted in 11 companies categorised as successful and 
19 unsuccessful. The minimum recorded value was 2.5, the maximum 5 and the standard deviation 
67.3.
' The second specific success measure was a replication of Datta and Grant's (1991) success measure 
as shown in figure 6.1 The dividing point used to convert the second specific success measure lo a 
dichotomous variable was 3.4. This was marginally below the mean of 3.61 and median of 3.700 The 
lowest recorded value was I 545 and highest 5.0 The standard deviation was 797 
Pre-tax profits divided by sales.
The normally accepted minimum expected frequency for a chi-squared test to be valid is 5 (Kaii|i.
199.3 69). For tests which use 2 by 2 contingency tables, where the minimum expected frequency is 
below five, a Fisher exact test result is given
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“ The normally accepted minimum expected frequency for the test to be valid is 5 (Kanjt, 1993:69). 
For lests which use 2 by 2 contingency tables, where the minimum expected frequency is below five, a 
Fisher exact test result is given.
For 5 of these companies, data was collected on the second specific success measure, for 2 
companies on the general success measure and 2 companies on the first specific success measure 
The second specific success measure was a replication of Datta and Grant's (1991) Success measure 
as shown in figure 6.1. It required the respondent to rate the acquisitions perforamnee for 5 variables, 
return on investment, effect on earnings per share, effect on group share price, cash flow and sales 
growth and weght them by how important the respondent thought those criteria were in the decision 
process for that acquisition
11 Fisher exact tests is only valid for 2 by 2 contingency tables.
" The Chi-squared test on companies using DCF analysis as one of their three key criteria and 
standardisation of application of criteria produced a result of ,a probability of occurring by chance of. 
.3495.
13 See table D.5 in appendix D.
"  See table D.5 in appendix D.
15 See table D 18 appendix D.
K’ For main variables used in this research the mean, standard deviation, median mean, minimum 
and maximum recorded values arc given in appendix E.
The significance levels of a company having a corporate library and sales split at I billion . 2 
billion and 3 billion respectively, were. 99 1, 99.2, and 96.4. See table D 6 appendix for full rcsiills of 
chi-squared tests.
ls See table D 7 in Appendix D for details.
19 Sec table 10.3
The significance levels were 74, 7.3 and 74 per cent respectively for the variable internal or 
external source of acquisition idea and size split at 3, 2 and 1 billion pounds sales
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1 Rocklcy (1970:130) proposes that DCF should be used bul that they' arc 
acceptance for the evaluation of industrial capital expenditure' and th a t ' the most 
of investment evaluation is payback ' (1970:124)
Correlations between success measures can be seen in table D 8 in appendix D
finding increasing 
videly used method
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Chanter 10 Experience. Management Resources And The Esc Of Consultants
10.0 Introduction and Summary of Chanter Five
The last 3 chapters have examined the core of the acquisition decision process, what 
information companies collected, the criteria they used to make a decision and their 
link with success. This chapter will examine the variables presented in figure 1.10 as 
being influences on these processes. These are primarily experience and the 
management resources available.
The literature examined in chapter 5 on expertise and experience suggests that, 
contrary to the expectations of the rational economic man model, decision makers who 
have greater experience behave differently to those with no experience of making 
specific decisions Chapter 5 presented conflicting evidence on how expertise and 
experience effect success. Many studies, which have examined real situations have 
found that experienced decision makers performed in a fundamentally different 
manner, recognising situations and recalling previous solutions (Klien, 1993). The 
evidence from the experiment-based research found that expert decision makers 
performed worse at stock prediction, while they were able to sort problems more 
rapidly. Studies on chess have found that the advantage of expertise is more 
pronounced in time pressured situations. Chapter 5 therefore proposed the hypotheses 
that, Experience of acquisitions will increase success levels.
Chapter 5 further showed that experience was multi-faceted, with individual 
experience of the industry, company and acquisitions, and company experience of 
acquisitions found to be relevant The researcher decided that any measure of company 
experience of an industry would be arbitrary A parent company may have only been 
involved in an industry for 6 months after a take-over, the subsidiary may, however, 
have been in that industry for hundreds of years The above hypothesis was therefore
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restated defining individual experience as, the number of acquisitions completed by 
a manager (Hypothesis 5:1) the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a 
manager (Hypothesis 5:2) the number of years a manager has spent with a 
company (Hypothesis 5:3) the number of years a manager has spent within an 
industry (Hypothesis 5:4) with company experience defined as; the number of 
acquisitions completed by a company in the last 5 years. (Hypothesis 5:21).
The literature further proposes that it is not just the outcome, but how expert decision 
makers make decisions that are different Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) found 
expert decision makers collected more information before making a decision The 
researcher therefore proposed that; experience, defined in the 5 ways above, would 
lead to greater information collection. He measured information collection in 2 ways; 
the number of information sources used and the number of people asked for 
information This resulted in hypotheses 5:5 to 5:12 and 5:22 and 5:23 being 
generated.1
Day and Lord(1991) found evidence of a second difference, experts were significantly 
faster in their categorisation to sort problems. This is supported by Calderwood, Klien 
and Crandwall's (1990) and Chase and Simon's (1973) work on chess. The researcher 
therefore, proposed that: Experience will lead to greater speed in acquisition 
decision making. This will be tested for the 5 types of experience proposed above 
(the number of acquisitions completed by a manager, the number of acquisitions' 
reviews carried out by a manager, the number of years a manager has spent with a 
company, the number of years a manager has spent within an industry). Two facets of 
time were considered relevant to this situation, elapsed time and man weeks work 
involved This resulted in the generation of Hypotheses 5:13 to 5:20 and 5:24 and 
5:25
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This chapter will examine the hypotheses dealing with expertise in 3 groups, those 
relating to expertise combined with success, the number of information sources used, 
and decision making speed
Figure 1.10 also proposed that, the management resources available to analyse an 
acquisition will influence the process and its outcome. Kitching (1972,1973) suggested 
that acquisitions can consume large volumes of management resources, and the 
management skills available must be greater than the task. The researcher thus put 
forward the hypotheses that:
5:26) The greater the volume of management time devoted to a project the 
greater the success.
5:27) The greater the number of people dedicated to working on acquisitions the 
greater the success.
It was further proposed that companies could use external consultants as a substitute 
for internal managers to carry-out analysis work. The evidence presented, however, 
implied that the use of consultants might reduce success levels. Chapter 7 showed that 
acquisitions which resulted from an external stimulus were less successful than those 
resulting from an internal idea. It was therefore proposed that:
5:31) The greater the number of consultants used the lower the success level.
This thesis will divide the hypotheses on the management resources available to 
conduct an acquisition into 2; those that deal with internal management resources and, 
those that cover the use of consultants
The researcher will now begin the empirical content of this chapter by examining 
individual experience.
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10.1 Individual Experience
The researcher proposed in chapter 5 that:
5:1) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the probability of an acquisition being successful and,
5:2) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager 
the greater the probability of an acquisition being successful.
Table 10.1 shows the results of testing these hypotheses
Table 10.1 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between 
Individual Experience of Acouisitions and Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure One
Specific Success 
Measure Two
Sample Size 27 27 33
Number of 
acquisitions' 
reviews completed 
by manager
.0813 .0381 .0721
Sample Size 29 28 35
Number of 
acquisitions' 
reviews completed 
by manager that 
have resulted in an 
acquisition
.1069 .0193 0541
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients are given
There is no evidence, in table 10 1, to support any relationship between success levels 
and the experience of managers measured by the number of completed acquisitions or 
number of acquisitions' reviews carried out.
This could be a product of variation in how involved a manager was with each of the 
acquisitions The researcher considered reviewing each acquisition case with the 
manager to determine their level of involvement Developing a categorical variable 
based on this would be impossible with any manager actively involved in acquisitions
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All companies stated that one manager was in overall control of the project for the 
period The manager responsible for the project, however, rarely carried out all the 
analysis work. Specific experience of acquisitions by the manager responsible for the 
acquisition does not appear to be a factor in the success level.
In contrast, table 10.2 supports hypothesis 5:3 and 5:4
5:3) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the probability of an acquisition being 
successful.
5:4) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the probability of an acquisition being 
successful
fable 10.2 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between
Manager Experience of The Company and Industry and Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure One
Specific Success 
Measure Two
Sample Size 34 29 40
Years spent at 
company
.0361 .1407 .2541 **b
Sample Size 34 29 40
Years spent in 
industry
.0794 2657**a 2717**c
** Significant at 5 per cent level a Significance level 4.6 per cent
k Significance level 2.3 per cent c Significance level 1 5 per cent
Individual experience of the industry and the company therefore seems important in 
acquisition success. However, there could be several other explanations for this The 
success measure may be biased Long serving employees may rate acquisitions they 
were involved in as more successful than other people, who have not been at a 
company for a long period. That is, long serving employees might rate acquisitions,
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which are equal on some hypothetical neutral scale, as more successful than other 
managers. They will also have no recent external experience with which, to compare 
the success of an acquisition Equally, however, managers who have not been at a 
company a long period, may rate acquisitions as more successful, because they have 
been responsible only for a few acquisitions at that company. Their reputation at that 
company may therefore be highly related to the success of each acquisition A manager 
who has been at a company a long period may be less dependent on each acquisition 
being seen as successful, as he or she may have conducted many acquisitions and been 
responsible for many major decisions at the company that have resulted in a successful 
outcome
Other factors that could possibly explain this relationship will be explored in sections 
10 2 and 10.3, which will focus on experience and information collection and speed 
Corporate experience, like individual experience of acquisitions, does not appear to 
influence acquisition success. Not only does the evidence, in table 10.3, not support 
hypothesis 5:21: The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company 
the greater probability of an acquisition being successful, it indicates the opposite 
direction of relationship This relationship is, however, very weak
It should be noted that the measure of company experience only covered the last 5 
years of acquisitions The reason the researcher used only the last 5 years of data, was 
that this was available from a reliable consistent source, Extel Data before this would 
have had to have been taken from company reports, which might include a wide 
variation in reporting standards. This might affect the relationship, as it could be that 
total company experience is important Measuring total company experience would be 
difficult, as it would require going back over a 100 years of company reports A 
second problem with this data is that many small acquisitions may not be reported at 
all
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Given that no relationship existed between success and corporate experience, the 
researcher considered that, this could be because companies were conducting 
acquisitions in bursts This could give periods of intensive activity that might overload 
resources and periods of inactivity where experience becomes out of date or lost 
(Kusewitt, 1985). The researcher therefore proposed to test this view by testing the 
following hypotheses
10:1) The lower the minimum number of acquisitions conducted in any of the 
last 5 years the less likely is success.
10:2) The higher the highest level of acquisitions conducted in the last 5 years 
the less likely is success.
10:3) The greater the range between the highest and lowest levels of activity over 
the last 5 years the less likely is success.
The evidence presented in table 10:3 does not support these hypotheses.
The researcher further thought that the size of the company and the management 
resources available to conduct acquisitions would affect the level of transactions at 
which the overloading of resources would start to occur. (Kusewitt, 1985). To examine 
this the researcher looked at the number of acquisitions conducted in the last 5 years 
divided by sales and the number of people currently working on acquisitions. Table 
10 3 shows that when standardised for sales and the number of people currently 
working on acquisitions no significant relationships between company experience and 
success existed for the companies in the sample frame These relationships are, 
however, positive
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I able 10.3 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation l ests between Coninnnv
Experience of Acquisitions ami Success
General Success 
Measure
Specific Success 
Measure One
Specific Success 
Measure Two
Sample Size 36 29 42
Total number of 
acquisitions 
completed in last 5 
years.
-.0693 .0638 .0499
Sample Size 36 29 42
Lowest number of 
acquisitions 
completed in one 
year in last 5 years.
-.0262 -.1647 -.0364
Sample Size 36 29 42
Largest number of 
acquisitions 
completed in one 
year in last 5 years.
-.1053 .1122 -.0149
Sample Size 36 29 42
Range between 
largest number of 
acquisitions 
completed in one 
year in last 5 years 
and lowest.
-.1620 - 1122 -.0435
Sample Size 34 28 41
Total number of 
acquisitions 
completed in last 5 
years divided by
sales
.1774 .1509 .1572
Sample Size 27 24 33
Total number of 
acquisitions 
completed in last 5 
years divided by 
number of people 
currently working 
on acquisitions.
.1198 0148 .1618
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This is in contrast to Kusewitt(l985 159) who found a significant relationship between 
return on assets and acquisition rate divided by assets and a market return measure 
The researcher therefore concluded there was no evidence to support hypothesis 5:21, 
even when modified to account for the availability of management resources The 
measure or number of acquisitions conducted over the last 5 years could be viewed as 
an acquisition rate measure. The results produced do not fit with Kusewitt's (1985) 
finding that higher acquisition rates were associated with poorer performance This 
could, however, be a product of what Kusewitt(1985) saw as 2 opposing forces, 
management overload resulting from too many acquisitions and increased experience 2
10.1.1 Section Sum m ary
This section has examined the hypothesis that: greater experience will improve 
acquisition success It has found no evidence to support the hypotheses that, individual 
or corporate experience of acquisitions effected success Individual experience of the 
company and industry was, however, positively correlated with acquisition success
The researcher will now examine the hypothesis that experience will affect the number 
of information sources used.
10.2 Experience unci Information Collection
The literature examined in chapter 5 proposed that not only did experience and 
expertise affect the success of decisions but also how decisions were made Yates, 
McDaniel and Brown, (1991) found experienced decision makers used more 
information As a result of this the researcher generated the hypotheses that:
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Experience will increase the number of information sources used.
Experience will increase the number of people asked for information.
The researcher will test these hypotheses using the 5 measures of experience proposed 
in chapter S: the number of acquisitions completed, the number of acquisition 
reviews', years spent in industry, years spent at company, and the number of 
acquisitions conducted by the company over the last 5 years (Hypotheses 5:5 to 
5:12 and hypotheses 5:22 and 5:23).
Table 10 4 shows no support for the hypotheses, referring to company experience, that 
is:
5:5) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the number of information sources used.
5:6) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the number of people asked for information.
5:7) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager 
the greater the number of information sources used.
5:8) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager 
the greater the number of people asked for information.
The relationships in table 10.4 although not significant are negative indicating greater 
experience of acquisitions resulted in fewer people being asked for information and 
information sources used
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Table 10.4 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between Individual
Kxpericncc of Acquisitions and Infornialion ( Ollcelion
Number of sources 
of information used
Number of people 
asked for information
Sample Size 36 34
Number of acquisitions' 
reviews completed by 
manager
-.1230 -.2486
Sample Siz.e 34 36
Number of acquisitions' 
reviews completed by 
manager that have resulted 
in an acquisition
-.1148 -.1647
Note - numbers quoted are Pearson correlation coefficients
In contrast, table 10 5 shows support for hypotheses 5:10 and 5:12 There, however, is 
no evidence in table 10 5 to support hypotheses 5:9 and 5 1 1 ’ That is greater 
experience of the company and industry are correlated to asking greater number of 
people for information
fable 10,5 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between Experience of
Company and Industry and Number of Information Sources Used
Number of sources of 
information used 4
Number of people asked 
for information
Sample Size 40 39
Years spent at 
company
.1444 3356**a
Sample Size 40 36
Years spent in 
industry
.1018 .3361** b
a Significance level 2 6 per cent b Significance level 3.6 per cent
This could be explained by larger companies employing more people and therefore 
there being more people to ask for information, shown in table 10 6, and people 
staying at larger companies longer, shown in table 10 7
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I able 10.6 Results of Pearson Oorrcliition l exis between Number of 
People Asked for Information and Sales.
Number of sources of 
information used 5
Number of people 
asked for information
Sample Size 45 42
Sales for last set of 
accounts
- 0425 6331****
Sample Size 45 42
Sales for 
penultimate set of
accounts
-.0446 6392****
**** Significant at less than 0 01 percent level
Table 10.7 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between
Sales anti Length of Time Spent at A Comnanv
Years spent at 
company/’
Years spent in industry
Sample Size 42 42
Sales for last set of 
accounts
3874**e 2706*8
Sample Size 42 42
Sales for
penultimate set of 
accounts
3873**e 2730*h
** Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
e Significant at 11 per cent level 8 Significant at 8 3 per cent level
11 Significant at 8 0 per cent level
Note - Pearson correlation coefficients given
A second possible explanation for this is that people who have spent long periods 
within an industry or company know more people in that sector whom they can ask for 
information, without alerting the city or competitors that they arc considering making 
an acquisition Whether this increased availability of information is responsible for the 
greater success levels that are associated with greater experience of the industry and 
company is uncertain and difficult to explore in a naturalistic setting
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The evidence on company experience, in table 10 8, does not support the hypotheses 
that:
5:22) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:23) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
One relationship out of the twelve tested was significant However, it was of the 
opposite direction to that hypothesised The researcher therefore rejected the 
hypotheses, 5:22 and 5:23, but decided the results were insufficient to warrant further 
exploration.
10.2.1 Section Summary
This section has examined experience and information collection. Experience of 
acquisitions by the company and the individual did not appear to be an influence on the 
number of information sources used The individual's experience of the company and 
industry, however, did appear to be a factor in the volume of information collected for 
the process The next section will examine the hypothesis that greater experience will 
lead to more rapid decision making
2%
T a b l e  1 0 . 8 R e s u l t s  o f  P e a r s o n  (  01 r e l a t i o n  T e s t s  b e t w e e n
(Oinnaiiy Kxncricnce ¡nul I n to mi :i < ion Collection
Number of people asked 
for information 7
Number of sources of 
information used
Sample Size 3 9 40
Total number of 
acquisitions completed in 
last 5 years
-  0 1 5 4 - 0503
Sample Size 4 0 41
Lowest number of 
acquisitions completed in 
one year in last 5 years
- . 2 7 3 4 * - 0100
Sample Size 4 0 41
Largest number of 
acquisitions completed in 
one year in last 5 years
-  0 4 4 4 - 0765
Sample Size 4 0 41
Difference between largest 
number of acquisitions 
completed in one year in 
last 5 years and lowest
- . 0 2 1 0 - 0836
Sample Size 3 8 29
Total number of 
acquisitions completed in 
last 5 years divided by
sales
.1 641 -.1169
Sample Size 31 31
Total number of 
acquisitions completed in 
last 5 years divided by 
number of people currently 
working on acquisitions
- . 0 2 3 0 - 1315
* Significant at 10 per cent level
2 9 7
10,3 Kxnerience and Time
In chapter 5, material from Day and Lord (1991) was presented to the effect that, 
experienced decision makers categorised decisions more rapidly This suggested to the 
researcher the hypothesis: Experience will lead to greater speed in acquisition 
decision making. This section will test this hypothesis for the 5 measures of 
experience proposed
The researcher further proposed that 2 elements of time were relevant, elapsed time 
and man weeks work. Elapsed time taken was aimed at capturing delays and time 
taken for committees to be formed, and the board to meet Man weeks work involved 
in the acquisition was aimed at capturing the time when active work was being 
conducted as well as the level of management resources committed. This measure, 
however, must be treated carefully given that the researcher used post event interviews 
to collect data. The man weeks work data collected must therefore be taken as an 
impression rather than an accurate figure. This figure may, however, encapsulate the 
interviewees' perception of how hard they were working at the time. This may be 
illuminating if not identical to an exact measure of management time consumed.
The researcher also noted that the elapsed time given by companies tended to be 2, 3, 
4, 6, 9, 12, 24 months similar to Hickson et al.'s data (1986:102) * It is possible this is 
due to the calendar framing thinking, board meeting times, timetables set by merchant 
banks, but also that answers were rounded to the nearest period
Table 10 9, however, does not support the hypothesis that Experience will lead to 
greater speed in acquisition decision making, for the 5 measures of experience used
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Box 10.1 Hypotheses on Experience and Time Taken to Make An 
Acquisition Decision
I n d i v i d u a l  e x p e r i e n c e
5 : 1 3 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n i i m h c r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  b y  a  m a n a g e r  t h e  s h o r t e r  t h e  e l a p s e d  
t i m e  t a k e n .
5 : 1 4 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  by  a  m a n a g e r  t h e  f e w e r  t h e  m a n  h o u r s  
w o i  k  i n v o l v e d .
5 : 1 5 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s '  r e v i e w s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  a  m a n a g e r  t h e  s h o r t e r  t h e  
e l a p s e d  t i m e  t a k e n .
5 : 1 6 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s '  r e v i e w s  c a r r i e d  o u t  b y  a  m a n a g e r  t h e  f e w e r  H a ­
i n a n  h o u r s  w o r k  in v o lv e d .
5 : 1 7 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  m a n a g e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a  p r o j e c t  h a s  s p e n t  w i t h  a 
c o m p a n y  t h e  s h o r t e r  t h e  e l a p s e d  t i m e  t a k e n .
5 : IX) T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  m a n a g e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a  p r o j e c t  h a s  s p e n t  w i t h  a 
c o m p a n y  t h e  f e w e r  t h e  m a n  h o u r s  w o r k  in v o lv e d .
5 : 1 9 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  m a n a g e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a  p r o j e c t  h a s  s p e n t  w i t h i n  a n  
i n d u s t r y  t h e  s h o r t e r  t h e  e l a p s e d  t i m e  t a k e n .
5:211) T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  y e a r s  a  m a n a g e r  r e s p o n s i b l e  f o r  a  p r o j e c t  h a s  s p e n t  w i t h i n  a n  
i n d u s t r y  t h e  f e w e r  t h e  m a n  h o u r s  w o r k  in v o lv e d .
C o m p a n y  K x n e r i e n c e
5 : 2 4 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  b y  a  c o m p a n y  t h e  s h o r t e r  t h e  s h o r t e r  
t h e  e l a p s e d  t i m e  t a k e n .
5 : 2 5 )  T h e  g r e a t e r  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  a c q u i s i t i o n s  c o m p l e t e d  b y  a  c o m p a n y  t h e  f e w e r  t h e  m a n  h o u r s  
w o r k  in v o l v e d .
in this research and the 2 measures of time proposed These hypotheses shown in box 
10 1 (5:13 to 5:20 and 5:24 and 5:25) were therefore rejected
T a b l e  1 0 . 9  K e s a l l s  o f  P e a r s o n  C o r r e l a t i o n  T e s t s  b e t w e e n  E x p e r i e n c e  a m i  T i m e
Elapsed time 9 Man weeks work
Sample Size 35 35
Number of acquisitions' reviews completed 
by manager
0127 -1292
Sample Size 34 37
Number of acquisitions' reviews completed 
by manager that have resulted in an 
acquisition
-.1292 -.1633
Sample Size 42 42
Years spent at company by individual .0333 -1574
Sample Size 42 42
Years spent in industry by individual -.0113 -0402
Sample Size 44 39
Total number of acquisitions completed in last 
5 years by company
-.1063 -1237
Sample Size 45 41
Lowest number of acquisitions completed in 
one year in last 5 years by company.
-.1284 -.1891
Sample Size 45 41
Largest number of acquisitions completed in 
one year in last 5 years by company.
-.1652 -.0123
Sample Size 45 41
Difference between largest number of 
acquisitions completed in one year in last 5 
years and lowest by company.
-.1546 0368
Sample Size 44 39
Total number of acquisitions completed in last 
5 years by company divided by sales.
-.0990 -1683
Sample Size 34 31
Total number of acquisitions completed in last 
5 years divided by company by number of 
people currently working on acquisitions
-.0730 -2163
Given that no evidence was found to support the hypothesis that: Experience will 
lead to greater speed in acquisition decision making, the researcher thought that 
this may be an excessively simplistic view of the relationship between decision making 
speed and time If managers had a finite amount of time to carry out the work and
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fixed man power available, improved speed in certain tasks might show up as reduced 
time spent on that task and more time spent on another That is if the simple tasks can 
be carried out more rapidly rather than the total time taken reduced, time may be 
diverted to other issues
This assumes that time is a given But how managers use it is not and more work can 
always be carried out. The researcher therefore proposed 3 fairly simple hypotheses: 
I0:A) Greater experience would lead to less percentage of time being spent on 
financial analysis.
10:B) Greater experience would lead to less percentage of time being spent on 
information collection.
10:C) Greater experience would lead to a greater percentage of time being spent 
on other factors.
These are stated for each of the 5 experience measures used in this research in box 
10 2 (Hypotheses 10:4 to 10:19) Only 3 categories were used to divide management 
time use, because the data collection method was post event interviews To use more 
categories may have stretched peoples memories to the point where they gave random 
answers to get past the question The data must therefore be treated as an impiession 
not a precise figure. Second it would give a false impression of accuracy The 
researcher based the categories on the 2 main processes this research has focused on, 
information collection and decision making The other category, it was hoped, would 
capture issues unique to the acquisition being discussed
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l*ox_10,2 Hypotheses on lixpcricncc and Distribution of Management Time 
f i n a n c i a l  W o r k
10:4) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the lower the percentage of 
time spent on routine financial work
10:5) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager the lower die 
percentage of time spent on routine financial work
10:6) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent with a company 
the lower the percentage of time spent on routine financial work
10 7) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent within an 
industry the lower the percentage of time spent on routine financial work
10:8) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company lower the percentage of time 
spent on routine financial work.
Information Collection
10:9) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the lower the percentage of 
time being spent on information collection
10:10) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager the lower the 
percentage of time being spent on information collection
10:12) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent with a company 
the lower the percentage of time being spent on information collection
10:13) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent willun an 
industry the lower the percentage of time being spent on information collection 
10:14) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the lower the 
percentage ol lime being spent on information collection
Other
lo 15) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater the 
percentage of lime spent on other factors
10 16) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager the greater the 
percentage of time spent on other factors
10 17) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent with a company 
the greater the percentage of lime spent on other factors
10 IS) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent within an 
industry the percentage of time spent on other factors
10 19) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the greater the percentage of 
lime spent on other factors__________________________________________________________________
The correlation test results on hypotheses 10:4 to 10 19 are presented in table 10 10 
This shows that experienced managers were spending less percentage of their time on 
financial considerations and more on other factors Only 2 measures of individual 
experience and the percentage of time spent on financial work are, however, 
significant Four further results relating to company experience were significant. They 
are, however, not of the direction predicted and imply that experienced companies 
seem to spend more time on information collection and less on other issues
The results presented on individual experience, particularly of the company, are 
consistent with the hypotheses presented. That is, experienced decision makers 
commit a lower percentage of time to financial work than less experienced decision 
makers The results on company experience are contrary to expectations
These results should be treated carefully as the data was collected post event, in some 
case up to 3 years after the acquisition. The numbers therefore must be treated as 
approximations. The results are reflections rather than fact
Research on how both management time and elapsed time arc distributed would 
benefit from a detailed case study work, to provide insight into exactly 
what, managers spend their time on
There is, however, no link between how managers said time was spent and success 
Two of the 3 success measures were negatively related to the percentage of time spent 
on routine financial work These relationships, however, were not significant 10
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Table 10.10 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between
Kxncrience and Distribution of Time
Percentage of 
time spent on 
routine financial 
considerations
Percentage of 
time spent on 
collecting 
information
Percentage of 
time spent on 
non-routine 
considerations
Sample Size 27 2.3 24
Number of acquisitions' reviews completed 
bv manager
-.2792 1301 1208
Sample Size 29 25 26
Number of acquisition's reviews completed 
by manager that have resulted in an 
acquisition
-.2879 .1156 1123
Sample Size 33 28 29
Years spent at company -,332(>*b .2286 -.0510
Sample Size 33 28 29
Years spent in industry - 3259*a .2170 -1230
Sample Size 31 27 29
Total number of acquisitions completed in last
5 years bv company
-.0503 2985 -.0736
Sample Size 33 29 29
Lowest number of acquisitions completed in
one year in last 5 years bv company.
-0375 .0870 .0863
Sample Size 33 29 29
Largest number of acquisitions completed in
one year in last 5 years by company.
.1253 .3186* -.2586
Sample Size 33 29 29
Difference between largest number of 
acquisitions completed in one year in last 5 
years and lowest bv company.
.1345 .3667** -.3480*
Sample Size 31 27 29
Total number of acquisitions completed in last 
5 years by company divided bv sales.
.09381 .2471 -.3204*
Sample Size 29 26 25
Total number of acquisitions completed in last 
5 years divided by company by number of 
people currently working on acquisitions
.0875 1577 1276
** Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
a Significant at 6 4 per cent level b Significant at 5.9 per cent level
Note - In some cases the answers given did not add up to 100
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10.3.1 Sedioli Summary
This section has found no evidence to suggest that experienced decision makers take 
less time to make decisions. The author has proposed that the time available was fixed 
Given this, if experienced decision makers could carry out certain tasks more rapidly, 
it was proposed, this would show up in which areas managers devoted time to Given 
the data collection method, post event interviews, a simple 3 part division was 
proposed, routine financial work, information collection and other It was found that 
greater individual experience of the industry and company were negatively correlated 
with time spent on financial work However, the evidence on company data was 
contrary to that expected Companies experience of acquisitions were negatively 
correlated with the percentage of time spent on non-routine considerations and 
positively correlated with information collection time.
This leaves the final issue this thesis will examine; the effect of the availability of 
management resources and the use of external consultants as a substitute on the 
likelihood of success.
10.4 Management Resources
I'he first pait of this chapter examined the experience of the manager responsible for a 
project and how this affected success and the time taken. That is, the skill of the 
individual and the company. This section will examine the view that 2 heads arc better 
than one, however skilled and experienced the one is
Chapter 5 proposed that the greater the management resources available to examine an 
acquisition the greater the probability of success This resulted in hypotheses 5:26 and 
5 27 being generated.
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5:27) The greater the number of people dedicated to working on acquisitions the 
greater the success level.
It was also proposed given Hunt’s findings that
5:28) The greater the elapsed time spent on an acquisition the greater the success 
level.
Hypotheses 5:26 and 5:27 assume that the only management resources being used to 
consider an acquisition are internal to the company. The use of outside consultants as 
a substitute will be considered in section 10.5. This section, however, will focus on the 
above 2 hypotheses Table 10 11 presents the results of testing hypothesis 5:26 and 
5:27.
5:26) The greater the volume of management time devoted to a project the
greater the success level.
fable 10.11 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between Success 
and Management Resources Used and Available
General success 
measure 11
First specific 
success measure
Second specific 
success measure
Sample Size 34 29 42
Man weeks work 
spent on project
-.2339* -.0200 -.1242
Sample Size 31 25 37
Number of staff 
currently working 
on acquisitions
- 2005 0311 - 1883
Sample Size 37 30 46
Elapsed Time 0283 2230 - 0172
* Significant at 10 per cent level
Only I of the relationships presented is significant This result and the majority of the 
correlations between man weeks work, number of staff currently working on 
acquisitions and success are, however, of the opposite direction to that predicted That 
is, more work and more people means less success
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Thus the researcher concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
hypothesis that The greater the volume of management time devoted to a 
project the lower the success level, however, hypothesis 5:26 could he rejected 
These measures, however, fail to take account of the complexity of the task faced or 
the use of exiernal resources such as consultants
The researcher further examined the proposed relationship, by standardising for 
relative size of the acquisition at under 2 per cent of sales This attempts to take 
account of the importance of the acquisition to a company No significant relationships 
were found.12
Kitching (1972,1973) suggested that the work required to conduct an acquisition is 
not linked to the size of the acquisition Thus in chapter 5 the researcher contended 
that, the number of acquisitions conducted could represent a measure of demand on 
management resources It was therefore proposed that:
5:30) Success will be positively related to the number of staff available for 
acquisitions divided by the total number of transactions reported in the last 5 
years.
The evidence in table 10 12 shows no support for this hypothesis The only significant 
correlation coefficient is negative indicating that the fewer managers dedicated to 
acquisitions, compared to the number of acquisitions completed, the greater the 
success Hypothesis 5:30 was thus rejected
To take account of peaks in demand on management resources the researcher 
proposed the hypothesis that
5:31) Success will be positively related to the number of staff available for 
acquisitions divided by the highest number of transactions reported in any of the 
last 5 years.
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The evidence on this shown in table 10 12 is similar to that on hypothesis 5:30 That 
is, the number of people available seems to have a negative impact on the performance 
but this is only significant in one case It is possible this is a product of the small 
sample size not being large enough to investigate this adequately or that companies 
with larger numbers of managers dedicated to working on acquisitions, have higher 
targets for acquisitions and thus rate them as less successful than companies with 
fewer dedicated staff. The researcher, however, concluded that further interpretation 
of this result was not warranted given the nature of the correlations The researcher 
thus rejected hypotheses 5:31.
Table 10.12 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between Success and 
The Number of Staff Currently Working on Acquisitions Divided 
by The Number of Acquisitions Conducted in The Last Five Years
General
success
measure
First specific
success
measure
Second specific
success
measure
Sample Size 29 25 35
Number of staff currently 
working on acquisitions divided 
by number of acquisitions 
conducted in last 5 years
-.1926 -.0611 -.2010 *
Sample Size 29 25 35
Number of staff currently 
working on acquisitions divided 
by largest number of acquisitions 
conducted in any one years in the 
last 5 years
-.1615 - 1197 - 1835
* Significant at 10 per cent level
These measures are however still simple and do not take account of the number of 
operating units and countries involved or the number of people and complexity of 
markets
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I lie lack of a relationship between management time expended on examining a 
potential acquisition and success could also imply that time was being used to carry­
out tasks that had no bearing on success Time spent on an acquisition was 
significantly correlated with the length of report produced"
In a similar vein it was put forward that resources available would be dependent on the 
size of the organisation and not the needs of an acquisition programme 
5:29) The larger the sales of a company the more people there will be available to 
work on an acquisition.
The evidence in table 10.13 clearly supports hypothesis 5:29. The researcher 
concluded that the management resources available was related to the size of the 
company and not the number of transactions The researcher also concluded that the 
use of management time and the management resources available was not worth 
further examination in this thesis, as to examine it effectively a detailed case study 
approach is required, to build up a description of how managers use their time and 
how they say they used it afterwards
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Table 10.13 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between Size and
Management Resources Available
Number of staff currently 
working on acquisitions.
Sales for last set of accounts .6837 ****
Sample Size 40
Sales for penultimate set of accounts 7106 ****
Sample Size 40
Sales for anti- penultimate set of accounts .7010 ****
Sample Size 40
Total number of acquisitions .0185
Sample Size 36
Minimum Number of acquisitions in one
year
.1183
Sample Size 37
Maximum Number of acquisitions in one 
year
-.0026
Sample Size 37
**** Significant at . 1 per cent level
10.4.1 Section Sum m ary
This section has examined the hypothesis that the management resources available to 
carryout an acquisition review will influence the success of an acquisition Limited 
evidence for a simple negative relationship was found This, however, was 
inconclusive. The researcher, however, considers this is because no adequate way to 
reflect the size and demands of the task were included The researcher did find that the 
number of staff currently working on acquisitions was related to the size of the 
company but not the number of acquisitions conducted. The researcher will now 
examine the associated effect of the use of consultants who can in certain 
circumstances be used as substitutes for internal resources
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10.5 Consultants Used
Chapter 5 proposed that the use of consultants would lower success levels because 
they have different priorities to the acquiring company and that their advice might be 
motivated by the consultancy company's profits and not their client's best interest.
The literature, however, seems to assume that the consultants in question fit into 3 
basic groups, merchant or investment banks, strategy consultants or, specialist mergers 
and acquisitions consultancies. As table 10.14 shows, most companies are using a 
variety of consultants A number stated that their use of merchant or investment banks 
did not aid analysis but that they were used to sell the deal to the stock market.
One company said : 'All they, (name o f  com pany's merchant bank) did was put their 
name to the circular to shareholders.' 14
A second said: 'It is a funding thing, if you have got a class one or a super class one 
which require shareholder approval, or you have got one which involves 
issuing shares or a rights issue then, certainly our merchant bank would be 
involved then.'
A third stated: 'We use our merchant bank (name o f  com pany's m erchant bank) as 
advisers, but not in advising us about the qualitative aspects o f  an acquisition 
It would tend to be more to do with the market response to it, or whether it is 
a class one circular, and what to put out The technical aspects '
Many of the companies said they would only use a merchant bank occasionally when 
they wanted to make a right's issue. But 31 said they had used a merchant bank on 
some occasions, primarily to deal with the city.
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Additionally, all companies said they used their auditors to carry-out due diligence 
work This, however, was post agreement to check any information that had been 
supplied was accurate No company said they would use their auditors before making 
a decision
Table 10.14 Types of Consultant Used by Companies
Type of Consultant Number of companies who said they 
used this type of consultant
Merchant Banks 31
Environmental Consultants 22
Property 17
Industry Specialists including geologists 9
Strategy consultants 9
Tax 4
Pensions 3
Market Research Companies 3
The consultants used were typically used to advise on specific areas where the 
company did not maintain resources. This can be seen in the large numbers of 
companies using environmental, property, tax, and pensions consultants and industry 
specialists including geologists The importance of this type of consultant over 
iiwestment bankers is further illustrated by the quotes below
One company:' Accounting firms. We don't use accounting firms. We have used the so 
called boutiques from time to time but with less success If we have an 
environmental concern on an acquisition we would use environmental 
consultants.'
Another company: 'We might use specialist consultants , where appropriate We 
might use it in certain industries, in some of the more technical areas 
particularly in our (Name of Industry) division we might use a radio 
consultant, if there was a particular issue for example'
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A third 'We would ask environmental specialists to review that particular aspect of 
acquisitions, and we do have a property service manager and he would 
become involved when it became appropriate As far as the legal 
conveyancing is concerned that would be done by the lawyers, but he 
would go and look over the place and if it wasn't over worked he 
would survey it himself, but if he didn't he would get someone else to 
do it.'
One company did say that they used merchant banks but, most consultancy work 
was done by specialists:
'Depending what type of acquisition it is we would speak to merchant 
banks quite regularly If we are going into markets where we have not 
had a great deal of experience then we would. For example, Eastern 
Europe, 1 know last year we commissioned a study, from some 
consultancy who purported to be Eastern European experts, normal 
stuff, market share, countries economy, business opportunities, etc etc. 
viability of various industries behind the former Iron Curtain '
Strategy consultants played a minor part in the acquisitions studied. Consultants were 
used to provide a report and exit In conclusion the type of consultants used by the 
companies interviewed were primarily providing narrow technical advice, not 
controlling the process as many consultant-prescriptive authors would hope
10.5.1 l)se o f Consultants and Success
Having examined what consultants were used, and found they were mainly technical, 
property or environmental, the researcher will now examine the hypothesis (5:32) 
that, The greater the number of different consultants used the lower the success 
level, as proposed in chapter 5 The evidence on this presented in table 10.15 gives no 
support to this hypothesis the researcher therefore rejected it
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Table 10,15 Results o f Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between The
Number of Different Types of Consultants Used and Success
General Success 
Measure 15
First Specific 
Success Measure
Second Specific 
Success measure
Sample Size 35 27 40
Number of 
different types of 
consultant used
.1176 .0727 - 0863
One possible explanation for this lack of relationship is that the authors, particularly 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), were not considering the type of consultants that 
companies were found to use in this research. When Haspeslagh and Jemison(1991) 
proposed that poor advice might lead to acquisitions performing worse they seem to 
have been focusing on investment or merchant banks Given that the researcher 
interprets that the authors were primarily considering merchant banks paid on a 
completion fee basis, he proposes that:
10:20) Companies that used merchant banks as consultants would perform 
worse than other companies.
Another possible hypothesis that: Companies that used strategy consultants would 
perform worse than other companies, was not tested because of the small number of 
companies stating they used them.
The evidence on hypothesis 10:20 table 10.16 is inconclusive There is clear evidence 
to suggest that the use of merchant banks by companies resulted in worse performance 
on the variables that companies considered important, those incorporated into the first 
specific success measure. However, for the criteria included in the general and second 
specific success measure (which were imposed by the researcher, return on investment, 
effect on earnings per share, effect on group share price, cash flow sales growth) there 
are 2 and 1 significant relationships respectively. The researcher therefore sees this as 
an area for further research with a larger sample size
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T ab le  10.16 Results of Chi-Siiuarcd Tests between 1 so of
Merchant Banks as Consultants and Success
Company used a merchant bank as a 
consultant and first specific success 
measure divided at
Minimum 
expected 
frequency 16
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3 5 3.6 .40576
3 6 4.0 22559
3 7 4 9 .14264
3 8 5 6 04694** *
3 9 6.3 00539***4.
4.0 5.4 .01041** *
4 1 5.4 01041** *
4.2 4.9 .02373** *
4.3 4 9 .05237 * *
4 4 4.0 10695
Sample size 29 with one degree of freedom
Company used a merchant bank as a 
consultant and general success 
measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
2.5 2.5 1
2.7 3.5 1
2 9 3.5 1
3 0 4.2 1
3.1 4.9 .95409
3 2 5.6 .79254
3 3 6 3 82318
3 4 6.3 .82318
3 5 5.6 79254
3 6 4.6 .75509
3 7 3.8 .46455
3 8 3 5 27486
3 9 2.8 09999* *
4 0 1.9 .04232** *
4 1 14 1 1474
Sample size 37 with one degree of freedom
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Table 10.16 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Use of
Merchant Hanks as Consultants and Success
Company Used A merchant Hank as a 
consultant and second specific 
success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3 0 3.2 43902
3 1 4 9 .73277
3.2 4 9 .73277
3 3 6 5 72908
3.4 6 6 54267
3 5 7.0 54777
3 6 7 8 63241
3.7 9.0 .53971
3 8 7.0 51032
3 9 5.7 13461
4.0 4.5 03052 **
Sample size 44 with one degree of freedom
+ Direction of relationship negative
10.5.2 Use of Consultants and Time 'Taken
The second other hypothesis proposed in chapter 5 concerning consultants was that, 
5:33) The greater the number of different consultants used the shorter the 
elapsed time taken. This was based on the view that the main group of consultants 
used by companies would be merchant banks on win fees. Table 10.17 shows no 
relationship between the number of different types of consultants used and time taken
Table 10,17 Results of Pearson Correlation Tests between Time 
and Use of Consultants
Management time 
spent on acquisitions
Elapsed Time
Sample Size 41 44
Number of different types 
of consultant used
0506 1038
Note - Pearson correlations coefficients given not probabilities
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The researcher therefore restated hypothesis 5:32 as: 10:21) Companies which used 
merchant bankers as consultants will take less time to conduct acquisitions.
The evidence on hypothesis 5:33 in table 10 18 shows there is a significant relationship 
between the use of merchant banks and man weeks work used before a decision. Table 
10.19, however, shows that this relationship is not linear. That is, companies that used 
merchant banks as consultants conducted the most acquisitions that took less than
25.5 man weeks work and those which took more than 69 man weeks work
Given this relationship, the researcher conducted a limited sensitivity analysis. It was 
not possible to use a wide range of values for the division of the amount of man weeks 
put into the acquisition before the decision because this would have resulted in the 
minimum expected frequency falling below 517. The results of this are shown in table 
10.18
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Tiihlc 10,18 Results of Clii-Soiiarcd Tests between 11st- of Merchant Banks 
as Consultants and Time Tiikon to Conduct an Acquisition
Company used a merchant 
bank as a consultant and 
length of taken divided at:
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
3 3 68299
4 4.4 1.0
5 7 21704 +
6 7.4 13810 +
8 9 6 16548 +
9 8 7 18422 +
10 5 3 61429
4 25 and 10 5.3 61275
4 25 and 9 5.7 39898
5 and 10 5 3 46678
Sample Size 48
Company used a merchant 
bank as a consultant and 
man weeks work used 
divided at
Minimum expected 
frequency
Probability of distribution 
occurring by chance
40 8.2 46676
50 10 54483
25.5 and 69 5 01565***
25.5 and 101 5 03688**
30 and 90 5 9 12199
Sample Size 44
* Cross tabulation table shown in table 10 19 
+ Companies which used merchant banks tended to take less time 
** Significant at 5 per cent level
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Table 10.19 Contingency Table for lise of Merchant Banks as 
(  O i l  s i i  11 ;i n I s Against Nninhe r of I V l i i i i  Weeks Work
Below 25 5 25 5 to 69 69 and Above Total
Companies which 
did not use 
merchant banks as 
consultants
2 1 1 7 20
Companies which 
used merchant 
banks as 
consultants
9 4 1 I 24
Total 1 1 15 18 44
One possible explanation for this is that some of the companies that used merchant 
banks included the bankers' time in the time figure they gave and others did not 
Another possible explanation, for the division of companies who used merchant 
bankers falling into 2 groups, illustrated in figure 10.1, is that those acquisitions that 
took a small amount of work were those which were actively for sale Those which 
took a large volume of work were those which were hostile For the latter, there may 
be no information available and the company is using a bank to collect information and 
conduct an investor relations campaign with both the companies and the target's 
shareholders. In the former case the information may be given to the company by a 
selling bank It is possible that this relationship is a chance one The evidence thus 
does not support a simple relationship between time, both elapsed and man weeks 
work and the use of a merchant bank as an adviser No relationships between elapsed 
time and use of merchant banks as a consultant were found A kinked relationship 
between man weeks work used on the acquisition before the decision was made, and 
use of a merchant bank was found T his relationship was not totally robust to Hexing 
the points at which the variable was divided, as only limited flexing of the variables 
coding was possible while still maintaining a minimum expected frequency above 5 in 
the chi-squared tables It is thus difficult to determine if the relationship is a random 
one or significant
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Figure 10.1 Histogram of Man Weeks Work for Companies Which Fsctl
Merchant Banks as Advisers
10
12 5 37.5 62 5 87.5 112.5 137.5 162.5 187.5
Man weeks work done on acquisition prior to decision
Note - 3 outliers that had man weeks work figures over 200 were excluded from the 
histogram to allow a reasonable representation of the rest of the data
This result is similar to the evidence on hypothesis that:
7:3) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take less elapsed 
time to complete.
support for this hypothesis was found but not the hypothesis that:
7:4) Acquisitions resulting from ideas generated externally will take less man 
weeks work to complete.
it is difficult to make a clear conclusion from the data collected on external 
involvement and elapsed time. The researcher, however, proposes that merchant banks 
are used in 2 instances One, to act as an interface with another merchant bank when 
biding for targets which are actively for sale will conclude rapidly; or 2, where the bid
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is hostile and during the bid the company is using a bank to conduct an investor 
relations campaign and advise on bidding tactics These acquisitions may have long 
gestation periods
10.5.3 Section Summary
This section has examined the hypothesis that companies that used more consultants 
would perform worse This view was rejected. The researcher proposed that this could 
be because the authors proposing this hypothesis were expecting companies to 
primarily use merchant banks, rather than more specialist consultants that covered 
narrow topics as was found The hypothesis was therefore restated to focus on 
merchant banks There was clear evidence to support this for one of the success 
measures used However, this did not hold for the other 2 measures The second 
hypothesis proposed that the use of consultants would result in a shorter time being 
taken and this produced similar results. No relationship was established between the 
number of consultants and either measure of time used in this research, elapsed or man 
weeks work However, a relationship between man weeks work and the use of 
merchant banks as consultants was found This however was kinked The researcher is 
unclear why this is One possible explanation is that companies used banks where 
another bank was conducting a sale and the process was relatively simple While banks 
were also used in hostile acquisitions to act as an interlace between the company and 
its shareholders and the shareholders of the target company, which required extensive 
amounts of man power to conduct
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10.6 Chante r  Summary
This chapter has focused on 2 issues that the literature proposed might influence 
success and the acquisition process; experience of the project manager and the 
company and management resources including the use of consultants as a substitute 
for internal resources. Individual and corporate experience of acquisitions were not 
found to effect success or information collection Experience of the company and 
industry by individuals measured in years was found to be correlated with greater 
success and use of more information sources. However, no evidence of experience 
affecting the time taken to complete an acquisition was found.
To further explore this the researcher examined how management resources were 
distributed between 3 broad areas, information collection, financial analysis and other 
Experience of the company and industry by the individual was found to be negatively 
correlated with this. The evidence on company experience, however, conflicted with 
this. No evidence for a simple relationship between resources and success was found 
The researcher, however, considered that this might be because no adequate measure 
of demand could be constructed
The final area this chapter examined was the use of consultants. It was found that the 
number of consultants used did not effect success levels or the time taken to conduct 
an acquisition.
The researcher felt that the authors these hypotheses were based on particularly 
Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991), were thinking of merchant banks when they proposed 
this view The researcher thus restated the hypotheses,
5:32) The greater the number of different consultants used the lower the success 
level, as 10:20) Companies that used merchant banks as consultants would 
perform worse than other companies. Clear evidence was found to support
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hypothesis 10:20 for one success measure but only very limited evidence for the other 
2 The relationship between the use of merchant banks and the management time used 
by the company to make a decision was found to be kinked with companies that used 
merchant banks mainly falling at the 2 ends of the distribution.
The last 4 chapters have focused on 4 areas:
A) information collection and the source of the idea
B) the decision criteria used
C) the relationships between the decision criteria used and success
D) the effect of experience and management resources on the process
In the next chapter the researcher will attempt to tie these together to the literature 
He will also propose directions for future research. The final section of this chapter 
lists the hypotheses covered in this chapter and the results of testing them.
10.7 Hypotheses Covered in This Chanter
Experience and Success
Experience of acquisitions will increase success levels.
This was tested as:
5:1) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the greater 
the probability of an acquisition being successful.
5:2) Tbe greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager 
the greater the probability of an acquisition being successful.
There was no evidence to support hypotheses 5:1 and 5:2
5:3) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the greater the probability of an acquisition being 
successful.
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There was evidence to support hypotheses 5:3 and 5 4 for both specific success 
measures
5:4) T h e  grea ter  the n u m b e r  of years a m anager responsible for a project lias
spent w ith in  an industry  the grea ter  the probability of an  acquisition being
successful.
Experience and Information Sources
Expert decision makers use a greater number of information sources, and; 
Expert decision makers ask more people for information.
These were stated in 8 forms, incorporating individual experience of the company, 
industry, completed acquisitions and acquisition reviews No evidence was found to 
support these hypotheses except the hypothesis that
5:12) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the greater the number of people asked for information.
Experience and l ime Taken
Greater experience will lead to a shorter elapsed time being taken.
Greater experience will lead to fewer man hours work being required.
These were he tested with experience defined as, the number of acquisitions 
completed, the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out, the number of years a 
manager responsible for a project has spent with a company, and the number of years a 
manager responsible for a project has spent within an industry
These hypotheses (5:13 to 5:20) were rejected As a result the researcher generated 
hypotheses 10:4 to 10:18
financial Work
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10:4) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a manager the lower 
the percentage of time spent on routine financial work.
10:5) The greater the number of acquisitions' reviews carried out by a manager 
the lower the percentage of time spent on routine financial work.
There was limited evidence to support these 2 hypotheses it however was not 
significant
10:6) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent with a company the lower the percentage of time spent on routine financial 
work.
10:7) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has 
spent within an industry the lower the percentage of time spent on routine 
financial work.
There was evidence to support these 2 hypotheses. However, it was only significant at 
the 6.4 and 5 9 per cent levels respectively.
Information Collection
There was no evidence to support the hypothesis (10:9 to 10:13) that: the greater 
the experience of the manager responsible for a project the lower the percentage 
of time spent on information collection, for the 4 measures of individual experience 
used in this research. The correlations that did exist although not significant were of 
the opposite direction to that predicted
Other
No significant evidence was found to support the hypothesis that The greater 
experience of manager the greater the percentage of time spent on other factors,
for the four measures of individual experience used in this research.
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C om pany Experience
5:21) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater probability of an acquisition being successful.
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis Given this the researcher tested 
sub-hypotheses defining company experience as: the minimum number of 
acquisitions conducted in any of the last 5 years , the highest level of acquisitions 
conducted in the last 5 years, the range between the highest and lowest levels of 
activity over the last 5 years . There was no evidence to support these hypotheses 
5:22) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of information sources used.
5:23) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the number of people asked for information.
There was no evidence to support these hypotheses
5:24) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
shorter the shorter the elapsed time taken.
5:25) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
fewer the man hours work involved.
The above 2 hypotheses were rejected.
10:8) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company lower the 
percentage of time spent on routine financial work.
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis
10:14) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
lower the percentage of time being spent on information collection.
There was limited significant evidence to support the opposite hypotheses to 
Hypothesis 10:14, that is
The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the greater the 
percentage of time being spent on information collection.
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10:19) The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the 
greater the percentage of time spent on other factors.
There was limited signilicant evidence to support the opposite hypotheses to 
Hypothesis 10:19, that is
The greater the number of acquisitions completed by a company the lower the 
percentage of time spent on other factors.
Management Resources and Success
5:26) The greater the volume of management time devoted to an acquisition the 
greater the success.
This hypothesis was rejected
5:27) The greater the number of people dedicated to working on acquisitions the 
greater the success.
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis.
5:28) The greater the elapsed time spent on an acquisition the greater the success 
level.
There was no evidence to support this hypothesis
5:29) The larger the sales of a company the more people there will be available to 
work on an acquisition.
The results of a correlations test on this hypothesis were significant at the 1 per cent 
level for the sales reported in the last 3 sets of accounts.
5:30) Success will be positively related to the number of staff available for 
acquisitions divided by the total number of transactions reported in the last 5
years.
The correlation coefficients on the tests on this were small but negative That is 
success was negatively related to the number of staff available divided by the number 
of transactions Thus hypothesis 5 29 was rejected
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5:31) Success will be positively related to the number of staff available for 
acquisitions divided by the highest number of transactions reported in any of the 
last 5 years.
This hypothesis was rejected as, like hypothesis 5:29, the correlations were of the 
opposite direction predicted
Consultants
5:32) The greater the number of consultants used the lower the success level.
The evidence on this presented in table 10.15 gave no support to this hypothesis The 
researcher therefore rejected it.
10:20) Companies that used merchant banks as consultants would perform 
worse than other companies.
Clear evidence was found to support this hypothesis for one success measure only very 
limited evidence for the other 2.
5:33) The greater the number of different consultants used the shorter the 
elapsed time taken. No evidence was found to support this hypothesis 
10:21) Companies that used merchant bankers as consultants will take less time 
to conduct acquisitions.
There was a significant relationship between the use of merchant banks as consultants 
and man weeks work used before the decision However, this was kinked. That is, 
companies that used merchant banks as consultants conducted the majority of 
acquisitions that took less than 31 man weeks work and those which took more than 
90 man weeks work The researcher proposed that this was because acquisitions 
involving merchant banks fell into 2 distinct groups Sales, where all information was 
available, and hostile deals where no information was available
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' For a full list of the hypotheses examined in this chapter see section 10.7
* For the data used in this research for the five year period the. Mean 14.000, Median 11.000 
Standard deviation 12.994, Minimum 1.000 and Maximum 78 000. This compares to 
Kuscwitt's(1985) data with a mean of 2.55 per year, and a range of 3 to 15.3. For five years this 
would be 12.75 15 and 76.5.
1 Hypotheses 5:9 to 5:12 arc
5 9) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent with a company 
the greater number of information sources used.
5:10) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent with a company 
the greater number of people asked for information
5 11) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent within an 
industry greater number of information sources used.
5:12) The greater the number of years a manager responsible for a project has spent within an 
industry greater number of people asked for information
3 The table below shows the correlation coefficients for the three success measures and percentage of 
time spent on routine financial work 
' Numbers quoted arc Pearson correlation coefficients 
Numbers quoted arc Pearson correlation coefficients 
Numbers quoted arc Pearson correlation coefficients 
Numbers quoted arc Pearson correlation coefficients
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* Frequencies of elapsed times arc given below. It's mean was 9.095, median 6.000, and standard 
deviation 8.364.
Value Frequency Value Frequency Value Frequency
1.3 1 4.0 5 9.0 8
1.5 1 4.5 2 12.0 6
2.0 3 5.0 1 14.0 1
2.5 1 6.0 8 24.0 5
3.0 3 7.0 1 48.0 1
3.5 1 8.0 2
9 Numbers quoted arc Pearson correlation coefficients.
Pcrccntaac of Time Spent on Financial Work and Success
General success 
Measure
First specific 
Success Measure
Second Specific 
Success measure
Sample Size 29 25 33
Percentage of time spent on 
routine financial considerations
1326 -.1832 - 1473
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients given.
11 Kendall rank correlation coefficients given.
' 2 Success and Management Resources Available and Used for Acquisitions which 
were less Ilian Two Per Cent of the Buyers Sales
Man weeks work 
dev oted to acquisition
Number of people 
currently working on 
acquisitions
General Success Measure -.4121 -.0166
Sample Size 16 18
First Specific Success Measure - 1929 -0263
Sample Size 14 16
Second Specific Success Measure -2623 -.2140
Sample Size 18 21
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients given.
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Correlation coefficient 5098, significant at less than 1 per cent level 
' ' Italics added
Results given are Kendall rank correlation coefficients
Where minimum expected frequency is below 5 a Fisher Exact test result is presented 
Fisher exact test is only valid for 2 by 2 contingency tables.
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(.’hauler 1 KKVIKW ANI) CONÇU NIONS
The main purposes of this thesis were to examine how companies made the decision to 
acquire another company, and to identify best practice. This thesis focused on 3 areas, 
the information collection and search phase, the decision criteria, and the influence of 
management resources and experience on this process. Negotiations were explicitly 
excluded.
The rationale behind this study was that, while many billions of pounds are spent by 
managers in the United Kingdom on acquisitions each year, relatively little research 
existed directly on this topic A framework was developed from research material 
which focused directly on the acquisition decision process and was used to structure 
the rest of the thesis. (Chapter 1)
The extensive capital markets literature on acquisitions failed to provide a detailed 
base upon which to build this research. It did, however, provide a background to allow 
some variables to be controlled for and place other material in context (Chapter 2)
Literature from a number of areas including that on decision-making, strategic 
decisions and finance was therefore used to develop substantive hypotheses on: limits 
to the acquisition search domain, information collection, the decision criteria used, 
management resources used, and experience. (Chapter 3, 4, and 5)
Chapter 6 explored the potential methods available to conduct this research It 
concluded that structured interviews with a subjective success measure were best 
suited to examining the issues and hypotheses developed in chapter 4, 5 and 6.
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Chapter 7 explored the characteristics of company searches and how they looked for 
acquisitions using some descriptive material as well as testing the hypotheses 
developed in chapter 3. All except one company was found to limit its acquisition 
searches to the industries within which they already operated The situation with 
respect to geographic limits to acquisition searches was more varied Acquisitions by 
companies which limited their acquisition searches by geography performed better 
Internal ideas were found to be significantly more successful than external ones
Chapter 8 showed that although most companies were using discounted cash flow 
techniques these were not the only methods used One company was found not to be 
using any of the five conventional capital appraisal techniques: payback, accounting 
rates of return, net present value, earnings per share and internal rate of return. Most 
companies also employed non financial criteria in their decision making process.
The analysis presented in chapter 9 concluded that the use of discounted cash-flow 
did not affect success levels, although there were significant results with one success 
measure to suggest it was associated with a lower success level This issue was further 
explored using descriptive and quantitative material to develop potential explanations:
- The result is inaccurate
- DCF methods were not applied correctly. Specifically, fixed hurdle rates are being 
used and these are not changed frequently.
- Companies using NPV did produce superior results, but companies using IRR did 
not because of its flaws and this reduced the overall success level of companies using 
DCF methods
- Companies are using DCF techniques but the results are ignored in the decision 
process
- DCF is being used as a substitute for analysis.
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It was not possible to reject any of these proposed explanations for the lower success 
levels associated with use of discounted cash-flow measures.
The descriptive material, however, showed that few companies were following the 
process proposed by the finance literature, using only net present value as a criterion 
with a discount rate established specifically for that acquisition. This chapter also 
tested the hypotheses developed in chapter 4 yielding mainly negative results .
The empirical content of this research was concluded by an exploration of 3 topics: 
experience, management resources, and use of consultants, which prior research 
suggested might influence the process and acquisition success. A variety of measures 
of experience developed in chapter 5 were examined. It transpired that no measure of 
experience o f acquisitions affected success. Individual experience of the industry and 
company was found to be correlated with increased success.(Chapter 10)
The empirical analyses presented in chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 each illuminated a different 
part of the acquisition process or a series of factors which influenced the process The 
main purposes of this chapter (11) are to draw these results together, to reconcile 
these with the literature and indicate some possible future directions for research 
Before proceeding with these the researcher will highlight some key findings
11.1 Search Area
All except one company limited the areas searched for acquisitions to those areas 
within which they already operated There was, however, a great deal of variation in 
how narrowly focused these limits were. The geographic limits had more explicit 
variation with some companies not limiting the geographic areas in which they 
acquired. This was found to be correlated with lower levels of success. This is in 
direct contradiction of the predictions of the Rational Economic Man concept These
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findings would fit with Simon's( 1976) concept of bounded rationality Those 
companies which did not explicitly limit their acquisition search area by geography, 
were possibly being affected by the cognitive limits of individuals, equally it could 
suggest the structure of the organisation did not allow knowledge of all geographic 
markets and of the acquisitions process to be effectively combined It also implies that 
companies may not be able to pursue truly global strategies effectively with their 
present structures.
11.2 Ideas and Number of Options Considered
Acquisitions resulting from internal ideas were found to be more successful than 
acquisitions resulting from ideas generated outside the company. The consideration of 
each acquistion idea in isolation so reducing opportunities to compare potential 
acquisitions may be a factor in this. This relationship could be because:
1) Some companies are actually following narrower and more focused strategies than 
they are presenting to the outside world, or their Boards realise. This leads outside 
advisers and sellers to present ideas to the board who commit the organisation to an 
idea, in principle, which could not have resulted from an internal idea Internal ideas 
are usually limited to areas the company already operates in because operating units do 
not have the time to conduct searches outside these areas. In terms of 
Mintzberg's(1978) perspective, if the sum of division strategies are realised as 
intended, some of the organisation's intended strategy will be unrealised Acquisitions 
stimulated by external ideas which fit into this gap will have an increased probability of 
failure because the divisions of the organisation do not have the skills and resources to 
understand the proposed acquisition or operate the proposed acquisition That is the 
division has a strategy and only has the resources to operate effectively within the 
areas this defines. The centre of the organisation may perceive these limits differently
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or try to define them in a different way leaving a gap For example an operating 
division may define itself as a road haulage operation, the centre may perceive it as a 
transport operation and present this to the outside world Given this limit an outsider 
might offer the organisation a rail-freight operation, which the operating unit is unable 
to manage
2) Outsiders are stretching corporate strategies to fit with what they have to sell and 
this is not being picked up. That is there are agency problems between the company 
and its advisers, who have incentives to operate in a way which may not be in the 
interest of the company. A board may make over optimistic assessments of its and the 
companies operational managers abilities to manage another business, without 
considering in detail the generalizeability of their skills
3) External ideas follow a different process. Ideas may go directly to board directors 
who are unable to effectively evaluate and understand the detailed consequences, or 
conduct detailed financial analysis.
4) Commitment. Units which have to run operations are not committed to external 
ideas They thus may run operations down, not carry out expansion plans, and blame 
head office staff for problems
The evidence collected in this research supports points I, 3 and 4 Option 2 is feasible, 
but may be difficult to prove without a longitudinal study
11.3 Information Collection
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The level of information collection and type of information sources used was found 
not to affect success levels This could fit Simon's (1976) Administrative Man model 
where decision makers have cognitive limits, which in some cases, although not in 
others, are being reached. Equally extra information may still have value but this is 
small and the success measure is unable to detect this. It is therefore difficult to draw 
any specific conclusions from this.
The main sources of data used by companies to collect information on acquisitions
was internal or from the target, either through direct access or an information
memorandum. Few companies used 'City' information sources
11.4 Decision Criteria Used
In spite of the prescriptions of the finance literature the information collected was 
processed in a variety of ways and subjected to a number of criteria Just 6 companies 
used only discounted cash flow measures However, 41 used discounted cash flow 
measures together with other measures The use of discounted cash flow measures did 
not increase success levels Attempts to test hypotheses to explain this were 
inconclusive
The use of other capital budgeting techniques did not influence the success measure to 
a significant degree Earnings per share was significantly negatively correlated with 
the second specific success measure, and the general success measure for 2 tests out 
of 7, but not the first specific success measure1 Payback and accounting rate of return
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were significantly positively correlated with the first specific success measure for 1 
valid test, but not for all other tests conducted using different dividing points to 
convert success into a dichotomous variable. The tests with the other success 
measures produced no significant results.
The decline in importance of payback as a criteria shown in Pike's research 
(1983,1988) was reinforced by this research. Although commonly used it was only 
used in conjunction with discounted cash flow or earnings per share criteria Criteria 
apart from the five main financial criteria seem to have played only a minor role in 
decision making.
11.6 Internal Resources
No evidence o f any relationship between the success measures used and management 
resources available for acquisitions was found. The only factor found to affect 
management resources available was size. The research therefore examined the use of 
consultants as potential substitutes for internal resources.
11.7 External Resources
Merchant banks were the most commonly used type of consultants, with 3 1 companies 
using them Many companies though expressed the view that this was only to 'sell' a 
deal to the city. A large number of companies used environmental consultants (22), 
and property consultants Fewer used strategy consultants (9). The number of 
consultants used was found not to influence success. The use of merchant banks, 
however, was found to be negatively correlated with I success measure There was 
only limited evidence to support this for the other 2 success measures
11.8 Experience
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Experience of acquisitions, by both the company and the individual, was found not to 
affect success levels In contrast individual experience of the industry and company, 
measured in terms of years spent at the company and in working in the industry was 
significantly related to success, thus supporting Day and Lord's(1991)fmdings, but 
contrary to Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991).
The researcher explored a number of possible explanations for this and found 2 other 
significant relationships with experience. A positive relationship with the number of 
people asked for information, as Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) predicted was 
found but, on the other hand, there was a negative relationship with the percentage of 
time spent on financial analysis. The number of people asked for information was 
shown also to be related to size.2
This contradiction of Yates, McDaniel and Brown (1991) could be a product of the 
acquisition situation. It could be argued that as acquisitions decisions are often 
constrained by limited information, unlike most situations, where extra information 
results in information overload, the extra information still has marginal value.
Secondly, acquisitions are often conducted under time pressure. There is an extensive 
body o f material (Calderwood, Klien and Crandall, 1990, Chase and Simon 1973, Day 
and Lord, 1991) which suggests that under time pressure more experienced decision 
makers performance does not deteriorate as rapidly as inexperienced decision makers. 
It has been proposed that this is because experienced decision makers use rules of 
thumb and recognitional techniques (Klien 1993, Abelson, 1976) which give 
approximate answers
This would imply that much of the laboratory based material may be irrelevant to 
examining naturalistic situations because the ability to collect additional information
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through contacts and real time pressure cannot be modelled using 'business' type 
situations. These conclusions have so far summarised the findings of this research The 
researcher will now utilise the frameworks presented in chapter 1 to draw together the 
findings of this research. This is not intended to refute these models but conflicts 
between the models and data collected will be highlighted.
11.9 Comparison Between Process Models and Research Findings
Research on the acquisition process has been scarce. Three pieces of research of note 
have been conducted over the last 30 years, Kitching (1972, 1973, 1974), Birley 
(1974, 1976) and Haspeslagh and Jemison (1991).
In chapter 1 the author either generated or extracted one model of the acquisition 
process from each of these authors works, figures 1.7, 1.6 and 1.4 respectively. These 
models did not specify exactly what companies should do or did but were general 
frameworks. The following section will compare these models and the data presented 
in chapters 7, 8, 9 and 10 and will therefore provide conclusions at a general level. The 
reader should note that this researcher did not set out specifically to test these models 
(figures 1.7, 16 and 1.4). He is using them to bring together points which have been 
discussed in isolation in the empirical chapters Data therefore on certain specific 
aspects of the models may not have been collected in a testable form.
11.10 Birlev's Model
The key features of the model based on Birley (1974, 1976) are that: the motivation 
for an acquisition is current profitability, and a proposal to acquire is subjected to 2 
screening criteria before a decision to buy is made These criteria are a vague concept
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of strategy and the gaining of executive commitment, the latter making financial 
analysis superfluous. These points can be seen in the model below, (figure I 6.)
Figure 1.6 Model of Acquisition Process based on Birlev's Work
All except 1 case collected in this research does not appear to fit this model. This case
stimulation was to raise profitability, or a vague concept of strategy. It is clear, 
however, that the driving factor behind this acquisition was executive commitment - 
the financial analysis was conducted but ignored Other companies may have followed 
a similar approach, but respondents were unaware that the analysis work they were 
conducting was being ignored or they were saying what they thought the researcher 
wanted to hear This point will be returned to in the section on methodology and 
research limitations.
Financial Evaluation 
Becomes Superfluous
was deemed to be unsuccessful ’ It is, however, unclear in this case whether the initial
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There are 3 areas where the majority of the cases collected seem to conflict with this 
model:
1 ) Most companies claimed to have conducted detailed financial evaluations Forty- 
one companies stated they used discounted cash flow analysis, and 24 companies 
claimed discounted cash-flow analysis was 1 of their 3 key criteria Only the 1 
company claimed not to have used any of the five conventional financial criteria.4 It is 
thus difficult to see the financial analysis as superfluous Companies may have ignored 
the results, in a few cases, but those acquisitions which were put forward to the head 
office by operating units were subject, in particular, to detailed financial controls.
It is possible that the variety of decision criteria used by most companies - only 18.7 
percent used one or less finance criteria and 56 percent 3 or more - is deliberate to 
allow vagueness. That is, the process as espoused by the finance literature has had 
additional variables such as payback and accounting rates of returns added to the 
decision process to allow board directors to rationalise decisions. Accordingly 
decisions are made on a vague notion of profit and executive commitment which is 
then rationalised with whichever criteria supports it.
Fixed hurdle rates may also be used to achieve this. Thirty-one companies claimed to 
have used fixed hurdle rates in the specific cases discussed Although most of these 
had some degree of flexibility, one operating unit felt it was subject to implicit hurdle 
rates even if they were not explicit.5
This use of fixed hurdle rates implies that companies had a clear idea of what their 
targets were and had quantified this. These hurdle rates however were in many cases 
old and had not been changed recently to take account of lower inflation and interest 
rates or changes in the industry in which the organisation operated in This is in line 
with Wardlaw’s research( 1994:254) which found that ‘many firms continued to seek 
rates of return which partly reflected past higher and more variable inflation and 
interest rates’ This leaves the possibility that companies only have a vague notion of 
profitability All proposals which pass the very high historic hurdle rates proceed
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2) All companies claimed that strategic criteria limited the industries within which they 
would acquire. Some companies claimed to have criteria which limited the countries 
in which they acquired. There was, however, a degree of variation in how tightly these 
strategic criteria were defined. A company's strategy may in some cases be stretched 
by brokers to fit what they have to offer Some managers, however, felt that the 
strategy they were subject to was narrower than Board statements by their chairman 
would imply6. The explicit strategy perhaps being broader than the implicit one 
underlying it The explicit strategy is, though, the one which external brokers see and 
therefore acquisitions which are the result of external ideas may be subject to more 
relaxed strategic limitations than internally generated ones Internal managers also may 
have little time to search for acquisitions, thus they may only be able to consider 
companies they come into contact with through normal trading. The situation 
therefore, for acquisitions resulting from internal ideas from non-board members, 
seems to have clearly changed from the situation Birley (1974) found. External ideas 
may be subject to less rigorous analysis if the approach is direct to the chairman and 
his commitment gained.
3) Companies claimed to spend an average of 130 man weeks work on analysis before 
making a decision to acquire; of this, 31 per cent, on average, was devoted to financial
work
This evidence suggests that Birley's model (1976) is not typical of companies in the 
sample covered in this research. It did, however, reflect the behaviour in one 
acquisition which was seen as a failure 7 This resulted from excessive commitment to 
the project by the chairman prior to detailed work having been conducted The main 
area where Birley's model breaks down as reflecting the data is that all companies
Which leaves all ‘marginal’ projects subject to vagueness of criteria and executive
commitment
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2) All companies claimed that strategic criteria limited the industries within which they 
would acquire. Some companies claimed to have criteria which limited the countries 
in which they acquired. There was, however, a degree of variation in how tightly these 
strategic criteria were defined. A company's strategy may in some cases be stretched 
by brokers to fit what they have to offer. Some managers, however, felt that the 
strategy they were subject to was narrower than Board statements by their chairman 
would imply6. The explicit strategy perhaps being broader than the implicit one 
underlying it The explicit strategy is, though, the one which external brokers see and 
therefore acquisitions which are the result of external ideas may be subject to more 
relaxed strategic limitations than internally generated ones Internal managers also may 
have little time to search for acquisitions, thus they may only be able to consider 
companies they come into contact with through normal trading. The situation 
therefore, for acquisitions resulting from internal ideas from non-board members, 
seems to have clearly changed from the situation Birley (1974) found. External ideas 
may be subject to less rigorous analysis if the approach is direct to the chairman and 
his commitment gained.
3) Companies claimed to spend an average of 130 man weeks work on analysis before 
making a decision to acquire, of this, 3 1 per cent, on average, was devoted to financial
work.
This evidence suggests that Birley's model (1976) is not typical of companies in the 
sample covered in this research. It did, however, reflect the behaviour in one 
acquisition which was seen as a failure 7 This resulted from excessive commitment to 
the project by the chairman prior to detailed work having been conducted. The main 
area where Birley's model breaks down as reflecting the data is that all companies
Which leaves all ‘marginal’ projects subject to vagueness of criteria and executive
commitment
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conducted detailed financial analysis. It is however possible that the flexibility 
indicated in fixed hurdle rates, and their historic nature in some companies indicates 
that these are used to reject all but exceptional projects which do not have senior 
executive commitment.
This review has suggested that the model based on Birley (1974, 1976) may not reflect 
the general reality of the acquisitions process in large companies in the early 1990's 
However, it does model one case which ended in failure. It is possible that, the model 
based on Birley (1974,1976) represents either the method by which companies which 
declined to be interviewed used, considering that their process was 'unprofessional' 
and not wishing to let it be seen, or which smaller companies operate. This will be 
discussed in the limitations section further.
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1.11 Kitching's Model
In contrast to Birley's (1974, 1976) model, Kitching's (1972, 1973, 1974) model views 
the process as very structured with a series of filters, as shown in figure 1 7
Kitching's (1973) model is difficult to refute as: A) All companies used some screening 
questions and reviewed their acquisitions against corporate strategy, B) all companies 
had a method for setting maximum price, whether it was a multiple of current profits, 
DCF or the cost of achieving the same by organic means.
A) Filters Used.
There was evidence of a wide degree in variation in the use of industry filters from
'The first thing is to establish the nature of the business. Is this the sort of thing 
that the group has the management to control? In our case that does include a 
very broad range of basic industries.' 
to:
'We are not a business that is interested in diversification....We consequently
typically acquire businesses similar to our own.' 'There would be 2 [criteria] 1) 
is it a competitor and is that enabling us to remove a competitor and 2) are the 
sites in locations which would complement our existing portfolio of sites If 
they are all adjacent to our existing sites the target would be less attractive '
That is, in some cases companies may be imposing very limited filtering by industry 
There was however greater variation in the other commonly used filter - geography 
Twenty companies imposed geographic filters and 25 stated they did not or considered 
themselves to be a global company: The limits to these filters, however, varied
'Acquisitions will be considered in any geographic area, however there is a 
strong preference for the UK, the USA and Northern Europe in that order'
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and another company
'the chairman has got his list of six countries we are looking at, at the moment, 
and those are the ones which I keep talking about, China, Vietnam, Mexico, 
the Far East and so on.'
No evidence though, was found for the series of filters proposed by Kitching (1973) 
(review against corporate strategy, review against objectives, and coarse screen 
questions) Most companies said they used 2 filters, industry and geographic area A 
few suggested others, including size and technology but these were relatively rare.
The use of only 2 filters prior to detailed financial analysis could be because only 1 
company was conglomerate in nature and many of the ideas were internally generated 
Many internal acquisition ideas which do not fit the objectives and general screening 
criteria may never progress to the stage where they are enunciated, let alone written 
down Secondly, ideas which are generated internally are more likely to be developed 
from the area bounded by the organisations competitive contacts. It is impossible to 
establish this with the research method used. This is clearly a limitation. However, to 
develop detailed transcriptions of how people thought they processed initial ideas 
would require very high levels of access to companies and individuals close to the 
event
Companies may therefore not require the early filters proposed by Kitching (1973) 
because the area which the organisation is drawing ideas from includes only 
companies which satisfy the filtering requirements
External ideas may be subjected to a more detailed filter process but interviewees did 
not enunciate these. Company Alpha, in illustration 7.1, used only the limits in their 
strategic plan before progressing on to a financial analysis
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B) Price Setting Method.
All companies described in detail how they set a maximum price Forty-one companies 
used discounted cash flow measures, however, 10 said they did not use discounted 
cash flow measures. Nine of these companies said that they used earnings per share, 
specifically the maximum price being the point at which the acquisition is earnings 
neutral The other company used the cost of achieving the same results by purchasing 
sites and other physical assets - ‘We would try to appreciate what those sites would 
cost’.
Kuching's (1972, 1973, 1974) model does not seem to mirror behaviour in detail at 
any of the companies surveyed. Companies did, however, use 2 filters on the ideas 
before analysing them in detail. It might, however, have reflected the prevailing 'long 
range planning' paradigm of the late sixties and early seventies 
There is, however, insufficient evidence to refute this model
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Figure 1.7 Developing Systematic Procedures for
Risk Reduction in Acquisitions
Steps in
Buying Company
6
Wh\ ■ don't we buy X
Could make sense 
Look more closelv.
Do we approach Co ? 
Price bracket ?
Impact on our growth ?
What data can we find ?
To determine negotiating 
strategy ?
To determine maximum price ?
Now we own i t ,
What do we do with it ?
Procedures for 
Reducing Risk
Narrowing f ield
Exact specifications of company ? 
What docs seller want ?
 ^What does our company want ?
Review against 
Corporate Strategy
700 Rejects
Review against objectives i200 Rejects
Coarse screen questions
Pre-negotiation checklist 
Methods for setting 
- Maximum price 
Price 'nackaac' outline
Factors in agreeing 
purchase price and terms 
Forecasts required 
’re-acquisition checklist
y -
rc
50 Rejects
30 Rejects
10 Rejects
Offer to purchase7 6 Failed Negotiations
Kitching, 1973: 154, Chart V1II-J
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11.12 llasncslagh and .Icmiswn's .Model
Haspeslagh and Jcmison's (1991) model of what they perceive as being current 
practice should reflect reality, as that was its aim, and it is a recent model It, like 
Kitching's (1973) model, is difficult to refute particularly as only 3 stages are relevant 
to this research, search and screening, strategic evaluation, and financial evaluation
Clear evidence exists for the first phase, search and screening All companies looked 
for acquisitions whether actively searching or just monitoring their competitive 
environment Clear evidence exists that companies conducted financial evaluations 
However, this researcher did not find evidence to suggest that companies conducted a 
separate strategic evaluation
This may be because this researcher used a 2 step model to structure this thesis. The 
data could have been subconsciously pushed into this even if it did not fit The model, 
however, was developed after the interview schedule and questions. It, therefore, 
should not have affected the data collected. This researcher can only state that he did 
not deliberately attempt to bias the analysis.
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Figure 1,4 Hasneslagh anti Jcinisoii's (1991)
Conventional View of Acquisitions
(Strategic Objectives )
(Search and Screening)
(Strategic Evaluation )
(Financial Evaluation )
(  Negotiation )
(  Agreement )
(  Integration )
Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991: 13
This section has so far compared the data collected by the researcher to a series of 
models ( Birley, 1974, 176, Kitching, 1972, 1973, 1974, Haspeslagh and Jemison, 
1991) It has concluded that the data does not support the models presented in chapter 
1 although one case fits Birley's model and it is impossible to refute the others.
The researcher will now review the method and examine the limitations this places on 
this research
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11.13 Methodology and Limitations
This section will be divided into two basic parts The first will examine the general 
tradition into which this research falls, second it will examine the more specific facets 
of the method used and the limits this places on the research findings.
Conceptual Position
Inherent in this thesis is the assumption that the decision episode is a relevant unit of 
analysis This approach has been challenged most notably by Pettigrew (1990A, 
1990B, 1990C) and Mintzberg and Waters(1990).
Mintzberg and Waters(1990 1) suggest that it makes ‘more sense for us to study 
streams of actions and then go back and investigate the role of decisions in 
determining these actions.’ This position is based on the view that decisions do not 
necessarily lead to actions and for an action to occur there does not have to have been 
a decision.
Mintzberg and Waters (1990) arguments suggesting that research should concentrate 
on actions and trace back events through various decisions, quasi-decisions and 
streams of actions, were to some degree followed in this research except that the 
central action was the final decision rather than the physical process of taking control 
The final decision in an acquisition was only a rubber stamping exercise in the one case 
where the chairman had committed himself to the acquisition In other cases funds may 
have been approved, and logically incremental decisions may have created an 
escalating commitment, but someone had to approve the bid, or agree the price in 
negotiations. The importance of the decision was partly due to the small number of 
people involved which limited search activity but by involving fewer people there is 
less momentum and political power groups behind any given route In a bidding war 
there may have been temptation to raise bids but this is still a decision The specific 
aim of the research was to examine one type of event- an acquisition where it is
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unlikely the specific action will occur without a decision, or that a decision to acquire 
which does not result in an acquisition will require a second decision to stop the 
process or it is inherent in the first decision - a limit on price The decision to acquire 
is unlikely to be ignored
The second major challenge to the decision event view has come from Pettigrew 
(1990A, 1990B, 1990C) he proposes that research should focus on a stream of 
changes to allow the decision to be placed in the context of a long stream of actions 
An approach which would have allowed an acquisition decision to be placed in 
longitudinal context collected over real time would have precluded collecting data 
from more than a few sites. The researcher chose to collect data from a large number 
of sites to allow statistical work to be conducted. An approach based on Pettigrew’s 
(1990A, 1990B, 1990C) methodological view would, however, provide valid insights 
into the process, particularly whether specific events occurred as decision makers have 
described them
This conceptual position raises the question of the researcher imposing the decision 
analysis and information processing framework on the data It to some degree is 
implicit even in the open ended questions. It is therefore difficult to claim that the 
analysis was not influenced by this. No evidence was found of a fundamentally 
different approach being taken by the companies. This, however, is the researcher’s 
interpretation of the data. This leaves a number of issues surrounding the specific 
methodology used and the limitations it places on the research
Methodological Position
This research used an interview approach to collect data 52 senior executives at 48 
companies were interviewed during 1994 and 1995 using a standardised interview 
schedule Success was measured using a subjective scale based on Datta and Grant
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This method contrasts with that used in the capital markets literature in that it collects 
data from within the organisations which may not have been publicly available (c.f. 
Franks, Harris and Titman, 1991). The cost of this is that it restricts the use of market 
based success measures and limits the sample size.
The structured interview method used, however, allowed a far greater number of cases 
to be collected than unstructured methods.( c.f. Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991) The 
structured nature o f the interview schedule and the structured subjective success 
measure (c.f Kitching, 1972, 1973, 1974) allowed both detailed hypotheses to be 
explored, without removing the possibility of collecting qualitative data, and data 
which did not fit with the hypotheses to be developed.
The nature of the data collected did restrict the type of statistical tests which could be 
conducted This researcher, however, thought that developing scales on many 
variables where either the interviewees recollection of events was not very detailed, or 
behaviour was inconsistent, or maybe, open to various interpretations, would have 
produced spurious results, although some might have been interesting. The method 
used represented a balance between the external and questionnaire approaches. The 
latter would have yielded a greater sample size but with less depth of data, while a 
longitudinal or unstructured interviewing or multiple interview approach would have 
yielded greater depth on fewer cases.
The researcher will now highlight a number of factors which may limit the 
effectiveness of the data collection and analysis methods used How these could 
potentially affect the findings of this research will then be discussed
(1990) Other data was collected from the Fame and One-source databases, Extel
cards and corporate reports
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Limitations of the research method used include:
1 ) The sensitivity of the subject matter made triangulation through the collection of 
documents impossible. This researcher therefore had to accept what interviewees said 
at face value. Multiple questions covering the same topic area were used to check 
consistency and for unusual features of the specific case discussed.
2) Reliance on interviews as a data collection method leaves the possibility that the 
researcher’s expectations and conceptual framework may influence the interviewing 
approach
3) Highly detailed descriptions of the process were not possible using this method 
This limited the analysis of the search phase.
4) Memory - respondents have limited memories and long gaps between the 
acquisition and the interview may result in loss of data. Events may become viewed 
through ‘rose tinted spectacles’, and certain less palateable events forgotten.
5) Reliance on one interview may result in missing data. That is if respondents are not 
asked specific questions they may not volunteer information. Secondly, respondents 
may have answered questions with the objective of minimising interview time and 
therefore may not have volunteered relevant information.
6) Interviewees may have given answers they believed the interviewer wanted to hear
7) The use of only 1 interviewee per company limits the data to reflecting what the 
interviewee knew of the acquisition
8) Biases in the sample selection in terms o f industry and size were examined in 
chapter 6. There is, however, a problem that the companies which were using what 
they saw as ‘ unprofessional’ methods may have declined to be interviewed That is, 
the sample may have included a disproportionately large number of companies using 
discounted cash flow analysis
9) The small size of the sample reduced the power of some statistical tests It also 
prevented wider sensitivity analysis for chi-squared tests for some variables.
10) The success measure used was subjective.
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These limitations affect how the research should be interpreted The reliance on one 
post event interview per company makes it impossible to determine whether 
interviewees are giving inaccurate information concerning the acquisition, either 
deliberately or as a result of having to recall events that happened up to 4 or 5 years 
ago The researcher is unsure whether he would have been able to obtain multiple 
interviews from companies on one acquisition and even if there was more than one 
respondent at each company who could answer many of the questions put to the 
interviewees The data is, therefore, in most cases, the view of the person most closely 
involved with the acquisition. This is a double edged sword It implies that the 
respondent should be able to give the most accurate reflection of events available. It 
equally implies that the respondent is the person most associated with the acquisition 
and may wish to show it in a favourable light.
The industry and size biases in the sample could have been corrected if they had been 
spotted earlier. The use of the 2-digit code for the companies is clearly problematic 
They fail to capture the diversity of the industries individual companies operated in. 
However, to use more than one code per company would have made any analysis 
difficult particularly given the small sample size It is difficult to propose a consistent 
test for a bias to 'more professional’ companies given only external information is 
available on the companies which declined to be interviewed
This researcher concluded that the method used was the most suitable to the problem 
given the state of the literature and the sensitivity of the issue. The one area where the 
method used could be improved was the sample selection, where the researcher could 
have stratified the sample to reflect the sample frame as a whole. The sample, 
however, would then not have been random
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1 lie method used, however, clearly has other limitations as set out above It is difficult 
to see how these could be corrected within the resources available for this research 
The author will now present what he sees as fruitful avenues for future research
11-14 Directions for Future Research.
This research has utilised the interview method to produce a combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative data This has allowed some hypotheses to be accepted, 
some rejected and others explored inconclusively It, however, has left a number of 
unanswered questions, and in those areas where significant results were found, there is 
a need to further test these hypotheses
The conclusions concerning experience and the source of an acquisition idea would 
benefit from a large-scale questionnaire approach to test them further This could use 
both the subjective scale used in this research and a capital market measure on those 
cases where the company declares the date of the acquisition and sufficiently robust 
data can be established. This would allow the development of theory along the lines 
that the capital markets literature has developed for external variables.
The lack of superior performance by companies using discounted cash-flow analysis 
would also benefit from the confirmation that a larger scale approach would allow 
The use of a variety of success measures would also add to the value of this approach
The analysis of the process of conducting and using the results of DCF techniques 
would benefit from being subjected to in-depth study utilising ethnographic technique, 
and longitudinal methods with post event interviews used to establish how participants 
viewed the process. An opportunity to conduct these types of research is unlikely
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outside a company which is already allowing itself to be studied on a longitudinal 
basis
A matched pair observation approach could allow the effects of managerial experience 
to be examined This would require access to 2 managers conducting acquisitions, 1 
experienced the other not, in different parts of the same organisation or 2 similar 
organisations This would allow detailed comparison of the process This researcher 
suspects it is from easier access to information, both that stored in the memory and 
available through contacts, which allows the rapid development of initial models and 
assumptions. With time being limited this allows attention to be focused earlier on 
specific issues which seem important.
This researcher considers that participant observation is unlikely to give sufficiently 
unbiased data to allow issues such as whether DCF was ignored, whether fixed hurdle 
rates were really applied and how consultants influenced the process to be explored.
How experienced managers make decisions could also be explored in an experimental 
setting. This researcher, however, considers that it would be difficult to obtain 
experienced managers to participate. One potential way round this is to use MBA 
students who are currently practising managers as the inexperienced managers, and to 
use recently retired managers as the experienced managers. The complication of 
differing education level though would have to be tackled Tasks set should closely 
mirror real situations, possibly using prospectuses for recently floated companies 
Limiting where subjects can collect information and having a correct answer though 
would reduce the relevance of this method to developing useful insights into the 
difference between how experienced and less experienced managers operate and, in 
particular, develop cash-flow forecasts.
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In summary, this researcher considers that a variety of methods can aid the 
development of knowledge about the processes involved in acquisitions
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1 1 14 Main Conclusions 
The main findings of this researcli are that
•  Acquisitions resulting from ideas from outside the company are less successful than 
internal ideas
•  Companies which limit the geographic area covered in looking for an acquisition are 
more successful than those that did not
•  No relationship between the levels of information collection and success was found
•  Birley’s (1974,1976), Kitching’s (1972,1973) and Haspeslagh and Jemison’s (1991) 
models do not reflect the acquisition process found by this research in most cases
•  The use of DCF does not increase success levels
•  Individual experience of the company and industry are positively correlated with
success.
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Footnotes
1 This measure asked the respondent to state their 3 key criteria for the specific acquisition discussed, 
rank their importance on a scale from 1 to 10 and rate how successful the acquisition had been on 
those criteria, on a scale from 1 to 5 
:Sales for last two set of accounts.
1 Details of this ease is given in illustration 7.2
4 NPV, IRR, EPS, ARR and Payback.
5 'Officially no, is perhaps what 1 should say to that But 1 think there are perceived hurdle rates that 
we as a subsidiary feel we arc working against, and we tend to filter out projects that don't meet those 
rates.'
6See section 7.1.2 Company L.
Details of this case is given in illustration 7.2.
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A I ’ I ’ T . N D I X  A INTERV IKW S( :HEDUEK
Thank you for allowing me lo interview you.
I would first like to briefly explain my area of research and the structure I would 
like to follow in this interview.
The main aim of this research is to examine how companies acquire and whether 
the management process effects success. That is the management procedures and 
processes before a decision is made on whether to acquire or dispose of a business. 
To help me carry this out I would first like to ask you a series of general questions 
about how Company Z carries out acquisitions and disposals. This will be followed 
at the end by a series of questions which 1 would like you lo answer referring to 
specific acquisitions. You may chose to not to name these.
General Data 
Information Collection
I would first like to ask you about information collection prior to considering 
acquiring another company.
I) Does Company Z monitor product market variables for markets it is present in 
(l or example market share, market size) ?
A) Yes
B) No
2) Are these product market variables monitored '!
A) Continuously ?
II) As Events Demand ?
< ) Regularly But Not Continuously ?
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3) I low is this product market data processed ?
Is it collected together at all ?
Is it filtered and summarized ?
//•• NO C O  TO QUESTION 5
d) At what level is this data collected together 1 [For example Unit, Region, Division]
5) Is this market data ?
A) Available To You On Request ?
15) Automatically Scut To You ?
(') Not Generally Available ?
I)) Non Of These ?
38d
(>) Does Company /  monitor market variables for its current product range outside 
tlie geographic markets it is present in ?
A) Yes
It) No
7) For geographic markets Company Z is present in do you monitor product 
markets that you currently do not compete in ?
A) Yes
It) No
I f  no to both 6 and 7 move to I I
8) Is this monitoring of markets you are not currently present in done 7
A) Continuously ?
It) As Events Demand ?
( ') Regularly Itut Not Continuously ?
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9) Is this information on markets you are currently not present in collected together at
all?
A) Yes
B) No
10) Is this information on markets you are not currently present in ?
A) Available To You On Request ?
B) Automatically Sent To You ?
C) Not Generally Available ?
D) None Of These ?
I 1) Does Company Z have its own corporate information library ?
A) Yes
B) No
Prompt - Collecting company accounts and general financial data and general 
data that may be o f  use
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12) I las Company Z arranged access to any external corporate information libraries ?
A) Vcs
1$) No
13) Has Company Z commissioned external consultants to carry out information 
searches for acquisitions ?
A) Yes
B) No
392
Management Resources
I would now like to ask you a few questions about the provision and location of 
management resources available for the review of acquisitions or divestments and 
established procedures
14) If Company Z was reviewing a potential acquisition where within the company 
structure would this analysis be conducted ?
Prom pts - in business units, division , Headquarters
- does this vary with size and over the process
15) Does Company Z employ anyone whose primary role is to review acquisitions ?
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B) Does Company Z employ anyone for whom it is an important part of their job but 
not their main role ?
A) Yes
1$) No
I f  no to both 15 and 1511 go to lb
16) At what level within the organisation is the most senior person whose main 
responsibility is acquisitions ?
prom pt - an d  below  him o r  her .[Exploring divisional structure]
17) How many stall'are currently mainly working on acquisitions within Company Z 
Europe 9
B)I ixcluding legal stall'
Ci) Within the entire company 9
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18) Docs Company Z ever use external consultants including merchant banks to
review proposed acquisitions ?
A) Yes
B) No
I f no go to 21
19) What type of consultants have you used ?
Prom pt- Fur exam ple Merchant hank, Accounting firm s, stra teg ic  consultants, 
specialists, e tc
20) Where an external consultant has been used have they ever 
A) Acted as the sole analysts ?
A) Yes
B) No
B) Acted in consultation with other external consultants ? 
A) Yes
B) No
C) Has an external consultant ever been used in parallel with another external 
consultant ?
A) Yes
B) No
I)) I las an external consultant ever been used in parallel to an internal review ? 
A) Yes
B) No
K) I las an external consultant ever been used as part of an internal review ?
A) Yes
B) No
0  1 las an external consultant ever been used in any other ways ? 
A) Yes
B) No
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If no to f  go to 21
h) Could you explain how they were used in these cases ?
21) For those acquisitions examined internally does Company Z examine all 
acquisitions ?
A) Completely individually using no established 
procedures .
B) Using some standardised techniques .
C) In a totally routine manner.
D) In another way not adequately covered by the 
previous options.
i f  B)
How much of the process would be standardised in terms of management time ?
?
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22) What criteria would be used to review an acquisition ?
23) Are these criteria standard or do they vary between acquisitions ?
i f  they do not vary go to 25
24) Would these criteria be established.
A ) Before a review is started
B) Or as the analysis takes place?
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25) Is the way these eriteria are applied and measured
A) Standardised For All Acquisitions.
B) Varies From Case To Case.
C) Standardised But Exceptions Are Made.
D) Usually Applied In The Same Way.
26) Does Company Z have fixed hurdle rates for any of these criteria ?
A) Yes
B) No
I f  N O  go to 28
27) Which criteria are subject to fixed hurdle rates ?
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28) What percentage of the time available to review an acquisition would be spent on
A) Routine Financial Considerations
Prompt - Approxim ately
15) Non-Routine Considerations
C) Information Collection
Prompt - These may not add up to 100
29) Does Company Z currently have an acquisition strategy ?
A) Yes
It) No
Prompt - in  term s o f  what sectors and geographic regions you  are in terested  in 
carrying o u t acquisitions
400

3 1 ) Could you please fill in the following question -
A) ( •ould you rate the performance of XXXx's acquisition programme over the last 
three years for the following variables ?
( I being very poor performance)
Return on Investment 1 2 3 4 5 Don't know
Effect on 1 
Earnings per share
2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't
Know
Effect on group 1 
Share Price
2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't
Know
Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 Don't Know
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 Don’t Know
B)Could you assign a number out of 10 for each factor based on how important you 
think each is in determining the success of an acquisition programme ?
Return on Investment I 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Effect on Earnings per Share 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10
Effect on group Share Price 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cash f low 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sales Growth 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
402
Case
’Hie aim of the following section is to develop descriptions of the processes before 
negotiations for a specific acquisition.
To achieve this could you please answer the following questions by referring to a 
specific acquisition rather than what is normal
If you feel able to name the acquisition could you do so at the end so you can be sure 
you are happy with this
32) What were the sales of this company prior to you considering it for acquisition 7 
For Company Z 
Less than 140 Million Dollars 
140 Million to 350 million Dollars 
350 Million to 700 Million Dollars 
Greater than 700 Million Dollars
Prom pt -  this is not aimed at isolating who the acquisition was but various 
authors have claimed that relative size is an important variable in determining  
acquisition success.
33) How successful would you describe the process of reviewing this company as an 
acquisition target7
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34) Was this suggestion associated with any particular group ?
35) Where did the stimulus to examine this company come from ?
36) Were any external advisers involved in the proposal of the target company ?
37) Did the proposal concerning the target company emerge from the acquisition 
strategy ?
[Had this target been considered before]
38)Who [What function] received this suggestion ?
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39) Could you describe any elements of the process which led to this company 
being considered as an acquisition candidate which you feel have not been covered
?
40) Were you involved in the negotiation process ?
41) Was the review of this acquisition split up between various people ?
YES
42) Was anyone in overall control of the project for the entire period ?
YES
NO
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43) How many different separate groups were involved during the acquisition ? 
(Prom pt include lawyers an d  those who proposed  the acqu isition  originally i f  they 
worked independently )
44) Who evaluated this proposed acquisition candidate ?
/  I f  not person being interviewed -  ask is it possible to talk to this person and Skip
to question 4Hj
The following two questions are concerned with your experience of acquisitions the 
company and the sector. They are not aimed at collecting personnel data but to 
examine if experience of industry , company or acquisitions is important in examining 
acquisitions.
45) How many acquisitions reviews had you done prior to this acquisition ?
(Approximately)
B) Does this include acquisitions which were not completed
46) How long had you been with the company at this point ?
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47) Mow long had you (the manager in charge of the project) been employed in the 
food industry at this point ?
This following section is concerned with information collection.
48) In the process of examining this company as an acquisition target how many 
people were consulted for information7
49) What information sources were used in the process of examining this company as 
an acquisition target. 
prom pts  - in ternal data
- News papers
- What about information services such as Textline, fame
- Internal library (if relevant)
50 ) So approximately how many different sources in total ?
51) Could you describe any elements of the data collection process for this 
acquisition which you feel are important that have not been covered by the previous 
questions ?
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52) What criteria were used to examine this acquisition ?
53) Which of these criteria were the three most important 9
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Could you please fill in the following questions -
54) Could you assign weights out of 10 to each criteria based on how important you
think they were ?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 23 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
55) Could you rate on a scale from 
criteria ? ( 1 being very poor)
1 to 5 how the acquisition has performed on these
A) 1 2 3 4 5
B) 1 2 3 4 5
C) 1 2 3 4 5
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56) How was this acquisition evaluated against these criteria ?
Prompts - Were these based on projections ?
- How were these projections developed ?
- Were the projections changed as more information became available ?
- So was this an iterative process
- Did you include the value of plant and equipment in these valuations ?
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- If yes was the plant visited ?
- Was market growth included in the process of analysing this acquisition ?
- How was this achieved ?
- Was advertising considered.
57) Did this process involve any internal political factors ?
I f  No go l<> 59
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58) How did these effect the process ?
59) Could you describe any element of the process of examining this acquisition which 
has not been covered here ?
60) How long did this process take ?
(Prompt so the total man weeks taken were ?)
B) Approximately how many man weeks were involved ?
Prompts - Approximately 
-  1 0 ?
- 25 ?
- 50 ?
- more ?
61)1 low long was the report that resulted from this analysis ?
62) How many alternatives were considered in the final report ?
prom pt - buy not buy 
- buy 50%,
- Joint venture,
- buy another company,
- build your own plant ?
Where these considered at the same time as the acquisition ?
63) How many tables or graphs with quantitative data were included in the report that 
was presented 7
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04) Could you please fill in the following question -
A) Could you rate the performance of the acquisition for the following variables 9 
(1 being very poor performance)
Return on 1 2 3 4 5 Don't know
Investment
Effect on Earnings 1 2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't Know
per share
Effect on group 1 2 3 4 5 Negligible Don't
Share Price Know
Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 Don't Know
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 Don't
Know
BJCould you assign a number out of 10 for each factor based <on how important you
think each is in determining the success of the acquisition ?
Return on Investment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
E-flect on Earnings per Share 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Effect on group Share Price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Cash Flow 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Sales Growth 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Thank You
414
Thank You
Have you any questions you would like to ask 9
Thank you for your co-operation and time.
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APPENDIX B TABLES COMPARING SAMPLE KRAME. 
SAMPLE AND THOSE COMPANIES 
INTERVIEWED ON SALES AND PROFITS
Table B 1 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Last Set for Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked 119 2887.680 6960.015
Not Asked 152 2169.808 3137 488 717 872
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 2.217 P= .138 
T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.13 269 .258
Unequal 1.05 155 46 .259
Table B 2 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
119 2720.430 6875.967
Not asked 152 2064 778 3098 948 655 652
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.871 P= .173 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1 05 269 .296
Unequal 97 155 44 .335
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Table B.3 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and
Those Not for Anti-Penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
118 2496.397 6127.510
Not asked 151 1942.127 2919.824 554 269
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.653 P= .200 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal .98 267 .329
Unequal .91 158.32 .367
Table B 4 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Last Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
119 244.261 705.078
Not asked 152 174.435 414.598 69.825
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.877 P= .200 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.02 269 .310
Unequal 96 180.21 .339
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lest of Equality of Variance
Table B 5 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview
and Those Not for Penultimate Set of Accounts
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
1 19 222 038 650 078
Not asked 152 145.973 334 041 76 064
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 3 181 P= 076 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1 25 269 .213
Unequal 1.16 166.22 .247
Table B 6 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
118 201.079 598 813
Not asked 152 120.517 350.439 80.562
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 2.900 P 090 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1 38 268 168
Unequal 1 30 177.75 .196
Table H 7 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked I'oi An Interview and
Those Not for Last Set Tor Accounts With Largest Company
Excluded
Test of Iiquality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked 118 2387 350 4336 995
Not Asked 152 2169 808 3137 488 217 522
Levenc's 'Test for Equality of Variances F= .052 I’ 820
'T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 48 268 633
Unequal 46 205.14 646
f able B.8 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and 
Those Not for Penultimate Set of Accounts With Largest Company 
Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
118 2206 620 3999 804
Not asked 152 2064 778 3098 948 141 842
Levene's'Test for Equality of Variances l; 001 P= .976 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 33 268 743
Unequal 32 215 24 751
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Table B 9 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and
Those Not for Anti-Penultimate Set of Accounts with Largest
Company Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
117 2047 478 3726 211
Not asked 151 1942 127 2919 824 105.350
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances F= 005 P= 941 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal .26 266 795
Unequal .25 215 801
Table B.10 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Last Set of Accounts With Largest Company 
Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
118 190.170 387 599
Not asked 152 174 435 414 598 15.734
I.evene's Test for Equality of Variances: Fr 000 P= 998 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal .32 268 751
Unequal .32 258 89 749
Table B I 1 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview
and Those Not for Penultimate Set of Accounts With Lamest
Company Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
118 174 877 399.698
Not asked 152 145.973 334 041 28.903
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .279 P= .598 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal .65 267 .518
Unequal .63 243.84 .528
Table B 12 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts With Lamest 
Company Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
117 157.387 366.701
Not asked 152 120.517 350.439 36 870
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .2900 P= 591 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 84 267 403
Unequal 83 243.804 405
Fable B. 13 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and
Those Not For Last Set For Accounts With Largest Two Companies
Excluded
Test o f Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked 118 2169.589 3650 883
Not Asked 152 2169.808 3137 488 - 218
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .454 P= 501 
T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 00 267 1 000
Unequal 00 228.62 1 000
Table B 14 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and 
Those Not for Penultimate Set of Accounts With Largest Two 
Companies Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
117 2014.369 3425.991
Not asked 152 2064.778 3098 948 -50 408
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .786 P 382
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal - 13 267 900
Unequal - 12 236 16 901
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l est of Equality of Variance
Table B 15 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview and
Those Not Tor Anti-Penultimate Set of Accounts witli Largest Two
Companies excluded
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
116 1865 447 3177.243
Not asked 151 1942 127 2919 824 -76 680
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F :: 854 P= 356 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal -20 265 838
Unequal -20 235.35 840
Table B 16 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Last Set of Accounts With Largest Company 
Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
117 175 188 353 293
Not asked 152 174 435 414 598 753
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: I- 274 P= 601 
T-tcst for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 02 267 987
Unequal 02 264 21 987
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Table IT] 7 Comparison of Pre- Tax Profits between Those Asked Tor An Interview
and Those Not Tor Penultimate Set of Accounts With Largest
Coinpanv Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
117 159 030 362 280
Not asked 152 145.973 334 041 13 056
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .009 P= .926 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal .31 267 760
Unequal 30 238 90 762
Table B. 18 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Asked for An Interview 
and Those Not for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts With Largest 
Two Company Excluded
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Mean:; In 
Million Pounds
Asked for 
Interview
116 143.296 334.969
Not asked 152 120.517 350 439 22 779
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances F= 00 P= .991 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 54 266 591
Unequal 54 252 94 589
Table B. 19 Comparison of Sales between Those Asked for An Interview
and Those Not for Last Set for Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in Million 
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 46 4757.879 10471 681
Not
Interviewed
225 2020.366 3000 159 2737.513
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 20.971 P= 000 
T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 3 33 269 .001
Unequal 1.76 46.52 .085
Table B 20 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed
and Those Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Not
Interviewed
46 4505.187 10291.571
Not
Interviewed
225 1912.617 2944.209 2592.570
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.080 P= 000 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 3.19 269 .002
Unequal 1 68 4649 100
Table B 21 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed and Those Not
Interviewed for Anti-Penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 
for Interview
46 4110.2123 9203.250
Not
Interviewed
223 1788.190 2746.809 2322.022
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.145 P= 000 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 3.16 267 .002
Unequal 1.70 46.67 .097
Table B.22 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Interviewed and 
Those Not Interviewed for Last Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 46 417.206 1050 447
Not
Interviewed
225 161.732 382.634 255.473
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 13.783 P= 00
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2 85 269 005
Unequal 1.63 47.47 .110
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Table B 23 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Interviewed and Those
Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 46 381 000 967.859
Not
Interviewed
225 138 153 318.703 242 847
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 19.527 P= .000 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 3.06 269 .002
Unequal 1.68 47.01 .099
Table B.24 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Interviewed and Those Not 
Interviewed for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 46 333.290 890.882
Not
Interviewed
224 119.261 324.384 214.028
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 16 816 P= .000
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2 81 268 005
Unequal 1.61 47 48 .115
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Table 13 25 Comparison of Sales Between Those Asked for An Interview
and Those Not for Last of Set of Accounts With Lamest
Company Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in Million 
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 45 3487 410 6017.690
Not
Interviewed
225 2020.366 3000 159 1467 043
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 6.590 P= 011 
T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2.45 268 .015
Unequal 1.60 48 46 117
Table B.26 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed and Those 
Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts With 
Largest Company Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Not
Interviewed
45 3195.25 5476.6505
Not
Interviewed
225 1912.617 2944.209 1284.908
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 4 983 P= .026 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2 26 268 025
Unequal 1.53 49.20 132
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Table B 27 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed and Those Not
Interviewed for Anti-Penultimate Set of Accounts With Lamest
Company Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 
for Interview
45 2978.884 5139.175
Not
Interviewed
223 1788.190 2746 809 1190.694
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 5.011 P= 026 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2.23 268 027
Unequal 1.51 49.19 .137
Table B 28 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Interviewed and
Those Not Interviewed for Last Set of Accounts Largest Company 
Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 45 279.210 482 331
Not
Interviewed
225 161.732 382 634 117 478
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 2.316 P= .129 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.80 268 .074
Unequal 1.54 55.60 .129
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Table B 29 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Interviewed and
Those Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts With
Largest Company Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 45 260 867 528 281
Not
Interviewed
225 138 153 318.703 122.714
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 6 537 P= .011 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 2.08 268 039
Unequal 1.50 50.9 139
Table B .30 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Interviewed and Those Not 
Interviewed for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts With Largest 
Company Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 45 222 630 485 392
Not
Interviewed
224 119.261 324 384 103.368
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F  ^ 4 355 P 038 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.78 2687 077
Unequal 1 37 52 17 177
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Table B 3 1 Comparison of Sales Between Those Asked for An Interview
and Those Not for Last of Set of Accounts With Laruest
Two Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in Million 
Pounds
Standard
Deviation
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 44 2933.419 4787.777
Not
Interviewed
225 2020.366 3000.159 913.053
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1.202 P= .274
T-Test for Equality Of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1 65 267 .100
Unequal 1.22 49.80 .229
Table B.32 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed
and Those Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts With 
Laruest Two Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in
Million
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Not
Interviewed
44 2708 832 4437.652
Not
Interviewed
225 1912.617 2944.209 796.215
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .858 P= .355
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1 49 267 136
Unequal 1.14 50 65 .259
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Table B 33 Comparison of Sales between Those Interviewed and Those Not
Interviewed for Anti-Penultimate Set o f Accounts With I,argest
Two Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 
for Interview
44 2510.154 4143.607
Not
Interviewed
223 1788.190 2746.809 731 964
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .801 P= .371 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.47 265 .143
Unequal 1.12 5063 .268
Table B 34 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Those Interviewed and 
Those Not Interviewed for Last Set o f Accounts Laruest Two 
Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference 
between Means In 
Million Pounds
Interviewed 44 241.397 414.987
Not
Interviewed
225 161.732 382.634 79.665
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= .398 P= .529 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.25 267 .214
Unequal 118 58 18 243
I able B 35 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits bclween Those Interviewed and Those
Not Interviewed for Penultimate Set of Accounts Largest Two
Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 44 220.682 459 580
Not
Interviewed
225 138 153 318 703 82.529
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 2 264 P= .134 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.45 267 148
Unequal 1.14 51.38 260
Table B 36 Comparison of Pre-Tax Profits between Interviewed and Those Not 
Interviewed for Anti-penultimate Set of Accounts Largest Two 
Companies Removed
Test of Equality of Variance
Variable Number of 
Cases
Mean in 
Million 
Pounds
Standard 
Deviation in 
Million Pounds
Difference between 
Means In Million 
Pounds
Interviewed 45 186 962 427 207
Not
Interviewed
224 119.261 324 384 67.701
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances: F= 1 255 P= ,264 
T-test for Equality of Means
Variances t-value Degrees of 
Freedom
2-Tail
Significance
Equal 1.20 266 233
Unequal ! 00 53.16 324
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APPENDIX C LETTER REQUESTING INTERVIEWS WITH
COMPANIES
Note- Professor Gray's letter was sent out on his Warwick Business School headed 
paper, and Mark Albrighton's letter on Warwick Business School headed paper. This 
headed paper has since changed and is no longer available.
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A d d ress  o f  
com pany
11 th July 1994
Dear N am e o f  Person,
I am a carrying out a major project at Warwick Business School conducting research 
on the process of making successful acquisitions.
The main aim of this research is to examine the management processes leading up to 
an acquisition. This research intends to provide a better understanding of what is a 
very important process for major companies today.
We will provide feedback to all companies involved.
I am currently carrying out a series of interviews with senior acquisition managers in 
order to review current practice, these interviews generally take about an hour and 
focus on one acquisition in the recent past. To assist me with this research, I would be 
very grateful if I could discuss with you, or an appropriate member of your company, 
your management processes prior to an acquisition.
Complete confidentiality to individuals is guaranteed.
1 hope you will be able to assist me in this study and I look forward to hearing from 
you.
Yours sincerely
Mark Albrighton 
Doctoral Student
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A ddress o f  
com pany  
being  written to
Dear (Name o f  Person),
1 am pleased to inform you that a major research project is being carried out at 
Warwick Business School into the process of making successful acquisitions with a 
view to learning more about the critical factors involved
Mr Albrighton is the principal researcher responsible for the project (please see 
enclosed letter) and I would be most grateful if you could give your support to a very 
worthwhile endeavour.
Naturally, we will be pleased to let you have an advance copy of the main results of 
the research Please also note that your views will be treated in the strictest 
confidence
Your sincerely,
Professor Sidney J Gray
18 August, 1997
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APPENDIX D ADDITIONAL STATISTICAL TEST RESULTS
Tabic D. 1 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company has Information
Library and Number of People Asked for Information and Number of 
Sources of Information Used
Company has information library and Minimum Probability of
number of people asked for expected distribution occurring
information used divided at : frequency by chance
11 7.3 .27499
16 4.8 .30484
19 4.8 .30484
Sample Size 41 with 1 degree of freedom
Company has information library and Minimum Probability of
number of information sources used expected distribution occurring
divided at : frequency by chance
3 4.3 1
4 6.1 .96262
6 5.0 1.0
8 4.4 .73668
Sample size 44 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D.2 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company has Arranged Access 
to an Information Library and Number of People Asked for 
Information and Number of Sources of Information Used
Company has arranged access to an Minimum Probability of
information library and number of people expected distribution occurring
asked for information used divided at : frequency by chance
11 1 1
16 6 1
19 .6 1
Sample Size 39 with 1 degree of freedom
Company has arranged access to an Minimum Probability of
information library and number of expected distribution occurring
information sources used divided at : frequency by chance
3 .6 .47949
4 8 1
6 .7 53333
8 6 1
Sample size 40 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table D.3 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Data on Markets Company 
Operates in is Available to Manager; and Number of people Asked for 
Information and Number of Sources of Information Used
Market share data on markets 
company operates in is available to 
manager and number of people asked 
for information used divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
11 5 .45832
16 4 1
19 4 1
Sample Size 33 with 1 degree of freedom
Market share data on markets 
company operates in, is available to 
manager and number of information 
sources used divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 2.3 .17240
4 3.6 .43445
6 4.4 1
8 3.7 1
Sample size 35 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table D 4 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company Collects Data on 
Geottraphic Markets it Does not Operate in and Number of People 
Asked for Information and Number of Sources of Information Used
Company collects market share data on 
geographic markets it does not currently 
operate in and number of people asked 
for information used divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
11 8.5 .35156
16 6.5 .72860
19 6.5 72860
Sample Size 36 with 1 degree of freedom
Company collects market share data on 
geographic markets it does not currently 
operate in and and number of 
information sources used divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 4.9 .15103
4 6.8 41995
6 6.9 .58239
8 5.7 .63249
Sample size 37 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D.5 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Period Companies
Develop Cash Flow Models For and DCF Use and Success
Period used for cash 
flow analysis divided 
at 6 ^  years and :
Sample
Size
Degrees Of 
Freedom
Probability of 
Distribution 
Occurring by Chance
Minimum
expected
frequency
DCF used 27 1 .01306** 4
DCF one of a 
companies three key 
criteria
23 1 .01918** 3.9
General 5 
Measure
success First Specific 
Success Measure
Second Specific 
Success Measure
Period used for 
cashflow analysis
-.1565 K 0067k 1436k
Sample Size 21 14 22
Probability .331 .331 374
** Significant at 5 per cent level
K Kendall correlation coefficient A Mean 7 667, Median 5.
I able I) 6 Results of Chi-Squared lests between Company has Cprpoi ate
Information Library and Size
Company has Corporate information 
library and sales divided at
Probability of 
Distribution Occurring 
by Chance
Minimum expected 
frequency
1 Billion 00823 *** 5
I S Billion 00696 *** 5 8
2 Billion 00791 *** 7 7
2 5 Billion 00561 *** 7 7
3 Billion 03689 ** 6 3
** Significant at 5 per cent level *** Significant at per cent level
All Tests had a Sample Si/.e of 47 and 1 Degree Of freedom
Table D 7 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company has Corporate
Informat ion Library and Success
Company has corporate Minimum Probability of
information library and general expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at frequency by chance
2 5 2 3 1
2 7 3 2 69640
2 9 3 2 69640
3 3 6 1
3 1 4 2 1
3 2 4 9 53616
3 3 5 8 55607
3 4 5 8 55607
3 5 5 5 29486
3 6 4 5 07492 *-
3 7 3 8 02919 ** -
3 8 3 6 01834 *♦ -
3 9 2 9 03552 ** -
4 0 19 07279 * -
4 1 1 2 57049
Sample size 37 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D 7 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company has
Corporate Information Library and Success
Company has corporate 
information library and first 
specific success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 2.6 1
3 6 2.9 1
3.7 3.5 1
3.8 3.9 .68696
3.9 4.5 1
4.0 3.2 67747
4.1 3.2 .67747
4.2 3.2 67747
4.3 3.2 67747
4.4 2.6 1
Sample size 28 with 1 degree of freedom.
Company has corporate 
information library and second 
specific success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 3.1 .12709
3.1 4.6 .31631
3.2 4.6 .31631
3 3 5.7 25562
3.4 6.1 17040
3.5 6.5 10895
3 6 7.3 .15307
3.7 7.6 12983
3 8 6.1 55386
3 9 4 952 50974
4 0 3 8 .46489
Sample size 42 with 1 degree of freedom
- Negative relationship
** Significant at 5 per cent level |* Significant at 10 per cent level
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Table I) 8 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between Success Measures
General success 
measure
Second specific 
success measure
First Specific 
success measure
2760 A 3 129 C
Sample Size 23 29
Second specific 
success measure
.3025 B
Sample Size 36
Note - results are Kendall rank correlation coefficients
A Significant at 6 8 per cent level 
B Significant at I 0 per cent level 
C Significant at 1.9 per cent level
Table D 9 Results of Kendall Rank Correlation Tests between Success
Measures and Man Weeks Woik Standardised Tor IX T Use
Man Weeks 
worked
General success 
measure
- 2835
Sample Size 26
First Specific 
success measure
- 1689
Sample Size 25
Second specific 
success measure
- 2619
Sample Size 32
Note - Kendall rank correlation coefficients are given
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Table D K) Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash I-low Used
and first Specific Success Measure
Discounted cash How used and firs 
specific success divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 11 28352
3 6 12 56322
3.7 1.4 61106
3 8 1.6 1
3 9 19 1
4 0 16 1
4 1 16 1
4.2 1.5 61 106
4 3 1.5 61 106
4 4 5.2 1
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom.
Table D J J  Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash Flow one of a
Company's Three key Criteria and First Specific Success Measure
Discounted cash llow one of a Minimum Probability of
company's three key criteria first expected distribution occurring
specific success measure divided at frequency by chance
3.5 2.9 1
3 6 3.3 1
3.7 4.0 46615
3.8 4 4 44248
3 9 5 1 10521
4 0 4 4 26626
4.1 4.4 26626
4.2 4 69561
4 3 4 69561
4 4 3 3 68709
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table D. 12 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash flow
Used and Second Specific Success Measure
Discounted cash flow used and 
second specific success divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 1.6 1
3.1 2.4 1
3.2 2.4 1
3.3 3 693513
3.4 3.2 45592
3.5 3.4 44695
3.6 3.8 1
3.7 4.4 .72224
3.8 3.6 72123
3.9 3 1
4.0 2.4 1
Sample size 45 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D13 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Discounted Cash Flow One of a 
Company's Three key Criteria and Second Specific Success Measure
Discounted cash flow one of a 
company's three key criteria and 
second specific success measure 
divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 2.8 1
3.1 3.8 1
3.2 3.8 1
3.3 5.2 .38583
3.4 5.4 .33082
3.5 6.4 .13946
3.6 7.1 .46255
3.7 8 8 .49157
3 8 8 0 .53590
3.9 66 .11067
4.0 5.7 36415
Sample size 38 with 1 degree of freedom
444
Table D 14 Results of Chi - Squared Tests between Comp any
lJsed 1RR and Success
Company uses 1RR and general 
success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
ay chance
2.5 2 6 1
2.7 3 7 1
2 9 3.7 1
3 4.4 72808
3.1 5.2 91350
3.2 5 9 54760
3.3 7 50689
3.4 7 50689
3.5 6 3 86059
3.6 5.2 56238
3.7 4 4 29638
3.8 4 1 26568
3 9 3 3 24524
4.0 2.2 .16732
4.1 1.4 11476
Sample size 37 with 1 degree of freedom
Company uses 1RR and first 
specific success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 2.7 1
3 6 3 0 1
3.7 3 7 1
3 8 4 0 46113
3 9 4.7 1
4.0 4 0 69415
4 1 4 0 69415
4 2 3 7 70200
4.3 3.7 70200
4 4 3 0 67490
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table 1)14 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between
Company Used IRK and Success
Company uses IRR and second 
specific success measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 3 0 68996
3 1 4 5 48803
3 2 4 5 48803
3 3 5 7 28241
3 4 6 19411
3 5 64 12877
3 6 72 46846
3 7 8 3 84824
3 8 6 8 45136
3 9 4.7 28982
4 0 4 5 74279
Sample size 45 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D IS Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company Used Fixed Hurdle
Rate in Specific Case and Success
Company used fixed hurdle rate in 
specific case and general success 
measure divided at
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
ay chance
2 5 20 37521
2 7 2 7 1
2 9 2 7 1
3 2 2 1
3 1 4 0 70260
3 2 4 7 27830
3 3 5 3 32453
3 4 5 3 32453
3 5 5 0 45832
3 6 4 0 14898
3 7 3 3 0494 1 * * -
3 8 3 0 12104
3 9 2 3 02744 ** -
4 0 1 3 00806*♦♦ -
4 1 625 09073 * -
Sample size 33 with 1 degree of freedom
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Tab!eD  15 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company Used
Fixed 11urdle Rate in Speeilie Case and Success
Company used fixed hurdle rate in 
specific case and first specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 5 2.1 1
3 6 2.3 65266
3.7 2.9 1
3 8 3.1 1
3 9 3.4 1
4.0 2 3 36321
4 1 2.3 36321
4.2 2.1 63336
4.3 2.1 63336
4 4 1.6 1
Sample size 27 with 1 degree of freedom
Company used fixed hurdle rate in 
specific case and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
2.3
3 1 3.6
3 2 3.6
3.3 4.2
3 4 4 6
3.5 4.9 72008
3 6 5.2 41422
3.7 6.2 43286
3.8 5.2 22067
3 9 4.2 28356
4.0 3.3 70038
Sample size 40 with 1 degree of freedom
- Negative i elationship *** Significant at 1 per cent level
* * Significant at 5 per cent level * Significant at 10 per cent level
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Table D 16 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company
Used NPV and Not IRR and Success
Company used NPV and not IRR 
and success and general success 
measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
3y chance
2.5 1 1 1
2.7 1.6 .64400
2.9 1.6 64400
3 1.9 1
3.1 2.2 1
3.2 2.6 1
3.3 3 1
3.4 3 1
3.5 2.7 .67420
3.6 2.2 1
3.7 19 1
3.8 1.7 1
3.9 1.4 1
4.0 9 1
4.1 .5 1
Sample size 38 with 1 degree of freedom.
Company used NPV and not IRR 
and success and first specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3.5 1.6 1
3.6 18 63714
3.7 2.2 1
3 8 2.4 65987
3 9 2.8 1
4.0 2.4 .35753
4.1 2.4 .35753
4.2 2.2 .37171
4 3 2.2 37171
4.4 1.8 62714
Sample size 30 with 1 degree of freedom.
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Used NPV and Not IRR and Success
Table D 16 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company
Company used NPV and not IRR 
and success and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 1.4 1
3.1 2.3 41864
3.2 2.1 41864
3.3 2.7 69919
3.4 2.8 69148
3.5 3.0 68996
3.6 3.4 42547
3.7 3.9 .69950
3.8 3.2 23514
3.9 2.7 40995
4.0 2.1 .66087
Sample size 40 with 1 degree of freedom
Table D. 17 Results of Chi-Squared Tests between Company Used IRR
and Not NPV and Success
IRR used and not NPV and general 
success measure divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution 
occurring by chance
2.5 18 1
2.7 2.6 1
2.9 2.6 1
3.0 3.2 1
3.1 3.7 .71500
3.2 4.2 46902
3.3 5.0 46125
3 4 5.0 .46125
3 5 4.5 .29318
3.6 3.7 1
3.7 3.2 1
3 8 2.9 1
3 9 2.4 .67314
The sample size was 38 with 1 degree of freedom
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Results of Chi-Squared Tests between
Company Used IRR and Not NRV and Success
Table I) I 7 Continued
IRR used and Not NRV and first 
success measure divided at :
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution 
occurring by chance
3 5 2.7 68213
3 6 3 1
3.7 3 7 70200
3.8 4 0 32155
3 9 4.7 1
4 0 4 46113
4 1 4 46113
4.2 3 7 42528
4 3 3 7 42528
The sample size was 45 with 1 degree of freedom
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Results of Chi-Squared lests between 
PCF Used and Measures of Company Size
fable 0,18
DCF used and Sample
Size
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
Distribution Occurring 
by Chance
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 1 billion 
pounds
50 3.5 29569
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 15 
billion pounds
50 3 6 13028
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 2 billion 
pounds
50 4.9 07513 * +
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 2.5 
billion pounds
50 4 0 26628
Sales for last set of 
accounts split at 3 billion 
pounds
50 3 7 28661
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
100 million pounds
50 3 8 46415
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
200 million pounds
50 T it 06129 * +
Pre-tax profits for last 
set of accounts split at 
300 million pounds
50 2 2 09174 * +
All tests bad I degree o f freedom
I Direction of relationship postitive 
***Significant at I percent level 
** Significant at 5 per cent level 
* Significant at 10 per cent level
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Table I) 19 Results of Chi-Squared Tests bet ween DCF as One
of a ( Company's Three Key Criteria and Success 
lot Acquisitions Resulting from an Kxternal Idea
DCF as one of a company's three Minimum Probability of
key criteria and success and genera expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at frequency by chance
2 5 9 1
2 7 1 5 1
2 9 1.5 1
3 1 8 55944
3 1 18 26573
3.2 18 26573
3.3 16 21678
3.4 16 21678
3.5 12 53007
3.6 12 53007
3.7 9 20280
3 8 9 20280
3 9 9 20280
4 0 6 i
4 1 6 1
Sample size 13 with 1 degree of freedom.
DCF as one of a company's three Minimum Probability of
key criteria and first specific expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at frequency by chance
3 5 3 27273
3 6 4 36364
3.7 5 45455
3 8 5
3 9 3
4.0 2
4 1 2
4 2 2
4 3 2
4 4 2
¡Sample size I I with I degree of freedom
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Table D. 19 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between [XT' as One
of a Company's Three Key Criteria and Success 
for Acquisitions Resulting from an External Idea
DCF as one o f a company's three 
key criteria and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 8 1
3.1 1.3 54670
3.2 1.3 54670
3 3 1.8
3.4 2
3.5 1.8
3 6 18
3.7 1.5
3 8 13
3 9 8
4.0 5
Sample size 16 with 1 decree of freedom
- Direction o f relationship negative
""""■Significant at 1 per cent level
** Significant at 5 per cent level
* Significant at 10 per cent level
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l ablc D 20 Results of Chi-Squared l ests betweenIX'F as One pi a
Company's Three K ev C r i ten a and Success for Acquisitions 
Resulting from an Internal Idea
PCF as one of a company's three Minimum Probability of
key criteria and success and genera expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at: frequency by chance
2.5 4 44444
2 7 9 1
2 9 9 1
3 9 1
3 1 13 55882
3 2 2 2 11765
3 3 2 7 04299 ** -
3.4 2.7 04299 ** -
3.5 3 1 14480
3 6 4 15343
3.7 4 15343
3 8 3 6 18799
3 9 2 7 63801
4.0 18 09150* -
4.1 9 47059
Sample size 18 with 1 degree of freedom
DCF as one of a company's three Minimum Probability of
key criteria and first specific expected distribution occurring
success measure divided at frequency by chance
3 5 2.4 62848
3 6 2 4 62848
3.7 2 8 34985
3 8 2 8 34985
3 9 2 8 34985
4 0 4 3 65628
4 1 4 3 65628
4 2 4 3 1
4 3 4 3 1
4 4 3 3 1
Sample size 19 with 1 degree of freedom
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One of a Company's Three Key Criteria and Success 
for Acquisitions Resu11inu from an Internal Idea
Table D 20 Continued Results of Chi-Squared Tests between DCF as
DCF as one of a company's three 
key criteria and second specific 
success measure divided at:
Minimum
expected
frequency
Probability of 
distribution occurring 
by chance
3 11 1
3 1 1.1 1
3 2 1 1 1
3 3 1.5 61771
3 4 1.5 61771
3.5 1.5 61771
3 6 2.3 1
3.7 2.7 1
3.8 3 8 1
3 9 3.8 .65944
4 0 3.4 1
Sample size 21 with 1 degree of freedom
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Table D 2 1 Variables Not Significantly Related to Use of Discounted 
Cash Flow Analysis in a Company's 3 key Criteria
Access to information from target_________________________________________________________
Number of options considered____________________________________________________________
Used merchant bank as a consultant_______________________________________________________
Number of groups involved in project_____________________________________________________
Years spcnl in industry by person interviewed______________________________________________
Years spcnl at company by person interviewed______________________________________________
Number of acquisitions completed by person interviewed_____________________________________
Number of acquisitions reviews carried by person interviewed________________________________
Elapsed time taken for acquisition________________________________________________________
Is market share data automatically sent to you or do you have to request i t_____________________
Monitoring of product markets which company operates in outside its present geographical areas
Monitoring of product markets which company does not presently operalc______________________
Number of Pages in report containing quantitative data______________________________________
Number of pages ill report________________________________________________________________
Number of sources of information used____________________________________________________
Number of people asked for information.___________________________________________________
Number of people currently working on acquisitions_________________________________________
Number of consultants used.______________________________________________________________
Number of criteria used__________________________________________________________________
Is the way the criteria applied and measured always standardised_____________________________
Was person responsible from finance department or not._____________________________________
Docs the company employ anyone for whom acquisitions work is an important part of their job but 
not their primary role
Docs the company employ anyone whose primary role to work on acquisitions__________________
Percentage of lime spcnl on other work.____________________________________________________
The level of use of standardised procedures.
Percentage of time spent on financial work.
Percentage of tunc spent on information collection 
When criteria used to review an acquisition arc established.
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APPENDIX K MAIN VARIABLES USED
N ote in som e cases add ition a l divisions o f  scalar variables were u sed  f o r  specific  
ch i-squ ared  tests i f  the values norm ally used d id  not produce va lid  tests  or were 
m arginal on  significance levels.
ACQRANGE
Difference between highest and lowest number of acquisitions conducted in any year 
of last five years
Mean 4.532 Median 4.000 Standard deviation 4 713 
Minimum 1.000 Maximum 32.000
Valid cases 47 Missing cases 5
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 4 5
ATCO
Years interviewee had spent at company.
Mean 7.942 Median 5.000 Standard deviation 7.059
Minimum .000 Maximum 27.000
Valid cases 43 Missing cases 9
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 4,6,8, and 10.
COMPLT
Number of completed acquisitions conducted by interviewee
Mean 16 263 Median 6.500 Standard deviation 29.111 
Minimum 000 Maximum 150.000
Valid cases 38 Missing cases 14
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 6,8,9, and 10
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I)( HN3
Was the results of discounted cash flow techniques amongst a companies three key 
criteria for the specific acquisition conducted
DCFUSED
Was discounted cash flow analysis used 
EPS
Was learnings per share used as a decision criteria
FIXED HURDLE RATES
Were fixed hurdle rates used in specific acquisition examined in detail taken from 
description of process This was further divided into no fixed hurdle rates, fixed hurdle 
rates but some flexibility, fixed hurdle rates applied reasonably rigorously ( this 
includes companies that used rule based approaches to determine the rate)
GENERAL USE OF FIXED HURDLE RATES
Did the company generally have a fixed hurdle rate answer to closed question 
Geographic limits Did the company place geographic limits on the areas it was 
looking foi acquisitions
GEOGRAPHIC LIMITS
Did the company place geographic limits on the areas it was looking for acquisitions 
GROUPS
Number of groups of people involved in specific case
Mean 5 439 Median 5 000 Standard deviation 3 105 
Minimum 1000 Maximum 15 000
Valid cases 40 Missing cases 3
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data 4 and K
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GSUCCES
Replication of Datta and Grants (1991) method where respondents were asked to 
answer with respect to the companies acquisitions in general
Mean 3.325 Median 3.368 Standard deviation .763 
Minimum 1.880 Maximum 5 000
Valid cases 38 Missing cases 14
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data :2.7,2.9,3, 3.1,3.2,3.3, 3.4 ,3.5 ,3 6, 
3.7,3.8,3.9, 4 and 4.1
IDEA
Was the source of the idea internal or external This was further divided into internal, 
seller, and third parties including advisers and merchant banks This further division 
often resulted in chi-squared tests being invalid as the minimum expected frequency 
fell below five.
IND
How many years had the interviewee spent in the industry the company he was 
working for was involved, including years spent at their present company
Mean 10.581 Median 8.000 Standard deviation 8.383 
Minimum .000 Maximum 35.000
Valid cases 43 Missing cases 9
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 6, 8 and 10.
IRRNPVA
Did the company use both IRR and NPV 
IRRONLYA
Did the company use IRR and not NPV 
IRRX
Did the company use IRR
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LNMNTHS
Elapsed time taken for acquisitions.
Mean 9 095 Median 6.000 Standard deviation 8.364
Minimum 1 250 Maximum 48.000
Valid cases 50 Missing cases 2
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 3, 4, 6, and 10 
Additional values were used as shown in tables
MAXACQS
Highest number of acquisitions conducted in any one year in the last five sets of 
accounts
Mean 5 447 Median 4.000 Standard deviation 5 405
Minimum 1.000 Maximum 36.000
Valid cases 47 Missing cases 5
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 4.5 and 6.
MEDIAN AC
Median of annual number of acquisitions for last five year.
Mean 2.585 Median 2.000 Standard deviation 2.968
Minimum .000 Maximum 17.000
Valid cases 47 Missing cases 5
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 3.3
MIACQS
Lowest number of acquisitions conducted any of last five years
Mean 915 Median 1.000 Standard deviation 1282
Minimum 000 Maximum 6.000
Valid cases 47 Missing cases 5
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 1.8
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NOCRIT
Number of the five financial criteria considered by the literature used
Mean 2.706 Median 3.000 Standard deviation 1.188 
Minimum 000 Maximum 5.000
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data 2 5
NOOFPE
Number of people asked for information.
Mean 17.105 Median 12.000 Standard deviation 17 741
Minimum .000 Maximum 100.000
Valid cases 43 Missing cases 9
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data 11,16 and 19 
NOSOURCE
Number of sources of information used in specific case
Mean 8 196 Median 5.000 Standard deviation 14 479
Minimum 2 000 Maximum 100.000
Valid cases 46 Missing cases 6
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 3, 4,6 and 8
OPTIONS
Number of options considered
Mean 1 760 Median 1.000 Standard deviation 1.318
Minimum 1.000 Maximum 6.000
Valid cases 50 Missing cases 2
Division used to convert variable to interval data: 1.5
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PRETAXO
Pre-tax profits for last set of accounts available on One Source on January 0 1996
Mean 462700.333 Median 162300 000 Standard deviation 1053858 69 
Minimum 129700.00 Maximum 6627000 00
Valid cases 5 1 Missing cases I
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data 100, 200, 300 and 400 million 
PRETAXI
Pre-tax profits for penultimate set of accounts available on One Source on January 6 
1996
Mean 408399.725 Median 129800.000 Standard deviation 942185 436
Minimum 350300.00 Maximum 5787000 00
Valid cases 51 Missing cases I
Not converted to an interval variable as it was highly correlated with PretaxO 
PRETAX2
Pre-tax profits for antepenultimate set of accounts available on One Source on 
January 6 1996
Mean 324977 745 Median 112000 000 Standard deviation 845849 824
Minimum 448400 00 Maximum 53 I 3000 00
Valid cases 51 Missing cases I
Not converted to an interval variable as it was highly correlated with PretaxO
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PRFITABO
Pre-tax profits for the last set of accounts available on one source on January 6, 
divided by sales
Mean .089 Median .084 Standard deviation .052
Minimum .052 Maximum .253
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
Divisions used to convert variable to interval data: 6,8,10 and 12 per cent 
PRFITAB1
Pre-tax profits for the penultimate set of accounts available on One Source on January 
6, divided by sales.
Mean .078 Median .083 Standard deviation .056
Minimum 119 Maximum .219
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
PRFITAB2
Pre-tax profits for anti-penultimate set of accounts available on One Source on 
January 6, divided by sales.
Mean .067 Median .077 Standard deviation .091
Minimum .422 Maximum .221
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
Q17
Number of staff currently working on acquisitions
Mean 4.608 Median 3.000 Standard deviation 6.087
Minimum .000 Maximum 35.000
Valid cases 40 Missing cases 12
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QI9NUM
Number ol different type of consultants a company has used
Mean 3 244 Median 3.000 Standard deviation 
Minimum 000 Maximum 6.000
Valid cases 45 Missing cases 7
Divisions used to convert data to categorical data, 2 5 and 4
Q28A
Percentage of time spent on financial work
Mean 31.528 Median 30 000 Standard deviation
Minimum 5.000 Maximum 70 000
Valid cases 36 Missing cases 16
Q28I3
Percentage of time spent on other factors
Mean 38 839 Median 40 000 Standard deviation
Minimum 5 000 Maximum 82 500
Valid cases 31 Missing cases 21
Q28C
Percentage of time spent on information collection
Mean 35.313 Median 32.000 Standard deviation
Minimum 1.000 Maximum 70 000
Valid cases 32 Missing cases 20
1 694
17.560
20.174
19 647
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QUANTPAGE
Number of pages of quantitative material in final report
Mean 26610 
Minimum 000
Median 5 000 Standard deviation 112 922 
Maximum 800 000
Valid cases 50 Missing cases 2
REVIEWED
Number of acquisition reviews the manger responsible for the acquisition had 
conducted
Mean 86 806 
Minimum 1000
Median 13 500 Standard deviation 230 250 
Maximum 1000 000
Valid cases 36 Missing cases 16
RPTLN
Length of final report
Mean 43 608 
Minimum 3 000
Median 18 000 Standard deviation 139 221 
Maximum 1000 000
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
SALESYO
Sales for last set of accounts available on One-source on 6 January 1996
Mean 5283445 12 Median 2199400 00 Standard deviation 106994717
Minimum 31069 000 Maximum 61929000 0
Valid cases 5 1 Missing cases I
Divisions used to convert into SALESYO into dichotomous variable 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5,
3,3 5 billion
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SACHSY I
Sales for penultimate set ol aecounts available on One-source on 6 January l<J%
Mean 5064499 73 Median 2092500 00 Standard deviation 10743512 5
Minimum 38753 000 Maximum 63350000 0
Valid cases 51 Missing cases I
SALESY2
Sales for anti-penultimate set of accounts available on One-source on 6 January 1996
Mean 4658886 53 Median 1993500 00 Standard deviation 9640594 44 
Minimum 38593 000 Maximum 55020000 0
Valid cases 51 Missing cases 1
SPSUC1
f irst specific success measure Replication ofDatta and Grant's ( 1990) method See 
question 54 in appendix A
Mean 3 988 Median 3 974 Standard deviation 673 
Minimum 2 500 Maximum 5 000
Converted to dichotomous variable using divisions at 3.6, 3 7, 3 8, 3 9, 4 0 and 4 I
Valid cases 30 Missing cases 22
SPSUC2
Second specific success measure Replication ofDatta and Grant s( 1990) method See 
question 64 in appendix A
Mean 3 608 Median 3 700 Standard deviation 797 
Minimum I 545 Maximum 5 000
Valid cases 46 Missing cases 6
Converted to dichotomous variable using divisions at 3 I, 3 2, 13, I 4 ,3.5, 3 6, 3 7, 
3 8, 3 9, 4 0 and 4 I
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TOTACQ
Total number of acquisitions conducted by company in last 5 years Data collected in 
February 1995
Mean
Minimum
11
78
Median
Maximum
11
1
Standard deviation 12.94
Valid cases 45 Missing cases 6
Converted to dichotomous variable using a divisions at 9,10 and 12 
TOTACQSA
Total number of acquisitions conducted by company in last 5 years divided by sales for 
last set of accounts. Data collected in February 1995.
Mean .015 Median .006 Standard deviation .018
Minimum ,000 Maximum .068
Valid cases 44 Missing cases 8
Converted to dichotomous variable using a division at Oil
TOTACQPE
Total number of acquisitions conducted over last five years divided by number of 
people currently working on acquisitions.
Mean 6.740 Median 2.900 Standard deviation 7 867
Minimum 167 Maximum 31.200
Valid cases 34 Missing cases 18
WRK WEEKS
Man weeks work spent on acquisition prior to acquisition being concluded
Mean 130 402 Median 52.000 Standard deviation
Minimum 3.000 Maximum 1300.000
Valid cases 46 Missing cases 6
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